Skip to content

Tafsir al-Tasnim – Verse 4:59 ​

The Verse ​

بِسْمِ ٱللَّهِ ٱلرَّحْمَـٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ أَطِيعُوا۟ ٱللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا۟ ٱلرَّسُولَ وَأُو۟لِى ٱلْأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ ۖ فَإِن تَنَـٰزَعْتُمْ فِى شَىْءٍ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى ٱللَّهِ وَٱلرَّسُولِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِٱللَّهِ وَٱلْيَوْمِ ٱلْـَٔاخِرِ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَحْسَنُ تَأْوِيلًا

O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you have faith in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more favorable in outcome. (4:59)

Summary of the Exegeses ​

The previous verses discussed legislations, systems, governments, and being mindful of God’s bounds. This verse provides the foundation for those verses, as it calls people to obey God, the Messenger, and those vested with authority.

This verse contains fundamental principles, reveals sources of jurisprudence, and represents revealed proof (dalīl naqlī) of the authority of God’s words, the Messenger, and the figures vested with authority (ūlū al-amr). It thus combines commands and prohibitions in God’s commands. It does not reveal a jurisprudence law (ḥukm fiqhī)—the command in the verse Obey Allah and obey… is not guidance or emphasis on previous commands revealed by God, therefore it cannot be said: “Obey” does reveal any new laws. If the previously given command is obligatory (wajib) or recommended (mustahab) they “Obey” directs believers to comply with that command.

Obeying the commands of God, His Messenger, and the infallible (maʿṣūm) authoritative figures is obligatory upon everyone. But since the believers (muʾminūn) are concerned with obedience and are more inclined toward obeying them more than others, they are directly addressed in the verse. Believers must comply with their belief and obey God, the Messenger, and the figures vested with authority.

The repetition of the verb “obey” indicates that the Messenger’s commands are of two types and so is obedience to them: 1) legislative commands that are divine laws the Messenger conveys to people, and obeying these commands is obeying God and fulfills the command in the verse “Obey God…” 2) Governmental commands and commands he gives from his position as the guardian that are particular to the Messenger. Obeying these commands is obligatory as stated in the verse “obey the messenger”. In either type, God is the one and only being ultimately obeyed, while obeying the Messenger and infallible Imam is mandated by Him.

The referents of ‘those vested with authority’ are the infallible Imams since this phrase is linked to “the Messenger” using the conjunction “and”. Given that the command to obey the Messenger is unconditional and unrestricted, then obeying “those vested with authority” is also, especially in the absence of any restrictions in the verse.

The reason obedience to the Prophet is absolute is his infallibility, because obeying him is equivalent to obeying God, and disobeying him is equivalent to disobeying God. Therefore, the authoritative figures must be infallible and protected from erring, inadvertence, and sin. No doubt that this level of protection can only befit an infallible person. Meaning that the person we must obey unconditionally, who comes third to obeying God and the Messenger, must be infallible too. The qualities of this infallible person are, of course, not those of a royal, scholar, companion, or decision-making elite of the society.

The appointment of an authoritative figure can only happen by God’s will, as with the appointment of the Messenger, since the those vested with infallibility are only known to Him. In other words, the condition unconditional obedience is both scholarly and practical infallibility, and knowing whether a person possess this quality or not can only be done through a clear divine declaration revealed by the Messenger. God knows to whom He vested this quality and has protected the Prophet’s household from all wrongdoings (33:73). Thus, obeying the infallible Imams, who are linked in this verse to the obedience of the Messenger without repeating the verb “obey”, is obligatory. Their lives, including their sayings, actions, and tacit approval, have authority over us. They are the guardians of the Prophet’s laws, interpreting them and living by God’s bounds.

As for the infallible Imams, they do not disagree among themselves because they are all protected from wrongdoings, ignorance, and impurities, and they validate each other as with the Prophets. Moreover, people cannot disagree with them after having believed in their infallibility and recognized their status, because fallible individuals cannot argue with the infallible. However, disputes might arise among people themselves over the appointment of the infallible Imam, but in these cases the Qur’an and sunnah are the references for resolving these disputes. The reason those vested with authority were not mentioned among the references in resolving disputes, and if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, is that the first dispute following the Prophet’s passing was over the appointment of an authoritative figure and determining who qualifies as one. Naturally, this called for a reference that is acceptable by all and cannot be disputed over, namely God and the Messenger.

Thus, after proving through Qur’an (4:81) and Prophet narrations that the infallible Imams are those denoted in the verse “those vested with authority,” they become the reference in resolving disputes related to laws of jurisprudence, people’s rights, and other aspects of religion and life. Whereas for theological questions concerning the Imamate, the appointment of an Imam, and the number of Imams, the reference is to the Qur’an and the Messenger.

In case of disputes regarding obeying God, the Messenger, and the authoritative figures (the infallible Imams), the reference must also be the Qur’an and sunnah. By referring to them, believers ensure a better outcome.

The context of the verse makes it clear that the determiner “That” points back to both preceding phrases, and it refers to the core meaning of the verse.

Regarding the two words “Khair” and “Aḥsan” (Better and More Favorable, respectively), they do not indicate Tafdīl (they are not comparatives), which would change the meaning of the verse to “you have a choice between obedience and disobedience, but choosing to obey is better for you”. Instead, they indicate Taʿyīn (an obligation), as both obedience and the act of referring disputes to God and the Messenger mentioned in the verse is Wājib Taʿyīnī—obligations that have no substitute and must be followed by people. This Taʿyīn is affirmed in other verses (for example, 33:66-67 and 24:51-52) and is validated by the intellect, since otherwise addressing the believer in the verse would be incorrect.

Important remark:

  1. The conditional clause in the last segment of the verse …And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger which resembles a specific command that succeeds a general one, serves to emphasize the importance of this matter. But even if this segment were not included, we could still infer the command from the meaning implied in the first segment of the verse, that we must refer to God and the Messenger to resolve disputes, which is the generic command, and that we owe unconditional and unrestricted obedience to God, the Messenger, and the authoritative figures regardless of whether it is during disputes or not.

  2. This verse establishes a three-way obedience: to God, to the Messenger, and to the authoritative figures. Then obedience turns dual when resolving disputes, as we must refer to God and the Messenger, ultimately making obedience one-dimensional, and finally leading to monotheism (tawheed), the core of belief (iman): if you have faith in Allah and the Last Day.(1) Thus, God is the sole reference, and the rest only convey his rulings and cannot be compare to him.

Exegesis ​

Concordance between Verses ​

This verse is the fundamental principle on which the previous verses that dealt with legislations, systems, government, and being mindful of bounds. The previous verse addressed all believers, particularly those in charge in Islamic communities, advising them to return trusts to their rightful owners and to judge fairly. Meanwhile, this verse commands people to obey the commands of God, His Messenger, and authoritative figures. Thus, its purpose is to guarantee the obedience of God’s laws, and commands people in case of a dispute or quarrel, to refer to God’s rulings or those of His Messenger.

Segments of the Verse ​

The verse is divided into three segments:

  1. Necessity of obeying God, His Messenger, and figures vested with authority.

  2. Identifying the reference for resolving quarrels and disagreements, that is, God and His Messenger.

  3. Believing in the Origin and the Last Day.

The first segment contains three levels: obeying God, His Messenger, and people vested with authority. The second segment comprises two levels, which are the commands to people to refer to God and His Messenger to resolve disputes. Finally, the last segment refers to absolute monotheism and belief in the origin and the last day, for believing in the last day is believing in the origin.

Obeying God and His Messenger ​

Undoubtedly, obeying God and His Messenger is an obvious divine obligation for believers. The verse: O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger calls for believers to wholly adhere to their belief with all that it entails. In the verse: O you who have faith! God is commanding people to grow their faith in their hearts, words, and actions, along with maintaining the level of faith that marks them as believers.

It is an obligation for all to obey God, His Messenger, and the infallible authoritative figures, but God addresses the believers directly as they are held to higher expectations of obedience than others. They must comply with what their belief entails, as the remainder of the verse shows.

Repetition of Obey ​

The Messenger’s commands are of two types, and obedience to Him means adherence to both. First: they are God’s message and jurisprudence laws he teaches to people like in the verses: Maintain the prayer and give the zākāt (24:56) and O you who have faith! Prescribed for you is fasting (1:183). Such commands are in fact divine commands and laws, and adhering to them means obeying God. Second: the commands the Messenger gives as the ruler and guardian of believers, such as dismissing or appointing workers, declaring war and peace, and decisions related to the affairs and management of Islamic government.

Obeying the second type of commands is obligatory, yet, differs from the first type. That is why the command “Obey”, is repeated; obedience in “Obey Allah” refers to the first type of obeying the messenger’s commands, while “Obey the Messenger” refers to the second.

Some exegetes interpret the repetition of “Obey” as a tool for emphasis.(2) ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, however, says: “This meaning (and God knows best) is what necessitated repetition of the command of obedience: "obey God and obey the Messenger". This repetition, however, is not for emphasis, as the exegetes have opined. Had the intention been of emphasis, it would have been more appropriate not to repeat; it would have been more to the point to say, obey God and the Messenger, as it would have implied that obedience of the Messenger is one with the obedience of God; after all, not every repetition shows emphasis.”(3)

In Arabic, if the conjuncts linked with the coordinating conjunction “and” (wāw, و) are of equal status, the repetition would definitely show emphasis, for example, saying “Honor Zaid and honor Amr.” But if their statuses differed, then omitting the verb would create emphasis, for example: “Honor the Prophets and Zaid,” here, the emphasis is on honoring Zaid.

Ultimately, the intended meaning of “Obey Allah” is to obey the legislation that the Messenger conveyed to the people, for he does not himself legislate what is prohibited and what is permissible. While the command “Obey the Messenger” refers to obeying the Messenger’s commands, whether they are governmental (ḥukūmiyya) or related to guardianship (wilāya). Since obeying those vested with authority does not differ from obeying the Messenger, the command to obey was mentioned only once for both, without repetition.

