Appearance
Tafsir al-Tasnim – Verses 7:172–174
The Verses
بِسْمِ ٱللَّهِ ٱلرَّحْمَـٰنِ ٱلرَّحِيمِ
In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate
وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِنْ بَنِي آدَمَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ وَأَشْهَدَهُمْ عَلَىٰ أَنْفُسِهِمْ أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ ۖ قَالُوا بَلَىٰ ۛ شَهِدْنَا ۛ أَنْ تَقُولُوا يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ إِنَّا كُنَّا عَنْ هَٰذَا غَافِلِينَ ﴿١٧٢﴾ أَوْ تَقُولُوا إِنَّمَا أَشْرَكَ آبَاؤُنَا مِنْ قَبْلُ وَكُنَّا ذُرِّيَّةً مِنْ بَعْدِهِمْ ۖ أَفَتُهْلِكُنَا بِمَا فَعَلَ الْمُبْطِلُونَ ﴿١٧٣﴾ وَكَذَٰلِكَ نُفَصِّلُ الْآيَاتِ وَلَعَلَّهُمْ يَرْجِعُونَ ﴿١٧٤﴾
When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes indeed! We bear witness.’ [This,] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘Indeed we were unaware of this,’ (172) or lest you should say, ‘Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them. Will You then destroy us because of what the falsifiers have done?’ (173) Thus do We elaborate the signs, so that they may come back. (174)
Summary of the Exegesis
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At the very outset, God Almighty disclosed to the human being his own reality, so that he came to know that his reality and his being are nothing but connection (ʿayn al-rabṭ) to God Almighty. Then God asked the human being about His Lordship and the human being’s servanthood, and the human being acknowledged both, so that on the Day of Resurrection (the place where proofs are put forward) he would not be able to deny them. In the present, too, if the veils of heedlessness were lifted, the human being would see his relational and dependent (rabṭī and faqrī) identity. The connection cannot be witnessed without witnessing that to which it is connected.
To preserve the apparent meaning of the verse, the locus in which the covenant was taken must have certain characteristics: it must precede the life of this world, it must be possible to recall what happened there, and it must be continuous, universal, and a locus of awareness and perception.
The exegetes differ over the locus in which the covenant was taken. They have held it to be, variously, the World of Particles (dharr), the locus of reason, the locus of revelation, a representation (tamthīl), the malakūt, the World of Spirits, or the fiṭrah. Some of these views clash with the wording of the verse and with the purpose of taking the covenant, and some give rise to the problem of transmigration (tanāsukh). Some conflict with aspects of the verse such as its apparent meaning, its universality, the reasoning given in its closing words and the presential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) that it conveys, and so do not agree with other verses. Others are undermined by further proofs and are open to objection on other grounds. Likewise, taking certain narrations to refer to the World of Spirits contradicts the apparent meaning of the verse,(1) although establishing that a covenant was taken from the human being at each of the earlier stages would not in itself lead to anything objectionable.
The way that is safe from these problems and agrees with the apparent meaning of the noble verse is the way of the heart, of the fiṭrah and of witnessing (shuhūd), which differs from the ways of reason and of revelation.
On this basis, the meaning of the verse is: in the locus of the covenant We took from all the Children of Adam the pledge of God’s Lordship and of their servanthood to Him, and all of them answered with the tongue of the fiṭrah, ‘Yes indeed!’, and acknowledged it. If the dust were cleared from the fiṭrah, it would become possible to recall the situation in that mode of existence (nashʾah) and the scene of the taking of the covenant and the pledge.
In any case, God (s.w.t.) took the covenant in the locus mentioned, and He gave this reason why the covenant had to be taken there: to close the door to argument in the arena of the Resurrection, so that no one could say, ‘I was heedless’, or ‘I grew up in an unsound environment; our fathers drew us into polytheism and idol worship; will You then destroy us for what the falsifiers did?’
In this way God Almighty sets out His signs in detail, so that people may be guided, turn away from polytheism and unbelief, and return to their monotheistic fiṭrah.
Exegesis
Vocabulary
The words of these verses are explained in other volumes of Tasnīm: see note (2).