From God’s will and His eternal knowledge, religion was born, so it is illogical for anyone to obey but the commands of God. Since divine revelation is the inherent source of knowledge about religion, followed by the demonstrative reason (ʿAql burhānī) and the reliable revealed evidence (naql mu’tabar), the commands of the Prophet and guidance of the infallible Imams reveal divine will and that God is the one truly being obeyed, as by his commands the Messenger and infallible Imams are followed.

Disagreements over the meaning of “Those Vested with Authority” ​

There are numerous explanations regarding the true meaning of “those vested with authority.” Sheikh al-Ṭūsī and Amīn al-Islām al-Ṭabrisī mention three: 1) royal rulers (Umarā), 2) scholars, and 3) the Imams who are descendants from Prophet Mohammad.(4) By refuting the first two interpretations, the third is consequently affirmed.(5) Other exegetes suggest different interpretations, such as the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khlfāʾ rāshidūn), military leaders, and the decision-making elite in the society (ahl al-halli wa al-‘aqd).(6)

In support of this, Sheikh Al-Ṭūsī says: “they [those vested with authority] are descendants of Prophet Mohammad, the Imams, thus God required that they be obeyed unconditionally, as He required obedience to Him and His Messenger. Demanding unconditional obedience to anyone is not proper unless they are infallible and trusted not to err inadvertently or make mistakes.

That is not a quality of royal rulers and scholars, but it is a necessary requirement for the Imams, whose infallibility (al-ʿiṣmah) and purity (ṭahāra) have been proven through various sources. Regarding the claims that “those vested with authority” refers to scholars, it is far from the truth, because saying “and those vested with authority” means obedience to that who is truly authoritative, which scholars are not. A counterargument might say: “we obey them when they are correct, and we do not obey them if they deviate”. However, we here argue that such argument imposes baseless conditions on the obligation of unconditional obedience. Rather than being selective with obedience, it would be better to identify who should be obeyed unconditionally. Not to forget that selective obedience to God and His Messenger is unacceptable.”(7)

The Reference for Resolving the Disagreement ​

The disagreement on the true meaning of “those vested with authority” takes two routes: 1) disagreement between Shi’a Muslims and Sunni Muslims, and 2) disagreement among Sunni Muslims themselves. But the validity of either routes depends on its alignment with the Qur’an and the sunnah, given they are the reference for resolving the disputes: And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.

The Prophet’s Sunnah ​

The Qur’an, as will be proven below, demonstrates that “those vested with authority” refers to the infallible Imams. In the Discussion of Narrations section, we will demonstrate how the Messenger’s narrations affirm this claim.

The Qur’an ​

We can demonstrate the intended meaning of “those vested with authority” in the Qur’an through 3 premises:

The first premise: There are two types of commands to obey in the Qur’an:

  1. Unconditional and unrestricted commands, like the obedience to God, as mentioned in the verses: Obey Allah and obey the Messenger; So be wary of Allah and obey me (27:126); O mankind! Worship your Lord (1:21), and obedience to the Messenger as mentioned in the verses: A faithful man or woman may not, when Allah and His Messenger have decided on a matter, have any option in their matter, and whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly strayed into manifest error (33:36).

There is no doubt that the reason for obeying the Messenger unconditionally is his infallibility, for Nor does he speak out of [his own] desire * it is just a revelation that is revealed [to him] (53:3-4). Everything he says and does is a manifestation of revelation itself and is backed by God, as in: Take whatever the Messenger gives you, and relinquish whatever he forbids you (59:7). This is why God binds obedience to the Messenger, with obedience to Him, Whoever obeys the Messenger certainly obeys Allah (4:80), and likewise makes disobeying the Messenger like disobeying Him, But whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger, and transgresses the bounds set by Allah, He shall make him enter a Fire, to remain in it [forever], and there will be a humiliating punishment for him (4:14). Alternatively, if we were to confirm a person is infallible and carries a revealed message, we must obey that person as revelation commands and as the intellect concludes.

  1. Commands of conditional obedience, such as commanding children to obey their parents and grandparents and to be humble towards them as the verse states: Lower the wing of humility to them out of mercy (17:24). This obedience remains obligatory unless the parents’ commands contradict the commands of God: We have enjoined man to be good to his parents, but if they urge you to ascribe to Me as partner that of which you have no knowledge, then do not obey them (29:8).

This condition for obedience is not limited to parents since every type of obedience has a condition. Imam ʿAlī affirms this in his saying: ‘You cannot obey a man if it means disobeying God’.(8) This precept applies to all fundamental principles and laws. Therefore, when handling personal, social, or even national obligations, ensuring that one does not to disobey God is the basis.

In short, the Qur’an contains both conditional and unconditional commands of obedience.

The second premise: The phrases “those vested with authority” and “the Messenger” are conjoined, which indicated that obeying authoritative figures must be unconditional and unrestricted as well, as there is not any textual indicator in the verse that suggest otherwise.

God does not command people to commit indecent and corrupt acts, Indeed Allah does not enjoin indecencies (7:27) instead He commands us to be just, kind, and generous, as the Qur’an states: Indeed, Allah enjoins justice and kindness and generosity towards relatives, and He forbids indecency, wrong, and aggression (16:90). Should those vested with authority commit indecencies, aggression, and acts of injustice, intentionally or unintentionally, God does not command obedience to them. The true people vested with authority whom God commands us to obey do not disobey Him and are protected against wrongdoings and inadvertence, this way they do not violate people’s rights, and their decrees are in accordance with God’s commands. Such infallibility can only befit the infallible figures.

The third premise: The only way of knowing who is infallible is the Qur’an and the narrations attributed to the Messenger. The Qur’an attests to the purity of the Messenger’s Household and their infallibility in the verse known as Verse of Purification (ayat al-taṭhīr): Indeed, Allah desires to repel all impurity from you, O People of the Household, and purify you with a thorough purification (33:33). Using this logic, the Twelver Shia doctrine proves that “those vested with authority” refers only to the infallible Imams.

The Objections of al-Fakhr al-Rāzī and Responses to Them ​

We have proved that “those vested with authority” are the infallible Imams, but al-Fakhr al-Rāzī raised three arguments against the Shi’i theory, claiming that it is anything but true.(9) Below we present the three arguments along with our response to each of them:

The first argument: interpreting the verse to include the infallible Shiite Imams, as do the Rāfiḍah (the Twelver Shi’i Muslimas who rejected the three caliphates as successors of the Prophet), is false for many reasons, one of which is that obedience is bound by knowing them [those vested with authority] and the ability to communicate with them. Thus, if we were obliged to obey them before knowing them, we’d be tasked with something beyond our capabilities. On the other hand, if we were commanded to obey them after knowing them and their faith, this obedience would be conditional, whereas the verse at face value indicates unconditional obedience. Moreover, the verse itself refutes this claim, as God commanded obeying both the Messenger and those vested with authority without repeating the verb “obey”: obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. In the absence of repetitions, the command cannot be both unconditional and conditional at once. Since the command to obey the Messenger is unconditional, it must necessarily be unconditional for those vested with authority as well.”

Our response: When a command is given concerning a subject, obedience is always conditional upon the existence of that subject, and this condition does not turn unconditional obligations into conditional ones. For example, if the guardian commands to honor a scholar, there will be two underlying conditions: 1) the existence of the scholar in physical form and 2) knowing the scholar. The two conditions are absolute in all matters, while any other condition, such as the identity of the scholar, their origins, or field of specialty, is irrelevant due to the unconditional nature of the command. Thus, concerning God’s command to obey the person vested with authority, the command itself exists and is known, making knowledge of the existence of the subject nonrestrictive of it. The conditions are known as learned conditions (shurūṭ tahsīliyya) which the Islamically accountable person (mukallaf) must investigate to understand, unlike existing conditions (shurūṭ ḥuṣūlīyya) that require no research or investigation. Even if the knowledge was gained through scholarly agreement or consensus (ijma’), the command becomes obligatory.

The phrase “obey the Messenger” includes a learned condition. Let us assume a person claims prophethood in front of people and performs a miracle. These people are obliged to investigate this claim. Yet, knowing the identity of the Prophet, which is an obligation, does not limit the command: obey the Messenger; instead, it remains absolute. Thus, the verse: Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you, includes an absolute command and is uniform in meaning, while still being restricted in terms of knowing the subject.

If his objection were valid, it would also apply to his own view. He believes that “those vested with authority” refers to the decision-making elite in the society, which raises the same questions “Is it obligatory to obey these elites before knowing them, or is obedience conditional upon knowing them?” If obedience is obligatory without the knowledge, then according to his argument, we would be tasked with something beyond our capabilities. Whereas, if obedience is conditional upon knowing them first, then the verse is absolute and commands people to obey those vested with authority without any restriction or condition.

The second argument: “God commanded obedience to those vested with authority, using the plural form, whereas, their [Shia Muslims] Imams do not overlap; no two can rule at once. Applying this plurality to individuals contradicts the apparent meaning of the verse.”

Our response: The phrase “those vested with authority”, despite its plural form, is not bound to a certain time or era, but applies for all times. Obeying the infallible Imam entails obeying the Imam of our time as well as all his predecessors. Thus, during the occultation, everyone must obey Imam al-Mahdī and all the precedent Imams, as the narrations stated, just as following the Sunnah after the Messenger’s passing is obligatory. Therefore, “those vested with authority” is indeed plural but cannot be limited to a single individual.

The third argument: “The verse says: And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, had ‘those vested with authority’ been the infallible Imam, the verse would have been: And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to the Imam. Therefore, the exegesis we presented is the truth.”

Our response: It is true the verse excludes those vested with authority from resolving disputes, mentioning only God and His Messenger. This is because the first dispute after the Prophet’s passing was over the appointment of an authoritative figure, and it only makes sense to refer to the Qur’an and the sunnah if the dispute concerns the very meaning behind “those vested with authority.” It would be rather illogical to refer to that disputed figure to resolve the dispute. And how could one call upon those who believe that the people vested with authority are the scholars, the decision-making elite, or military leaders and say: “Refer to those whom we believe are authoritative to resolve the dispute over the intended meaning of those vested with authority?” Should people not refer that dispute to a reference accepted by all?

Indeed, after proving the authority of the infallible Imams by referring to the Qur’an and narrations of the Prophet, they become a reference for resolving disputes as well, since referring matters to the authoritative figures was mentioned alongside the Prophet in the verse: When a report of safety or alarm comes to them, they immediately broadcast it; but had they referred it to the Apostle or to those vested with authority among them, those of them who investigate would have ascertained it (4:83).

Again, granted that al-Rāzī’s objection is valid, it would also apply to his own exegesis. If “those vested with authority” are the decision-making elite of the ummah, whose infallibility lies in their consensus and whose word constitutes proof,(10) then why did the verse not mention them as a reference for resolving disputes as well?

In conclusion obeying the infallible Imams is obligatory, and their lives—their sayings (qawl), actions (fi’l), and tacit approval (taqrīr)—constitute proof. Therefore, all the objections al-Rāzī presented are baseless and false.

An Objection to al-Mughniyya’s Statement on the Infallibility of Authoritative Figures ​

The late Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyya states: “It has been proven that the person vested with authority must be infallible, and that this verse denotes the household of the Prophet, who are infallible and purified from any impurity. The concept of infallibility is not exclusive to Shia Islam. Shi’ism has reasoned the infallibility of the household of the Prophet by demonstrating that infallibility is a divine gift granted to whomever God wills. Therefore, the quality of infallibility can only be known through revelation, and both the Qur’an and sunnah attest to the infallibility of the Prophet’s Household.”(11)

Argument: The exclusivity of authority to the infallible Imams is not due to the impossibility of attaining infallibility; it is possible, though extremely difficult. For example, if parents were to raise their child to be mindful of what is prohibited (ḥarām) and permissible (ḥalāl), while ensuring for proper spiritual nourishment and upbringing, and if that child was intelligent, sane, moral, continuously strives against desires (jihād al-nafs), and progressing in knowledge after becoming an Islamically accountable, he might reach the state of infallibility.

Infallibility means protection against sinning. No revealed or rational proof indicates the impossibility of a virtuous seeker attaining infallibility, nor that God would withhold such grace from a devoted worshiper to protect them from sinning and erring. While infallibility is a subject of doubt, and its exalted statuses can only be attained by prophets and Imams, its lower degrees are accessible to others.

Carrying a divine message and holding the position of Imamate are not conditions for infallibility, even though both the Messenger and the Imam must be infallible. This makes the Shia Imams the true referents in the verse “those vested with authority,” for infallibility necessitates unconditional and unrestricted obedience to someone. Yet, the infallibility of a person can only be known through an explicit declaration from God or His Messenger, since God alone possesses knowledge of people’s inner realities, what they conceal and what they disclose, their actions, their true beliefs, their consciousness, and whether they have attained infallibility. Only He knows who is infallible, and He has stated in the Verse of Purification that the Household of the Prophet are indeed so, a truth the Messenger affirmed in narrations attributed to him.

Qualities of an Authoritative Figure from the Qur’an ​

According to the Qur’an, a person with authority over Muslims must possess the following qualities:

  1. Being a Muslim: The phrase “among you” (suffix -kum in Arabic) in the verse indicates that this person must be a Muslim. Moreover, the authoritative figure rules over people in the Muslim community, a position that faithless people cannot hold over Muslims: …and Allah will never provide the faithless any way [to prevail] over the faithful (4:141). Similarly, the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) cannot hold authority over Muslims: O you who have faith! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for allies: they are allies of each other (5:51). Thus, those who do not know or believe in Islam cannot possess authority over Muslims.

  2. Being Just: The actions of sinners are scorned in the Qur’an, so how can a person who requires guidance to abandon sins hold authority over Muslims? The Qur’an even forbids accepting the words of such a person without verification: O you who have faith! If a profligate [person] should bring you some news, verify it, lest you should visit [harm] on some people out of ignorance, and then become regretful for what you have done (49:6).

  3. Being infallible: The Qur’an commands unconditional and unrestricted obedience to those vested with authority, as seen in the verse: Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you, and it does not mention any condition that would limit it. It also links obedience to those vested with authority to obedience to the Messenger. Such unconditional and unrestricted obedience can only be required to an authoritative figure if they are infallible, so they wouldn’t lead their followers into sins, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

In fact, this reasoning was posed by Sheikh al-Ṭūsī(12) and Sunni critical editors (muḥaqqiqūn), including Al-Fakhr al-Rāzī.(13) As Sheikh Mughniyya stated, the believe in the infallibility of those vested with authority is not limited to Shia Muslims.

It must be noted that, although justice is a core quality of an authoritative figure, it is not sufficient on its own. A just person may be protected from intentional sin, but they remain susceptible to mishaps and inadvertence, which might cloud their judgment when issuing rulings or implementing them. For this reason, obeying the just person cannot be unconditional and unrestricted, since the verse indicates absoluteness rather than specifics. Moreover, Imam Ali’s saying does not negate the absoluteness of the verse “You cannot obey a man if it means disobeying God.”

Arguing the Infallibility of the Decision-making Elite ​

We have established that both believers of the Imamate and Sunni critical editors hold that authoritative figures must be infallible. The only difference between them concerns the referents of “those vested with authority.” Shia Muslims believe they are the Imams, while Sunni Muslims believe they are the decision-making elite of society.

The basis of Sunni position lies in their interpretation that the verse commands unconditional and unrestricted obedience to authoritative figures, whom they regard as the decision-making elite. If this group reaches unanimous agreement, then their opinion in this regard is considered infallible.(14) In other words, despite knowing that these individuals are not each infallible themselves, they still believe that their consensus entails infallibility.

But how is it possible to attain infallibility from consensus when the elites themselves are not infallible? Does one dare attribute infallibility to those who gathered in Saqīfat Banī Saʿīdah, manipulated the appointment of the new authority (wilāyah), and then fight among themselves—arguing and battling one another until the Caliph, the Islamic ruler, was killed? What rational mind could accept such absurdity?!

We must emphasize that the authoritative figure to whom we owe absolute obedience, and whose obedience followed that of God and the infallible Messenger, must also be infallible. There is no doubt that such a figure cannot be a royal, a scholar, a companion, an elite individual, or anyone else, as some have exhausted their time and effort in claiming otherwise.(15)

All these reasons lead us to deny the infallibility of royals, scholars, and even companions. These individuals never claimed infallibility, nor do their past actions permit them to make such a serious claim. As for the so-called decision-making elite, none of them is infallible, and their status is an abstraction with no tangible presence. An abstract entity with no external existence cannot be described with infallibility, for infallible beings exist physically; they are corporeal, not mental images (infallibility resides within the person, not in their mind). In other words, this apparent quality of infallibility cannot be attributed to an abstract subject with no external existence.(16)

We do not deny the possibility of truth in consensus, because it is a scholarly matter, and there is not much difference between individual and group opinion, for both opinions and scholarly topics are part of existence. However, opinions, whether individual or group, cannot be infallible. Infallible individuals do not commit wrongdoings purposefully or inadvertently, but this notion does not apply to opinions, which can only be true or false and are not immune to inadvertence or forgetfulness.

Consensus of the elite might indeed provide a strong assumption regarding a certain ruling, but assumptions alone are not enough to obligate unconditional and unrestricted obedience to a person, an institution, or a group. It must first be confirmed if the authoritative figure is protected from error and forgetfulness.

Infallibility is not exclusive to practical affairs. Infallible authoritative figures must possess the ability to identify scholarly matters, in addition to having immunity from sinning whether intentionally or inadvertently. It is evident that the only way to know if someone possesses these qualities is for God Himself to appoint them, for He knows the realities of all beings and who among them is truly deserving of this faculty. As we have discussed, God did not declare anyone purified from wrongdoing and impurity in the Verse of Purification except the Prophet’s Household.

Framing the Dispute and Its Resolution ​

The Qur’an has required unconditional obedience to God, the Messenger, and those vested with authority as a general principle in the verse: …Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. The second segment of the verse then mentions that in case of dispute, the matter should be referred to God and His Messenger: …And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger. This conditional clause is a specific command that succeeds a general one. The first segment of the verse commands absolute obedience to God, His Messenger, and those vested with authority, regardless whether disputes occur or not. Thus, the second segment of the verse emphasizes the significance of this matter.

Hence, even if the second segment did not exist, we could still infer from the first segment the command to refer to the Prophet and understand the matter in depth.

It is evident that the only way to frame and resolve the dispute is first and foremost dependent on the interpretation of “those vested with authority” This phrase has five different interpretations: royals, scholars, companions, decision-making elites, and the infallible Imams.

The first four interpretations are prone to numerous disputes over them, whereas for the fifth, disagreements are much more limited. Royals dispute among themselves, and people disagree with them and fight one another over their appointment. Similarly, scholars argue, and people debate over their selection, yet there is no dispute between them and the people, as a follower (muqallid) does not disagree with a jurist (mujtahid). The companions also disagreed, and people dispute over them. Disagreement with the Companions was possible during their lifetime, bit now that none remain, disagreement with them is not possible. When it comes to the decision-making elite of the society, disputes are widespread, whether among themselves, between them and the people, and among the people over their selection, appointment, reliance on them, and trust in them. Finally, the Imams never dispute among themselves, as they are all protected from sin and wrongdoing, and they affirm one another as the Prophets do. But people cannot disagree with them since fallible people cannot argue with infallible ones (once they accept their infallibility and status as Imams). Disputes among people, however, do occur over the identity of the Imam, and the Qur’an and the sunnah serve as the references to resolve them.