The Relationship between the Verses
This address is directed to people other than the Children of Israel, for they were not polytheists, and God says, ‘or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us]”’. The discourse therefore turns here to arguing against the polytheists among the Arabs, which is the aim of the sūrah from beginning to end, so this turn is like returning the end of the discourse to its beginning (radd al-ʿajuz ʿalā al-ṣadr). The occasion for the turn was the mention of the pledge that God took from the Children of Israel in the testament of Moses, which is the covenant of the Book, and on the day the Mount was raised. This [covenant in the present verse] is a pledge that came about through the creative address (al-khiṭāb al-takwīnī), that is, by placing its meaning in the innate constitution (jibillah) of every soul and in its fiṭrah. The sentence is therefore joined to the preceding sentences as one story is joined to another, and those it is first and foremost aimed at are the polytheists.(3)
The Most Brilliant of the Verses of Fiṭrah
Having recounted the story of the taking of the covenant in certain heavenly scriptures, God (s.w.t.) then mentioned the taking of the innate (fiṭrī) covenant from all human beings: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam…’.
The verses under discussion, together with the verse of the fiṭrah, ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind’,(4) and its companion verses on the inspired soul, ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’,(5) all of which speak of the monotheistic fiṭrah of the human being, are among the most brilliant (ghurar) of the verses of the Noble Qurʾān.
One of the Persian poets, speaking of eloquence and rhetoric, said: ‘How can “Perish the hands…”(6) be like “O earth, swallow…”?’(7)(8) In the same way, among the verses of the monotheistic fiṭrah, which are among the marvels of the Noble Qurʾān, the other verses (those not on tawḥīd) do not reach the height and importance of the verse of the progeny (dharr).
What Idh (“When”) Depends On, and What It Signifies
Idh is an adverb of past time, and most often it depends on the verb udhkur or udhkurū (“remember”), as in: ‘And mention in the Book Mary, when she withdrew from her family’(9) and ‘Remember when you were few’.(10) In places like the verse under discussion, where no verb is stated before idh, the verb udhkur is understood.
Idh tells of the time in the past in which an act took place, and of which people may validly be reminded in the present. In the verse under discussion, idh establishes a locus and a setting that was, in the past, the setting and locus of a charge (taklīf): that is, a locus before the life of this world, in which the Creator (s.w.t.) took a pledge from the Children of Adam. That locus and that covenant are fit to be recalled, because God said to His Prophet (s.a.w.), ‘When your Lord took’, meaning, ‘remember [all of you] when He took…’.
If it proves impossible to establish that this earlier world existed before this world, it still cannot be said that the verse speaks within the sphere of this world. For this world is the setting in which that pledge is fulfilled and the place in which it is recalled; it is not a locus in which the divine covenant was taken and the human being pledged himself to something. Nor can it be said that the human being, composed of spirit and body, existed in another mode of existence before this world, such as a ‘World of Particles’, and then came into the life of this world. Statements of this kind are tainted by the false doctrine of transmigration: that the human being was previously in the world of this world and has now come into this world a second time. There is no doubt that transmigration is false.
In sum, by the apparent meaning of the verse, the locus in which the covenant was taken precedes matter, time and the gradual unfolding of the life of this world. For in the locus in which the covenant was taken, which is the locus in which they were made to bear witness, everyone sees his own identity and reality, and no one forgets himself; whereas in the visible world (ʿālam al-mulk) some forget their reality and stray from it — ‘those who forget Allah, so He makes them forget their own souls’(11) — and some know themselves and know their Lord: ‘Whoever knows himself knows his Lord.’(12) There is, of course, a connection between the locus of bearing witness — from which forgetfulness, heedlessness and inattention are absent, and which exists now — and the visible world (ʿālam al-mulk). This is why God Almighty said ‘remember’. Were that mode of existence the same as this one, or had it ceased to exist and its connection with us been severed, there would be no room left for recalling it or for the command ‘remember’.
Why the Progeny of the Children of Adam Is Said to Be “Taken”
In this noble verse the bringing forth of the progeny of the Children of Adam is expressed as ‘taking’ (akhdh): ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’, whereas in another verse it is expressed with the word ‘bringing out’ (ikhrāj): ‘Allah has brought you forth from the bellies of your mothers’.(13) The expression ‘took’ contains several points:
1. Epistemic weight. The word ‘took’ carries a positive sense and shows care: it means that God Almighty is the one who took the progeny, not that He brought it out. Where something negative, a deficiency or a weakness is involved, the expression ‘bringing out’ is used, as in the verse just cited. In the verse before us, however, He said ‘took’, meaning that God took the progeny of Adam from his loins, made them His pupils and raised them on the foundation of tawḥīd. The expression therefore has epistemic, experiential (shuhūdī) and innate (fiṭrī) weight.
2. The taking of the covenant. The expression ‘took’ refers to the taking of the covenant, which is why the exegetes understood from it the taking of a pledge. Although He used ‘taking’ specifically of the progeny, the taking of the progeny is in reality their being summoned into the holy presence of God’s majesty to receive the covenant: God is the one who took the covenant from them. That is why He did not call it ‘bringing out’.