The Reference for Resolving Disputes ​

Disputes may arise over a general ruling (ḥukm ʿāmm) or a universal law (qānūn jāmiʿ), or they may concern a subject (al-mawḍūʿ) within the ruling, how the ruling applies to individuals, what accounts as a generic law, and other similar matters. All of this relates to the subject, not to the generic law.

The reference for resolving disputes over general rulings is the Qur’an and the sunnah of the infallible figures, referred to in the Qur’an as al-Thaqalayn (lit. “two significant things,” which are the Qur’an and the Household of the Prophet, Ahl al-Bayt). Intellect and revelation reveal the meaning of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s household (al-‘itra). They are the lights that guide to the right path (al-Ṣirāṭ). Such a dispute cannot be resolved by a draw, by the opinion of the majority, by forgiveness and lenience, or by compromises or the lack thereof, since the verse declares that the sole reference in disputes is the word of God [Qur’an] and the Prophet. The Imams have no legislative authority despite interpreting divine laws, ensuring adherence to them, and preserving them.

Definite knowledge, just evidence, the recommendations of experts, and reference to the interpretations of the intellectual scholars regarding the contradiction between revealed evidence and the preference of the majority are all references to resolving disputes over a ruling.

Some did not consider the Qur’an and the sunnah as references for resolving disputes among Muslims (the general population of Muslims). They argue that each group must have a reference to whom they turn and follow his decree, not minding the vast difference that may occur among Muslims. In other words, they hold that people must refer to a maraj’ (the highest non-infallible jurisprudential authority), while for other matters they must refer to their own judgment regardless of the division it might cause. For example, a Hanafi Muslim must remain in the mosque until the Shafi’i Imam concludes morning congregational prayer (Ṣalāt al-Jamāʿah) with his followers, and wait until a Hanafi Imam arrives to pray behind him.(17)

On the other hand, some consider the opinion of the most eminent Imam or the guardian of the Muslim ummah to be the reference in matters being disputed, for which the Qur’an or sunnah did not legislate. Or they would refer to the Prophet’s solution to resolve a disagreement between his companions during Uḥud and Badr. In Uḥud the Prophet acted upon the majority’s opinion which opposed his own, while in Badr, where the majority did not reach consensus, He turned to the opinion of a group of His companions who shared His opinion. These people hold that an imam must follow the Prophet’s lead in these two disputes.(18)

The Core of the Verse is a Foundational Matter ​

The narrations and verses such as “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger,” that emphasize the fundamental concept of obeying God are classified as advisory commands (amr irshādī) in the science of the Fundamentals of Jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). These commands serve to guide back to previously revealed commands in the Islamic law (Sharīʿa).

Explanation: For example, the Qur’an says: “and maintain the prayer” (73:20), and the Prophet says “Pray as have you seen me pray”.(19) Commands of this sort demonstrate the necessity of adhering to “what is being commanded,” while God’s command in “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger” guides back to previously revealed commands, and does not introduce a new rule. So, while the previous commands are obligations, the command “Obey Allah” guides us back to these same previous commands. In cases this previous command is a desirable or recommended action (mustahab), then the guidance is to that recommended action. Therefore, the purpose of the command is to assert previous ones.

Argument against the previous claim: Divine commands in the Qur’an such as: “…and maintain the prayer and pay the zakat…” (73:20) and “…O you who have faith! When the call is made for prayer on Friday, hurry toward the remembrance of Allah…” (62:20), and commands given in the Prophet’s sunnah, such as: “Pray as have you seen me pray,” or “learn your [pilgrimage, Hajj] rituals from me”(20) are commands that demonstrate a juristic ruling (Ḥukm fiqhī). Meanwhile, the verse: “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you…” is a revealed proof, as opposed to rational proof, of the authority of the word of God and His Messenger. Thus, the verse does not give advisory commands nor assert previous ones.

As in the case of the principle of exemption (al-Barāʾa), whose transmitted proof is the verse: “…We do not punish [any community] until We have sent [it] a Messenger” (17:15) and a rational proof is “The worst punishment is that without proclamation”,(21) sometimes the rational proof for the obligation of obedience is used, while other times it’s the revealed proof, such as the verse: “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you.” These commands do not reveal a juristic ruling for us to say they’re advisory or assertive; as we have established, they represent the authority of God’s words, those of His Messenger, and the authoritative figures, which is a fundamental matter. Thus, the verse includes both prohibitions and obligations. Additionally, drawing an analogy between “obey Allah” and “maintain the prayer” is invalid. The first verse reveals a fundamental principle, while the second reveals a juristic ruling. Comparing that first verse with this one: “You are prohibited carrion, [and] blood…” (5:3) is also invalid. According to the verse on obedience, we must always obey the Messenger, whether in prohibitions or obligations.

The verse we are interpreting contains fundamental principles and reveals the authority of jurisprudential sources. Both Imamate and Sunni scholars refer to this verse to prove that authority of their juristic sources, as Fakhr al-Rāzī did with Sunni sources (The Qur’an, Sunnah, consensus, and analogy).(22) Imamate scholars, meanwhile, used the verse to establish fundamental principles such as the authority of the Qur’an, the Messenger’s sunnah, the narrations of the infallible Imams, and the intellect.(23) For both sides, then, the Qur’an and the Messenger’s sunnah are authoritative, but they disagree over the authority of the remaining sources—the narrations of the infallible imams and the intellect, which all Shia Muslims accept, on one hand, and consensus and analogy Sunni Muslims believe in, on the other.

Authority of Consensus in the Verse: Analysis and Refutation ​

  1. Proof from the second segment of the verse: Amīn al-Islām al-ṭabrisī said: “From the verse …And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger… some inferred the authority of consensus of the ummah. They state: “God obligated referring to the Qur’an and sunnah on the condition that a conflict arises; otherwise, we should not. This can only be valid if consensus is authoritative.”(24)

The verse, in fact, does not mention that reaching an agreement on a matter and absence of conflicts entails the authority of consensus, regardless of whether it aligns with the Qur’an and sunnah or not. There is no accord between the authority of such consensus and the first segment of the verse where unconditional obedience to the Messenger was obligated for all. Thus, the verse cannot be used to prove the authority of a consensus that contradicts the Qur’an and sunnah. In other words, this conditional clause includes a concept, but in case a textual indicator negates this concept then there would be no concept at all. The first segment of the verse is considered an obvious indicator for the invalidity of consensus if it contradicts the Qur’an and sunnah.

If no disputes arise among Muslims, then they surely are following divine commands and there would not be a need to refer to God or the Messenger. This matter becomes a negative proposition with an empty subject term (Sāliba bi-intiāf al-mawḍū‘), meaning, that there is no need for a reference, the Qur’an or sunnah, because a dispute did not occur, not because consensus is authoritative.

Sheikh al-Ṭūsī responds to Sunni scholars using the second segment of the verse to argue for the authority of consensus. He wrote: “Some have cited this verse to proof that consensus is authoritative… If they had made this argument on the assumption that an infallible person, who lives by divine laws, is part of the ummah, then their reasoning is acceptable; otherwise, it is false. This is because their inference is based on the opposite ruling derived from the implied opposite meaning of the verse (dalīl al-khiṭāb —a form of reasoning). They did not infer their reasoning based on a condition or description that would justify deriving an opposite ruling for cases not mentioned in the verse. How can they rely on this argument when they themselves [their scholars] based their consensus on only the Qur’an and sunnah? How can they claim that reaching consensus removes the need to refer to the Qur’an and sunnah, when in fact they referred back to them to prove authority of consensus in the first place? Moreover, the command in the verse applies to any group, even if that group does not represent the entire ummah. If they achieve consensus over a matter, are they still not required to refer to the Qur’an and sunnah? Since the verse: ‘If you dispute’, addresses a group but does not include the entire ummah.(25)

Yet, Sheikh al-Ṭūsī’s response is still lacking. The proof of authority of consensus for Sunni Muslims does not include the presence of an infallible individual; instead that consensus is still considered an authority regardless of his presence. That is why the counter argument must falsify authority of consensus by relying solely on the verse itself.

Although a descriptive phrase (waṣf) has no implicature (mafhūm) unless the entire phrase contains a restriction (taḥdīd), the conditional phrase includes an implicature. In case the condition is not met, its main clause would not exist.

Proof from the first segment of the verse: Fakhr al-Rāzī concluded the authority of consensus through the sentence “O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you…” He explains: “We have proven that God obligated absolute obedience towards individuals vested with authority through this verse. But for us to abide by this obligation is conditional on knowing those individuals and the ability to connect with them and learn from them directly. We are well aware that in this time we cannot know the infallible Imam, we cannot reach him, nor can we learn from his religious and scholarly knowledge. In this case, we can assert that the infallible figure believers must obey by commands of God is not one of the ummah nor specific to one sect [Shia Muslims], which is false. This makes the referents of “those vested with authority,” the decision-making elite of the ummah; thus, there is no doubt that consensus of the ummah is an authority.”(26)

We must note here: if the verse indicated that consensus is valid in the same way the Qur’an and sunnah are, and if agreement negates the need to refer to the Qur’an and sunnah, then this will definitely end in total chaos. Let us assume that the consensus of a decision-making elite of one community is authoritative, and that of another in a different community is authoritative for the same topic, while neither group has knowledge of the other’s consensus, and given that both groups do not need to refer to the Qur’an and sunnah after agreement is reached, this will certainly result in chaos.

Moreover, if scholars and the decision-making elite in one period of time reach consensus over a certain matter, then another, in a different period, reaches a consensus that contradicts the first, both must be considered authoritative and there should be no need to refer to the Qur’an and sunnah. This implies that religion is aimless, with no direction it follows or a law to govern it. The Imāmīs, however, consider “those vested with authority” to be the infallible Imams of the Prophet’s Household, and this belief of theirs is asserted within the Prophet’s narrations and Qur’anic proofs we have mentioned above. Later we will discuss it from a narrational perspective.

Fakhr al-Rāzī Reasoning for the Authority of Qīyās ​

Al-Rāzī writes: “I do know that the verse ‘And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger’ for us [Sunni Muslims], indicates the authority of analogy (Qīyās). The first segment ‘And if you dispute concerning anything’ could mean one of two things: 1) disputes occur over matters that are already ruled out in the Qur’an, sunnah, or consensus (ijmā’), or 2) disputes occur over matters not ruled out in all three sources. The first interpretation is false because in such case disputers must follow the mentioned ruling; this falls under the first command in the verse “O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you” thus, the segment “And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger” would be a repetition of the preceding command, which is unacceptable. The invalidity of the first interpretations validates the second: disputing over matters that are not ruled out in the Qur’an, sunnah, or consensus. God’s command “refer it to Allah and the Messenger” does not imply referring to the Qur’an and sunnah; thus, the intended meaning must be to refer to the rulings issued to resolve similar disputes. That is analogy (qiyās). Thus, the verse proves the obligation of analogy.”(27)

That is to say, according to al-Rāzī, if disputes arise over a demanding matter that requires immediate resolving, and assuming that no solution for it is found in the Qur’an and sunnah, and if resolving it could not wait, and acquiring a revealed ruling was not possible—because it does not exist—then the segment ‘And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger’ implies referring to the ruling most relevant and similar within the Qur’an and sunnah. This is analogy in his opinion.(28)

To refute his reasoning, it is sufficient to mention two evidences:

  1. Some rulings hold divine secrets beyond the comprehension of the normal human intellect. For example, if someone stole a coin, the Islamic court will command that their hand must be cut after convicting them of robbery. But if someone were to use even just a coin from money entrusted to them, or accepted a hefty bribe, in both instances their hands would not be cut. If the purpose of punishing the thief is to maintain safety and economic stability in the society, then surely using entrusted goods and accepting bribery threaten safety. While if the purpose is to evade fiscal damage in society, then bribery and not safekeeping entrusted items will harm the economy.

  2. Analogy is but a guess, and guesswork cannot be a reference to resolve disputes. Anyone can reason using analogy based on their own interpretation, but then the final verdict would contradict analogy and deduction. Therefore, analogy (Qīyās) would not resolve disputes, if not ignite them.

Hence, the intended meaning of the verse does not prove the authority of analogy but rather referring to God and His Messenger—to the Qur’an and sunnah. This is called deduction (istnbāṭ) and juristic deduction (ijtihād), which are the processes of deducing juristic laws from the sources, the Qur’an and sunnah.

We must note that Fakhr al-Rāzī gave 10 proofs that the Qur’an and sunnah are the first and foremost sources, and they exceed analogy. He said: “This verse proves that the Qur’an and sunnah are above analogy completely; we must not oppose them to follow what analogy says.”(29) It must also be pointed out that some of his proofs are lacking since analogy is not an authority to begin with. This argument would be considered a negative proposition with an empty subject term (salib bi-intifā’ al-mawḍū‘), and so there is no need to argue against it.

The Four Sources in the Verse ​

Some Sunni exegeses hold that the verse asserts the authority of the four sources of Islamic jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh): the Qur’an, the sunnah, consensus (ijmā’) and analogy (Qīyās). Other Sunni exegeses claim that this verse is stronger evidence for the authority of consensus than the verse: But whoever defies the Apostle, after the guidance has become manifest to him… (4:115), they even went as far as to reject it as a proof for the validity of consensus.(30)

They posed this argument: the Qur’an and sunnah refer to obeying God and the Messenger, while consensus is the opinion of the authoritative figures, and the authority of analogy is proved through this segment of the verse: And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger”. By referring the dispute to the Qur’an, sunnah, or consensus, the exact ruling being disputed will be found, and we would simply be obeying these three sources. If, however, the ruling was not found in all three sources, but a similar one was found, then the dispute can be resolved through analogizing both the ruling found in the source and the matter of dispute. This is called analogy in Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence.

There has been significant criticism and extensive research regarding this topic, including what Fakhr al-Rāzī himself presented and what later exegeses mentioned in their writings.(31)

Some exegeses used the verse to invalidate analogy, and demonstrated the differences in its definitions, so much so that believers in the authority of analogy see it only as that part of syllogism (tamthil) in Mantiq (logic) through which the common elements (al-‘ila al-jami’a) between two rulings can be deduced. That element of logical syllogism (tamthil mantiqi) refers to the deductive analogy (qiyās burhani) in logic, the authority of which is established.

It must be noted that juristic deduction (ijtihād) by referring to the sources of knowledge, such as the Qur’an and sunnah, to deduce rulings is entirely unrelated to analogy as conceptualized by Sunni Muslims. These jurists perform extensive research and investigation in both sources to deduce the ruling over which people dispute. The fact that disputes occur does not mean that rulings are missing in the mentioned sources—they are there, whether based on al-barā’ah (principle of exemption: people are free of obligations until proven otherwise), al-ishtighāl (presumption of obligation in cases of uncertainty surrounding a ruling), or other principles. They are simply unknown to the disputers.

As a conclusion:

  1. Demonstrative reason (al-ʿaql al-burhānī) and authoritative or reliable revealed evidence (al-Naql al-Muʿtabar) are two pillars for identifying God’s set path leading to Him (al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm, literally: The Straight Path).

  2. Consensus that follows neither of the mentioned pillars is not reliable. Imamate jurists believe that consensus became valid only because an infallible figure took part in it, approved of it, or because the consensus was achieved through referring to the sunnah such as the Solitary Narration (al-Khabar al-Wāḥid: a hadith or narration with no sufficient number of narrators that does not contradict the fundamentals of Islam) which is a part of sunnah.

  3. If a real common element (al-jāmi‘al-ḥaqīqī) is found, which, in analogy (in Principles of Jurispridence), is considered a proof in the ruling of the middle term (ḥukm al-ḥadd al-wasṭ)—which is logical syllogism—then it is considered authoritative; otherwise, it is not. A reliable analogy depends on intellect (‘aql) or revelation (naql), since that common element between the two cases being compared in using analogy, is either found through intellect or known though reliable revealed evidence.

  4. It is possible to elaborate on some topics by referring them to those vested with authority, similar to how they are referred to the Messenger and his sunnah, since those vested with authority mentioned in the verse are the infallible Imams.

  5. The saying “My people [ummah] do not agree over misguidance”,(32) regardless of the validity of its chain, does not represent the authority of consensus. Instead, it means that the Islamic ummah, the Muslims, does not agree on anything that is clearly wrong or misguided. It does not mean that anything over which consensus is reached is correct. We must always remember what has been said about the division of Muslims into sects as happened with nations before them.

  6. Consensus that is reached based on the revelations of the sunnah is unquestionably authoritative. However, the reliability of one consensus achieved for a certain interest might be overturned by another consensus reached in the future after interests change.(33) Consensus as defined in Arabic as agreement or determination, is found in the Qur’an and sunnah, but the term as understood in the Principles of Jurisprudence is a technical term with no mentions in the Qur’an or sunnah.(34)

  7. The consensus reached between the Companions and their followers over religious matters cannot be disputed, since the early Muslims did not agree on anything without referring to reliable religious proof.(35) Their consensus differs from the consensus that jurists reached in later periods based on particular interests.

The Better Path and Favorable Outcomes ​

By the words of God, obedience to Him, the Messenger, and the authoritative figures, and referring to the Qur’an and sunnah to resolve disputes is better and has more favorable outcomes, “That is better and more favorable in outcome”.

The determiner That (Arabic: dhālika) denotes the core meaning of the entire verse. Linguistically, there have been debates over what the sentence-final qualifying clause, “that is better and more favourable in outcome” (the qayd in Arabic) truly points back to, as it is preceded by two phrases. Does it qualify all phrases or just the last one? It certainly does qualify the last phrase, but the questioning revolved the other phrase.(36) These doubts, however, are irrelevant in the verse since the context clearly indicates that the determiner That relates to both phrases. On this basis, a better life and favorable outcomes are certainly the fruits of obeying God, the Messenger, and the authoritative figures, and referring to the Qur’an and sunnah in case of disputes.

“Khayr” and “Aḥsan” ​

The two words خير (khayr: better) and أحسن (aḥsan: more favorable) are not comparative adjectives; rather they indicate taʿyīn, which refers to an obligation people have no choice in or alternative, such as daily prayers. If we consider them comparative adjectives, the meaning of the verse would be: you have a choice in obeying God and the Messenger, but choosing to obey them is better for you and will ensure a favorable outcome. But the human intellect will definitely conclude that obeying God, the Messenger, and the infallible Imams is a must. Also, referring to these three sources is an obligatory act that has no substitute (Wājib Taʿyīnī) because referring to knowledgeable authority and obeying its commands is enough to deter the followers from erring. Thus, it is not possible for the two words “khayr” and “aḥsan” to be comparative adjectives. This is similar to the case of the verse: “but the blood relatives are more entitled to inherit from one another in the Book of Allah.” (8:75), where “more entitled” indicates taʿyīn and not comparison.

Additionally, the context of the verse asserts that it is an unsubstitutable obligation for believers to obey God, the Messenger, and the authoritative figures, and that they must refer to the Qur’an and sunnah to resolve disputes or else they will be opposing their belief as the verse mentions: if you have faith in Allah and the Last Day.

Another proof that “khayr” and “aḥsan” indicate Taʿyīn is the stern warning included in some verses such as: The day when their faces are turned about in the Fire, they will say, ‘We wish we had obeyed Allah and obeyed the Apostle!’ * And they will say, ‘Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and elders, and they led us astray from the way.’ (33: 66-67). Hence, obeying God and the Messenger does not depend on people’s desires; it is necessary and obligatory (necessary from a legislative perspective and not creational one, since humans are created with freewill). Only those who truly obey God and the Messenger succeed: All the response of the faithful, when they are summoned to Allah and His Apostle that He may judge between them, is to say, ‘We hear and obey.’ It is they who are the felicitous. * Whoever obeys Allah and His Apostle, and fears Allah and is wary of Him—it is they who will be the triumphant (24:51-52).