Indeed, in the verse ‘Allah is the wali of the faithful: He brings them out of darkness into light’(14) He does use ‘bringing out’, but there He sets it against its counterpart: ‘As for the faithless, their awliya are the fake deities, who drive them out of light into darkness’.(15) Moreover, the underlying theme there is transformation, change, movement and transfer, in two directions; whereas in the verse under discussion the subject is the taking of the pledge from all the Children of Adam without distinction, and so it is expressed as ‘taking’.
3. A comprehensive expression. The Children of Adam came forth from the loins of their fathers and the wombs of their mothers. The Noble Qurʾān sometimes mentions the bellies — ‘Allah has brought you forth from the bellies of your mothers’(16) — and does without mentioning the loins; and sometimes it mentions the loins — ‘from their loins’ — and does without mentioning the bellies. When it speaks of bringing forth from the mothers’ wombs, the fathers’ loins are certainly implied, because the human sperm-drop comes out from between the loins (the fathers’ backs) and the breast-bones (the ribs of the woman’s chest) — ‘which issues from between the loins and the breast-bones’(17) — and then settles in the mother’s womb. In this verse, however, He does not mention the wombs and confines Himself to the loins: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins’. Even though coming out of the loins does not, in itself, entail coming out of the belly and the womb — for a drop that comes out of the loins(18) but does not settle in the womb is among the unformed drops (ghayr mukhallaqah) that are not fit for the taking of the covenant — it is known that the formed drop (mukhallaqah) is fit for the taking of the covenant, and this is possible only if it has come out of the loins and settled in the womb. On this basis, in this verse the mention of taking from the loins, together with the word ‘progeny’, makes mention of the bellies unnecessary.
The Change of Style in the Verse
The verses before and after this one are in the third person and speak about the Children of Israel: ‘When We plucked the mountain [and held it] above them as if it were a canopy (and they thought it was about to fall on them)’(19) and ‘Relate to them an account of him to whom We gave Our signs’.(20) In the verses under discussion, however, the manner changes: the discourse turns (iltifāt) from the third person to direct address, the one addressed is the person of the Noble Messenger (s.a.w.), and the subject is different from what precedes and follows it.
Clarification: The basic difference between the preceding verses and the verse of the progeny is that the content of this verse is directed to the person of the Prophet (s.a.w.), whereas the preceding verses concern an event specific to the Children of Israel and the like. There He says, in effect, ‘remember that scene’ — ‘When We plucked the mountain’(21) — but it is not specified whether what governs idh is the verb udhkur, meaning ‘remember, O Prophet (s.a.w.)’, or udhkurū, meaning ‘remember, O believers’. Certainly idh there has a governing verb, but the address is not directed to the Prophet (s.a.w.). In the verse ‘When your Lord took’, by contrast, He addresses the Prophet (s.a.w.) directly: ‘When your Lord took’. He is not telling him to remember a scene that concerned others, or in which he was present. The content of the two verses and the manner of address therefore differ: although the covenant was taken from the loins of the Children of Adam — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins’ — the address is directed straight to the person of the Messenger (s.a.w.). So He says, ‘your Lord did this’, and does not say ‘your [plural] Lord’.
To put it another way: the preceding verse spoke about the stories of earlier peoples, whereas the verse of the progeny conveys a bringing-into-presence. Sometimes God takes the addressee to the story and says, ‘Remember that scene’; and sometimes He brings the story itself into the presence of the addressee and says, ‘This is how the scene was.’ In His words ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam’, the taking of the pledge is made present before the Prophet (s.a.w.); He does not take His Eminence back to the story. When the addressee is taken to the past, this is in reality absence (ghaybah); and when what is absent is brought to the addressee, it is a turn from absence to address. When He says, ‘Recite the story to the people’ — ‘Relate to them an account of him to whom We gave Our signs’(22) — that story happened in the past and is past both for the Prophet (s.a.w.) himself and for people generally; but He may summon that scene from the past to the Prophet (s.a.w.). His words ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?”’ are of this kind, and so the turn from absence to address has taken place.
Most turns from the third person to direct address serve to show the importance of the matter, which is sometimes a matter of rebuke and belittling, and at other times of esteem, exaltation and honour. The importance of the subject calls for the address to change from the third person to the second, or from the third person to the first, and so on. In the verses under discussion there is no evidence of rebuke, because that mode of existence — if it is explained as the narrations require — is not a place for rebuke: at that time no sin had been committed, and everyone had cried out, ‘Yes indeed!’ The turn is therefore to honour the Children of Adam, since the Creator Almighty took their acknowledgement from them directly and made them witnesses over themselves.