Similarly, the verses used here do not mean that obeying God and the Messenger is optional, if a believer does it, they succeed, but if they do not, they will not be cast in Hell, but it would be better for them to obey. Obedience is obligatory, and that can be inferred through the intellect, and these verses represent the revealed proof of the obligation of obedience to God and the Messenger. Therefore, if a person obeys laws and the previous commands, including prohibitions and obligations they will be rewarded with great rewards, but if they refuse to obey, they will face severe punishment.

Remarks and illuminations ​

Only God Can Legislate ​

Exegesis books typically state that legislators in non-Islamic governments base their decrees on customs, traditions, and local cultures, whereas the sources of Islamic laws are the Qur’an and sunnah, and if a particular ruling is not found in them, then the opinions of the decision makers of the society would be the source of legislation.(37)

Argument: there are differences between legal rulings, legal principles, and legal sources, as with Jurisprudence (fiqh) where jurisprudent rulings, principles, and sources are different. These jurisprudent rulings are particulars (juz’iyya) mentioned within scholarly letters as problems, while principles are the universal basics (qawā‘id kulliyya) deduced by decision makers and jurists such as the basics of “No repetition” (lā tu‘ād) and “Belongs to the Hand” (‘alā al-yad). Meanwhile, the sources are the Qur’an and sunnah through which principles are deduced. Thus, juristic sources are three, and consensus cannot be a juristic source that can be referred to if no revelation exists about the dispute.

If consensus is considered authoritative, it is only as a revealer (kāshif) of the Legislator’s ruling, not as an independent source. And if the consensus of the decision-makers refers to the intellect, then it would be authoritative is independent rational indicator (al-mustaqillāt al-aqliyya) as decreed by the legislator. Therefore, consensus cannot be compared to the Qur’an and sunnah as a source. If the intellect understands a problem independently but a person acts against that understanding, they will be punished on the Day of Judgment. But if the intellect cannot understand a problem, and the legislator has not provided an explicit ruling on that matter, then the solution for missing rulings in revelation is known, and has already been legislated: everything is absolute unless explicitly prohibited(38)—this is known as ḥukum al-bara’. In these cases, as well, the ruling comes from the legislator, so all rulings are necessarily revealed by Him.

However, it is permissible to refer to the decision-makers in matters related to managing the society as it is considered part of people’s needs. By referring to the verse: “and their affairs are by counsel among themselves,” (42:38) we understand that we can adhere to the opinion of the people, the intellectuals and the wise. But universal rulings and laws are from God’s commands. He alone can command and prohibit, and people cannot take part in that, since divine laws cannot be found through consultations.

In summary, the Qur’an and the sunnah are the sources of law and jurisprudence, the intellect is the source in independent rational indicators, whereas analogy and human opinions can never be sources for religious rulings.

Mix-up in Tafsīr al-Manār: Sources and Methods ​

The exegete says in Tafsīr al-Manār: “…The principles of religion and legislation, and Islamic governments, are:

  1. The Qur’an, and adhering to its contents would be obeying God.

  2. The Sunnah by which we obey the Messenger.

  3. The consensus of those vested with authority. These authoritative figures are the decision-making elite of the society in whom the people trust, such as scholars, military leaders, public businesses of commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing, employers, political parties, reputable newspapers and their chief editors. Obedience to them is obedience to those vested with authority.

  4. Comparing problems being disputed to known generic laws and rulings from the Qur’an and sunnah, that would align with God’s command: And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.

These four principles are sources of Islamic Law and there must be a designated group tasked with referring problems to the Qur’an and sunnah. Would these individuals be from the authoritative figures? Or ones these authorities appoint to handle this task?”(39)

The exegete then elaborates on the three branches of a government, namely the legislature, the executive power which enforce laws, and the juridical system that resolves disputes. According to him, members of the third branch can be chosen from the first branch. Meanwhile, the Islamic world did not set a unique system due to clashing interests, problems, and the conditions of different eras and geographies.

Despite the useful remarks in his discussion, there must be clear distinction between the sources of Islamic rulings and the methods of knowing them—they should not be mistaken for each other. For example, the Qur’an and sunnah are sources, but the consensus of authoritative figures (assuming it is authoritative) only reveals the sources and the rulings obtained from them. As for the branches, there must be clear boundaries between them when they consist of fallible people. Any collusion between the judge and a criminal, the judge and the legislator, or the legislator and the criminal, could result in exploitation and mismanagement.

Legitimacy of Laws Between Monotheists and non-Monotheists ​

Legal compliance for both individuals and collectives is already established. Our discussion addresses three topics: 1) legal compliance by a community to a law it approves of, 2) legislation being a governmental responsibility, and 3) the establishment of a government is a responsibility of the accepted religion in that community. Monotheist communities get their religion from their creator and do not believe in the legitimacy of any laws besides His, but acceptance is given by the people of the community. On the other hand, non-Monotheists live by their desires, Have you seen him who has taken his desire to be his god (45:23). Desire here refers to everything other than God—anger, lust, illusions, imagination, and the so-called collective consciousness are all desires, and everything that is not God is a desire.

A society that lives by its desires sees collective consciousness as a standard for the legitimacy of laws. If the people of that society develop a shared collective consciousness, then laws that arise from that consciousness will be accepted; otherwise, they will not be accepted or even considered legitimate. This is because the standard of legitimacy in this society is its own shared collective consciousness. In other words, laws gain legitimacy in non- Monotheist societies after two levels of acceptance: the society elites whose approval grants the law authority, and then the general public. But the differences between the legislators themselves is abstract since the legislators and executives are one and their differences are meaningless. Certainly, the collective consciousness is closer to what the society deems correct. Here consultation is pivotal in achieving reality. Yet, the law of human happiness is based on the rule of the Creator of humans and the universe and combining them.

The Authoritative Figures Addressed in Hadith al-Nawafil ​

Some people of ‘Irfān, (Islamic mysticism), hold that the people vested with authority are the those who achieve nearness to God by supererogatory worship (Maqām Qurb al-Nawāfil). These people transcend spiritually such that God becomes to them their cognitive and dynamic functions—not as their own self or an attribute which is part of His self, “…I am his hearing with which he hears, his vision with which he sees, and his tongue with which he speaks…”(40) This type of people is truly those vested with authority. Nothing can match their commands, for with God they command, hear, and see; if they command something to: “Be! [Exist/Happen]” it does, because with God they speak.(41)

This indicates that commands of those vested with authority are the command of “Be and it becomes!” Such a high status can only befit the Household of the Prophet (al-‘itra al-ṭāhira). And if a seeker achieves that status, then it is by the blessings of these divine beings.

Note here that the interpretation we presented is given by the gnostic (‘ārif) in a remark that followed his explanation that “those vested with authority” refers to the caliph, royal, scholar, and the like. Thus, the a gnostic who refuses official positions and considers them obstacles in his path of self-discipline and purification, and hinders Kashif and Shuhūd (experiencing a personal divine revelation), cannot be a reference in political, military, and security affairs, except the few select that can combine these positions with their status properly.

Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and Authority over People ​

According to the verse we concluded the obligation to obey those vested with authority. In the age of the infallible Imam this obedience manifests as fulfilling his command and refrain from what he prohibits. In the time of the Imam’s occultation (al-ghayba), obedience to the qualified jurist whom the infallible Imams have deputized.

Those who are deputized by the infallible Imam and appointed by him as leaders or guardians over a community must be obeyed by that community. Likewise, during the Imam’s absence, a jurist who holds all qualities and holds general delegation (al-niyāba al-ʿāmma) from the infallible Imams becomes a guardian of the people. On this topic, Imam al-Ṣādiq says: “He of the jurists, who guards himself [from sin], remains true to his faith, opposes his desires, and obeys the commands of his guardian, then people must obey him,”(42) he then speaks about two disputants who wish to resolve their dispute: “they find among you [the people] one who narrates from us, investigates the permissible and prohibited, and knows our rulings; appoint him as a judge, for I have appointed him one over you. If he rules like us but his ruling was rejected [by one of the disputants] then that person has undervalued God’s ruling and defied us. And he who defies us defies God, and had deviated from God’s path.”(43)

The role of people here is to accept the guardian ship (wilāya) because they do not grant a deputized jurist the right of representation them (wikāla) based on their opinions. Rather, they accept the guardianship vested to the jurist by legislator. In other words, the command of the Imams to refer to the jurists does not grant them the right to represent people, instead it means the necessity of accepting the guardianship of the jurists who possess all the qualities of a guardian and are appointed by the Imams. That is why there are conditions required for the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist that are not required for representation. The people being represented can void the given representation whereas guardianship holds unless the guardian no longer meets some of the conditions, only then does his guardianship becomes void.

Reminder: the infallible Imam holds a parallel status to the Qur’an and is one of the two significant things Prophet Muhammad left for Muslims, “I leave behind for you the two significant things…”(44) The Imam’s sunnah reflects the Prophet’s sunnah and constitutes the ultimate divine proof (ḥujjat Allāh al-bāligha). A jurist who possesses all qualities is not infallible, and therefore his legal rulings (fatwas) must remain consistent with the Qur’an and the sunnah of the infallible figures. Including the guardian jurist among “those vested with authority” mentioned in the verse, is not because he is one of them, otherwise all his commands would be valid and he becomes himself a guardian we are bound to obey by divine command. Rather, the guardian jurist is included because he is appointed by the authoritative figures. This makes obedience to him restricted and conditional.

The Result of Delegating the Wrong People ​

The infallible authoritative figures are the reference for those who abide by the Qur’an and sunnah. Undoubtedly, referring to non-experts to get answers for a scholarly or practical matter will definitely end badly. In an elevated hadith (marfūʿ) the Prophet says “if a matter is delegated to people who have no knowledge of it, then await The Hour.”(45) “The Hour” here refers to the collapse of the government. If hiring, firing, and assigning responsibilities in any given system are not based on efficiency and competence, then that system is bound to perish and face its lesser resurrection (al-Qīyāma al-Ṣughrā) just like humans when they die “He who dies has faced resurrection”.(46) The continuity of a government depends on assigning responsibilities to the just, God-fearing people who can bear them. These people can either be the authoritative figures mentioned in the verse or the followers they appoint.

The popular saying “the hour [or time] has come” or “the lesser resurrection has happened” is what we express these days by “expiration date.” Materialistic goods have expiration dates and so do non-tangible elements of the world such as true governments which expire when they turn unfair, distrustful, and dependent on incompetent people to run them. The verse “O Noah! Indeed He is not of your family” (11:46), indicated that the person being discussed, Noah’s son, has ‘expired’ and that his end is near.

Some examples of replacing good with evil and caliphate with sultanate, and the delegation of the incompetent are:

  1. al-Zamakhsharī narrated from Abū-Ḥazm that Muslima b. ʿAbd al-Malik asked him: “Were you not commanded to obey us in the verse ‘and those vested with authority among you’? Abū-Ḥazm replied: “was it not suspended for you since you deterred from the right path which God stated in the verse: ‘And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to God and the Messenger.’(47)

  2. Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī entered upon Muʿāwiya and said: “Peace be upon you, O mercenary.” They [Muʿāwiya’s entourage] told him: “You should say, peace be upon you, O ʾAmīr [ʾAmīr al-Muʾminīn; the Ruler or Commander of the Believers].” But he repeated: “Peace be upon you, O mercenary.” They repeated their demand and he repeated his greeting. Then Muʿāwiya said: “let Abu-Muslim be; he knows better [what he is saying].” Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī wrote about this interaction in a poem:

مَلَّ المُقامُ فَكَم أُعاشِرُ أُمَّةً

أَمَرَت بِغَيرِ صَلاحِها أُمَراؤُها

ظَلَموا الرَعيَّةَ وَاِستَجازوا كَيدَها

فَعَدَوا مَصالِحَها وَهُم أُجَراؤُها(48)

Which means:

I have grown weary of staying here;

For how long must I live among people;

Whose royals command what harms them;

They were unjust and got permission to oppress and deceive them;

They ignored their interests when they are supposed to be their servants.

The premises of this interaction is as follows: As narrated from the Messenger, he said: “if the Trust is not kept then await The Hour [Day of Judgment].” He was asked: “How would it not be kept?” The Messenger answered: “By delegating (Wusida, Arabic root Wasad, the same root verb for Wisāda, lit. pillow) matters to people who have no knowledge of them. Then you await The Hour.”(49) Ibn Manẓūr defines wisāda as: “A pillow, a support for a reclining person. What is put under the head to rest on.”(50) This means that responsibilities and governmental status resemble pillows, which those who are not competent deem as luxury. This eventually causes the government to perish. For this reason, it is emphasized in the Qur’an to follow the true authoritative figures.

  1. Al-Fakhr al-Rāzī’s Evidence for the Authority of Analogy

Besides using the verse being discussed as proof of the authority of analogy, al-Rāzī quotes some narrations attributed to the prophet and sayings attributed to the second Caliph.(51) He says that analogy is confirmed in both narrations and sayings: “When they asked the Messenger about a fasting person kissing, and he replied: “If you gurgle,”” that means gurgling is a premise for eating like a kiss is a premise for sexual intercourse. Since gurgling does not ruin fasting, a kiss would not either. And when a woman from the tribe of Khath'am asked the Messenger about performing pilgrimage (ḥajj) in place of her deceased father, he answered her: “If your father was indebted and you paid it off for him, would it be paid off?” she answered yes, then the Messenger said: “then paying off God’s debt takes priority.” The report (athar) attributed to ‘Umar that Al-Rāzī cited: “know the similarities and parallels, then perform analogy according to your judgement.”(52)

Argument: the Messenger did not use analogy in either narration because analogy, just like the juristic deduction (ijtihād), is a presumed proof (dalīl dhanī)—a jurist might arrive at the truth at times, and he might not at others. But the Prophet is infallible and only speaks of rulings that are revealed to him by God, so, he has no use of analogy or juristic deduction for knowing rulings. In the narrations, the Prophet only wanted to simplify the answers to those who asked him; that is why he gave two examples. If he were to use analogy, he must first identify the “the unknown analogue” (the ruling of gurgling and freedom from liability for the dead after the “debt” has been taken care of), then he must perform analogical reasoning with other examples and explain why gurgling does not break the fast and why the dead is no longer held liable. Is each individual not supposed to carry out their assigned obligation? That is why, the Prophet did not use analogy but only revealed the rulings for both questions.

Meanwhile, the saying attributed to the second caliphate is meaningless since he is not infallible and his words do no constitute the Qur’an or sunnah.

Discussion of Narrations ​

The Occasion of Revelation ​

It is said in Tafsīr Mujāhid: “The verse ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’ was revealed about Imam ʿAlī when the Messenger left him in Madina. Imam ʿAlī said: ‘O Messenger of God! Are you leaving me behind with the women and children?’ The Messenger answered him: “O ʿAlī! Would you not like to be to me like Aaron was to Moses, when he told him: ‘Stay with my people and set things right’?”(53)

Abu Basīr says: “I asked Imam Ḥusayn about the verse: ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you.’ He answered: “It was revealed about ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Ḥassan, and al-Ḥusayn.’ I asked him: ‘Why did He [God] not name ʿAlī and the members of his household explicitly in the Qur’an?” He replied: ‘Answer them: prayer was revealed to the Messenger without saying which has three and which has four [Rakʿāt], but the Messenger explained the details. Zakāt was revealed to him without mentioning that each forty dirhams require paying one, but the Messenger explained the details. Ḥajj was revealed without stating that people must circle the Ka’ba for a week [seven times], but the Messenger explained the details. The verse ‘Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’ was revealed about ʿAlī, al-Ḥassan, and al-Ḥusayn, and the Messenger said about ʿAlī: ‘Whoever I am his guardian (mawlā), then ʿAlī is their guardian.’”

Remark: Undoubtedly, the Qur’an encompasses all universal principles and -, while the particular matters and boundaries of the universal rulings are the responsibility of the Prophet. The narration above is an example of that. Everything the Prophet taught or conveyed, whether rulings or universal laws, belongs to God, and He revealed them to the Messenger through direct revelation (waḥy) or inspiration (ilhām).

True Belief and Accepted Worship ​

ʿĪsā ibn al-Sarī ibn al-Yasāʿ narrated: “I asked Abū ʿAbd Allāh: Tell me the fundamentals of Islam which no one may remain ignorant of; those which, if someone neglects to learn them completely, his belief becomes corrupt and his worship not accepted; and those which, when someone knows them and lives by them, his belief becomes sound, his worship accepted, and his life not burdened by ignorance of one these fundamentals. He replied: To profess the shahada “There is no god but God,” to believe that Muhammad is the Messenger of God, to attest to what God revealed to him, to be righteous with money, to give zakat, and uphold the guardianship that God granted the Household of the Prophet.” He said: Then I asked him: Does guardianship something superior to the rest, known only to those who believe in it [guardianship]? He replies: ‘Yes. God said O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. And the Messenger said: ‘Whoever dies without knowing the Imam dies ignorant.’ The Imam is the Messenger then ʿAlī. They said: “the Imam is Muʿāwiya, then al-Ḥasan, then al-Ḥusayn. While some claimed: the Imam is Yazīd ibn Muʿāwiya and al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. But they are equal”.(54)

Remark: Many falsely claimed prophethood when true ones existed. Likewise, many falsely claimed guardianship to stand against the true guardians. Researching the true nature of guardianship and applying it to the Household of the Prophet is a condition for true faith and for the acceptance of good deed, just like other matters in Islam.

Who are “Those Vested with Authority”? ​

Jābir ibn ʿAbd Allah said: “When the verse ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’ was revealed to Prophet Muhammad, I asked: ‘O Messenger of God, we know God and His Messenger, but who are those vested with authority whose obedience is linked to obedience to you? The Prophet answered: ‘They are my successors, O Jābir, and the Imams of Muslims after me. The first of them is ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, then al-Ḥassan and Ḥusayn, then ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn, then Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, whose named al-Bāqir in the Torah or Pentateuch—you will live during his time, Jābir, when you meet him, relay my greetings. After him comes al-Ṣādiq Jaʿfar ibn Muḥammad, then Mūsā ibn Jaʿfar, ʿAlī ibn Mūsā, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad, then al-Ḥassan ibn ʿAlī. Finally, the one named after me, who bears my title, God’s authority on earth, His last revelation among the people, the son of al-Ḥassan ibn ʿAlī. The man through whom God will open the east and west of the earth. He who goes into occultation, hidden away his followers, and appoints guardians, and during that time only those whose hearts God has tested will truly believe in his Imamate.” He says that Jābir then asks: ‘O Messenger of God, do His followers benefit from him during the occultation?’ The Messenger replies: ‘I swear by God who sent me as a Prophet, they will benefit from him and be blessed by his light in his absence, just as humanity benefits from the sun even when it is hidden behind clouds. O Jābir, this man is one of God’s concealed secrets and a bearer of His knowledge. Do not disclose his identity except to his people.”(55)

Imam al-Bāqir says, commenting on the verse: ‘O you who have faith! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’: He [God] meant us specifically. He commanded all believers to obey us until the Day of Judgment.”(56)

Abu Jaʿfar says, commenting on the same verse: They are the Imams descending from ʿAlī and Fatima until The Time [Day of judgement] comes.”(57)

In a narration attributed to ʿAlī, he says: “‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’ refers exclusively to us, the Household of the Prophet, and no one else.”(58)

Another narration attributed to ʿAlī, from a sermon he held for the migrants from Mekkah (al- Muhājirīn) and the People of al-Madina (al- Anṣār), during the reign of ʿUthmān: “I adjure you by God, Do you know that when God revealed the verse ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you,’ this verse ‘Your guardian is only Allah, His Messenger, and the faithful who maintain the prayer and give the zakat while bowing down,’ (5:55) and this verse ‘and those who do not take, besides Allah and His Messenger and the faithful, anyone as [their] confidant?’ (9:16) The people asked: ‘O Messenger of God! Are these verses exclusive to a group of believers or do they apply to everyone?’ God then commanded the Prophet to inform them of the figures vested with authority over them and explain to them the meaning of guardianship(59) just like he explained prayer, zakāt, fasting, and pilgrimage. So the Messenger appointed me a guardian over the people at Ghadīr Khumm.”(60)

Remark: Vesting authority to individuals is an act of God’s will, just as appointing the Messenger and the Prophet is, since the quality of infallibility is only known to God, and knowledge of it is concealed from others. People can benefit from the Imam during his occultation in more than one way, and it was compared to how people can still benefit from the sun even when clouds conceal it. The infallible Imams are confirmed to be twelve according to reliable and valid traditions, and eleven of these Imams have indeed lived and passed. These certain facts prove and confirm the existence of the promised Imam, al-Mahdī.