The Universality of the Taking of the Covenant
The particle min (“from”) in the sentence ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam’ is not partitive (tabʿīḍ); that is, God took the covenant from the human species. A partitive reading would suggest that the covenant was taken from some of them and not from the rest, in which case the second group could, on the Day of Resurrection, plead one of the two excuses: that we were heedless, or that we grew up in a polytheistic environment. But the argument with which the noble verse closes — ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’ — shows that min is not partitive; that is, We took the covenant from all the Children of Adam. Since the hue of the human soul — ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it’(23) — is fixed and immaterial (mujarradah), it is certain that all human souls, when their Lord asked, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, said, ‘Yes indeed.’ Min in this sentence cannot be taken as partitive by saying that ‘They said, “Yes indeed”’ applied only to those who came before, and that those who come later will say ‘Yes’ in the future. For the mode of existence of the human soul is fixed and immaterial, and from this standpoint there is no difference between past, present and future such that the earlier generation would be those who ‘said, Yes indeed’ and the generation to come those who ‘will say, Yes’.
We shall show, in the discussion of the fiṭrah, that it takes the form of a real proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥaqīqiyyah) and of a universal affirmative, applying to every individual human being in every age and land and to every generation. That is why God (s.w.t.) did not present the taking of the covenant in a form that could be read as particular or indefinite. For example, He did not say, ‘When your Lord took from Adam’, or ‘from mankind’. Rather, the statement is framed so that it is known that all individual human beings, generation after generation, share in this compact, and that no individual is left out of it.
God has explained and interpreted the covenant taken from the Children of Adam — ‘Did I not exhort you, O children of Adam’(24) — in the verse under discussion, so that no one should imagine that the Children of Adam here means human beings only in part (the great ones of humanity), such as the prophets and the awliyāʾ (a.s.), and that this pledge is the pledge He took from the prophets and the leaders of humanity: ‘When Allah took a compact concerning the prophets’ (Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 81). Indeed, the covenant that God affirmed with His prophets (a.s.) concerns prophethood and messengership, and is a subject of its own. But the human being’s confession of God’s Lordship and of his own servanthood is a covenant that God Almighty took from every single human being, comprehensively, from all of them: universally (bi-l-jumlah), not partially (fī al-jumlah).
The expression ‘the Children of Adam’ includes even God’s Prophet Adam (a.s.). It cannot be inferred from this expression that God did not take the pledge from Adam (a.s.), so that we would need to account for such an exception in one of two ways:
1. That the covenant was not taken from him because of the eminence of his rank, since he was a prophet and had reached the station of human perfection. This view is not correct, because among his progeny are those more excellent than he, such as the resolute prophets (ulū al-ʿazm) (a.s.), and the beam of light of Abū al-Qāsim Muḥammad (s.a.w.) is preferred above them; yet the pledge and the covenant were taken from them. How then could Adam (a.s.) alone be excepted from the taking of the covenant?
2. That the covenant was not taken from Adam (a.s.) because he was complete in his creation and there was no need to bring him into the mode of existence of the progeny (al-wujūd al-dharrī). This view is likewise false, because every individual among his progeny has his own complete and perfect creation in his own particular setting. Why, then, was the taking of the covenant not postponed until that time, so that the proof would be complete at that time? What need was there to take the covenant in advance?
In any case, ‘the Children of Adam’ means the offspring of Adam, and it covers every individual of the human species. Compare what has been narrated from the Master of the Martyrs, Imam al-Ḥusayn (a.s.): ‘Death is drawn upon the children of Adam like the mark of a necklace on the neck of a young woman.’(25) By these words he did not mean only the progeny of Adam; even Adam (a.s.) and those who came after him are destined to die, and none remains alive in this world. The same meaning appears in Persian poetry, where human beings are members of a single body, all created alike, so that when one member is hurt the whole body is distressed.(26)
In sum, there is no expression subtler or more exact than the one set down in the noble verse for conveying a general, all-embracing covenant that includes every individual of humankind, even Adam and Eve (a.s.): ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’. Sometimes the definite article of the genus, with the help of evidence and context, indicates that every individual of the genus is included — as with ‘man’ in His words ‘By Time! Man is indeed in loss, except those who have faith and do righteous deeds’(27) — and the exception in these verses makes it clear that what is meant is the individuals of the human genus. In this verse, each of the phrases ‘from the Children of Adam’, ‘from their loins’ and ‘their descendants’ is an indication that what is meant is all human beings, and that no one falls outside this ruling. For each person in this world is the progeny of another, that other is the progeny of the one before him, the one before him is the progeny of one earlier still, and so on; and the verse includes every progeny.