The Call to Mubahalah ​

Abu Masrūq narrates from Abū ʿAbd Allāh: “I told him [the Imam]: when we address people and cite the verse ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you’ as proof, they say: “this verse was revealed about the commanders of the expeditions (umara’ al-saraya)… So He told me: ‘Call them to a Mubahalah [The act of two sides asking God to invoke His curse on the liar to prove they are saying the truth]”.(61)

Remark: The Event of Mubahalah is one of enduring blessed traditions of Prophet Muhammad. It is an effective and powerful measure in moments of utmost need and can be more impactful to some people than proof because it appeals to their sentiments.

Knowing the Authoritative Figures ​

ʾAmīr al-Muʾminīn said: “Know God though Himself, the Messenger through his Message, and the authoritative figures through their grace, justice, and benevolence.”(62)

Remark: This narration is among the most important hadiths of the Imamate. Imam Ali prioritizes in it the use of the intellect over revelation, giving preference to reason over what is taught through revelation. Moreover, the key insight in this narration is the guidance regarding the deduction of the middle term (al-ḥad al-wasṭ) of the proof. Some middle terms are the subject itself (the minor term, al-ḥad al-aṣghar). In such cases, if we want to know a subject whose status and attributes are its ownself, then inference using the specific method appropriate for knowing this middle term leads directly to the subject itself. This aligns with the narration “He shows Himself through Himself”(63) and “I know You [God] though You”.(64) Therefore, knowing God by through His divinity differs from knowing the Messenger through his Message, and from knowing those vested with authority through their grace, justice, and benevolence.

It is important to note that knowing the abstract self of the Messenger, not his real identity, is achieved through his Message. In this context, the description of the Messenger is precisely what is being described.

The Imams: the Successors of the Prophets ​

Abū Ja’far comments on the verse “O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you: “This verse refers to [Imam] ʿAlī and the Imams. “God placed them in the positions of the Prophets, except they do not make things lawful or unlawful”(65)

Remark: The preposition “except” indicating exclusion in “except that they cannot decree what is permissible and prohibited,” indicates that legislation is explicit to God and the Messenger,(66) and that the infallible Imams are the guardians of the Messenger’s sunnah—they explain it and safeguard God’s boundaries.

Referring to the Messenger to Resolve Disputes ​

ʿAlī wrote to Mālik al-Ashtar: “…and if you face conundrums that burden you refer to God and the Messenger for God told the people he wanted to guide: ‘O you who have faith! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.’ Referring to God is through the Qur’an, and referring to the Messenger is by following his sunnah that unites Muslims and does not divide them.”(67)

Remark: the calls for unity and cooperation, and the warnings against differences and division stem from a valid, constant, and single reason. The faith manifested as the Qur’an and religion includes unchanging and direct fundamentals that are sufficient to satisfy an eager searcher of truth and those on the path of righteousness. For this reason, Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī, clarifies to his envoy to Egypt, whose responsibilities include political, military, judicial, cultural, and security affairs, the fundamentals and principles that bring people together.

The Prophet’s Household are The Decisive Speech ​

In a long narration attributed to Abū Jaʿfar, he says: “…And if you fear that disputes might occur, then refer the matter to God, the Messenger, and those vested with authority among you, this is how He revealed it in the verse. How can God command them [the people] to obey the authoritative figures but permits disputing with them?! That command was given to the people addressed in the verse ‘Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you.’”(68)

In a narration from Husayn ibn ʿAlī, he says: “…Obey us, for obedience to us is obligatory since it is linked to obeying God and the Messenger. God said in the Qur’an: ‘Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those vested with authority among you. And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.’”(69)

And ʿAlī said: “…When the people called upon us to judge by the Qur’an, it was not we who turned away from God’s book, for He said ‘And if you dispute concerning anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger.’ To refer to God means to judge by His Book; to refer to the Messenger is to live by his sunnah. If the judgment was made fairly by the Qur’an, then we are worthiest of it [the Caliphate]. And if the judgement was made according to the Messenger’s sunnah then we are the worthiest and more entitled to it [Caliphate].”(70)

Remark:

  1. The Qur’an is protected from additions and omissions; it is guarded from distortion. Sometime a remark is written in exegesis next to a verse, and later exegetes mistook it as part of the verse. In such cases, the reference to resolve disputes over jurisprudence of legal rulings is the authoritative figures. But disputes over theological problems (al-masā’il al-kalāmiyyah) such as the principle of Imamate, the appointment of Imams, and their number, must be referred to the Qur’an and sunnah. Therefore, no distortion of the Qur’an occurred especially regarding this matter.

  2. The second narration points to the reason for obligating obedience to the Imams, as Imam Ḥusayn says: “…It is linked to obeying God and the Messenger”.

  3. The third narration includes a problem addressed previously: the reference for resolving disputes over Imamate and the rightful appointment of an Imam is the Qur’an. This was evident during the Battle of Ṣiffīn. It is known that the origin of the dispute was from those who opposed the truth and usurped the religious position...from the Messenger’s Household.

References ​

1. The Last Day, al-Ma‘ād, meaning returning to the origin, and believing in al-Ma‘ād means believing in the origin.

2. Majma‘al-bayān, 3-4:99.

3. Tafsīr al-mīzān, 4:235.

4. Al-tibyān, vol 3, p. 236. majma‘ al-bayān, vol 3-4, p. 100.

5. al-tibyān, 3:236.

6. Al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:148-149; tafsīr al-manār, 5:137.

7. al-Tibyan, 3:236.

8. Nahj al-Balāghah, sermon 165.

9. al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 5:10:150.

10. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:149.

11. al-tafsīr al-kāshif, 2:359-361.

12. Al-Tibyan, 3:236.

13. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:148.

14. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:148-149.

15. Tafsir al-Manar, 5:147.

16. Tafsīr al-Mizan 4:418-419.

17. Tafsir al- manār, 5:157-158.

18. Tafsir al- manār, 5:156.

19. ‘Awālī al-lA’ālī, 1:197.

20. ‘Awālī al-lA’ālī, 1:215.

21. Kifāyat al-Uṣūl, p. 343.

22. al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 5:10:149-156.

23. ālā’ al-raḥmān, 2:362-363.

24. Majma‘al-Bayān, 3-4:101.

25. al- Tafsīr al-Tibyān, 3:237.

26. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:148-149.

27. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:151-152.

28. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:155-156.

29. al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:151-152.

30. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:164.

31. See, al-tafsīr al-kabīr, 5:10:151-152 and 155-156; tafsīr al-Manār 5:171 and 177-178.

32. Tuhaf al-ʿuqūl, p. 458.

33. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:169-170.

34. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:165-166.

35. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:170.

36. Kifāyat al-uṣūl, p. 234-235.

37. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:152-157.

38. Man Lā Yaḥḍuruhu al-Faqīh, 1:317.

39. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:152-153.

40. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 2:352.

41. Raḥma min al-Raḥmān, 1:517.

42. al-Iḥtijāj 2:511; Biḥār al-Anwār 2:88; Wasā’il al-Shīʿa 27:131.

43. Uṣūl al-Kāfī 1:67; Wasā’il al-Shīʿa 27:34.

44. ‘Uyūn Akhbār al-Riḍā, 2:34.

45. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 1:21.

46. Biḥār al-Anwār 70:65; Fayḍ al-Qadīr 5:4.

47. al-kashāf, 1:524.

48. Tafsīr al-Manār, 5:176.

49. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 1:21.

50. Lisān al-ʿArab 3:459, Wasad.

51. Sunni Muslims call narrations attributed to the Prophet Khabar and narrations by the non-infallible figure Athar

52. al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, 5:10:155-156.

53. Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Ibn Shahr Āshūb, 3:20–21; Yanābīʿ al-Mawadda, 1:341.

54. Usūl al-Kāfī, 2:19-29.

55. Biḥār al-Anwār, 36:249.

56. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 1:276.

57. Kamal al-dīn wa tamām al-niʿma, 1:222.

58. Al-Iḥtijāj 1:370.

59. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib said: God appointed him over the ummah after the Prophet passed, and when the Prophet assigned him to stay in Madina… God commanded people to obey him and ignore other. “ (see, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, Ibn Shahr Āshūb, 3:21; al-Burhān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, 2:265).

60. Kamal al-dīn wa tamām al-niʿma, 1:276.

61. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 2:513-514.

62. kitab al-tawheed, al-soddouk, p. 286.

63. Biḥār al-Anwār, 91:243.

64. al-balad al-amin, p. 205.

65. Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī 1:287; al-Burhān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān 2:263.

66. Tafsīr al-mīzān, 4:437.

67. Nahj al-Balāgha, 35, paragraphs 63-65.

68. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, 1:276.

69. al-Iḥtijāj, 2:95.

70. Nahj al-Balāgha, Sermon 125.