Why the Covenant Is Not Said to Have Been Taken from Beings Other than Humans
The sphere of legislative obligation (al-taklīf al-tashrīʿī) is the domain of humans and jinn only, as is understood from the restriction in His words ‘I did not create the jinn and the humans except that they may worship Me’.(28) That is, although the angels obey God Almighty and do not fall short of His commands — ‘They do not venture to speak ahead of Him, and they act by His command’(29) — they have not been placed within the sphere of legislation in the technical sense. That all beings have a malakūt dimension is a matter that embraces the three kinds mentioned (humans, jinn and angels), just as all other beings also fall under it.
What deserves attention is that the story of the taking of the covenant is not told of the angels, nor of the jinn, even though, by the meaning of the verse in Sūrat al-Dhāriyāt, the jinn share in this with humans, and from another angle, in the grounds for argument (the plea of heedlessness, or of having been influenced by a polytheistic environment), the jinn are equal to humans. The focus on human society, and the restriction of the story of the taking of the covenant to the Children of Adam, is due to the human being’s distinctive qualities and his immense capacity for divine vicegerency, and also because he can attain the lofty stations of prophethood and messengership and of universal and absolute wilāyah. For among the jinn no one has ever appeared, nor ever will, who is God’s vicegerent, God’s prophet and an absolute walī like the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.). Because of this distinction, the making to bear witness and the taking of the covenant are not raised with respect to any being other than the human.
The Object of the Verb Akhadha (“Took”)
Some Sunni exegetes have said that ‘from their loins’ is a substitute (badal) for His words ‘from the Children of Adam’, and that the elided object is the covenant, as He said, ‘and We took from them a solemn covenant’(30) and ‘When We took a pledge from the Children of Israel, [saying]: “Worship no one but Allah”’.(31) The implied sense would then be: ‘When your Lord took from the loins of the progenies of the Children of Adam the covenant of tawḥīd and of worshipping Him alone…’.(32)
It should be noted, however, that the object of the verb ‘took’ is the word ‘their descendants’, and that no such elision or implied wording is needed to establish what the verse under discussion says about the taking of the covenant, since the covenant and the pledge are understood from the sentence ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed.”’
Characteristics of the Locus in Which the Covenant Was Taken
To preserve the apparent meaning of the verse, we must posit a locus for the taking of the covenant with the following characteristics:
1. It precedes the life of this world. The locus of the covenant must precede the life of this world and the locus of address and dialogue, because idh and akhadha (“when” and “took”) speak of the past. The covenant was therefore taken in a locus that is not temporal, not gradual and not subject to change,(33) for these are among the properties of the existence of nature and of this world. Time arises from motion, and motion belongs only to material being, so there is no room for time in the locus in which the covenant was taken. Precedence and priority in this locus are a matter of rank, not of time, like God’s precedence over His creatures; for time is the measure of motion and, like every other event, is a creature of God Almighty.
2. It can be recalled. This locus must be such that, in this world, all the Children of Adam are able to recall it, because idh depends on the verb udhkur (“remember”), and God has commanded everyone to remember it.
3. It actually exists and is not severed. This mode of existence must exist in the present, and the human being’s connection with it must not be cut; otherwise it could no longer be recalled.
4. It allows comprehensive universality. The locus of the covenant must be such that every individual human being is present in it, independently and one by one. For the import of His words ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves…’ is a universal affirmative proposition, which makes it clear that God took His covenant from every single human being independently.
Had He said, ‘When your Lord took from Adam’, or ‘When your Lord took from a human being’, it could have been read as an indefinite (muhmalah) proposition, which has the force of a particular affirmative, and one could then say that what is meant is a select few, such as the prophets and the awliyāʾ (a.s.). But God Almighty said, ‘from the Children of Adam, from their loins…’, which is the clearest way of conveying comprehensive universality.
5. Perception and awareness. This locus must be one in which the human being has perception and awareness. For the apparent meaning of ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ is that the human being’s witnessing of himself is through intellect and understanding, since every individual human being was endowed with awareness and consciousness.
Likewise, the conversation with the Lord of the worlds, in the form of question and answer, in the rest of the verse — ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ — tells us that the Children of Adam possessed intellect and perception in that locus; otherwise God’s argument on the Day of Resurrection, ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’, would be out of place.
6. The capacity to witness (God’s Lordship and the human being’s servanthood) by presential knowledge. The locus of the covenant must be such that every individual human being witnesses God’s Lordship and his own servanthood by presential knowledge, and witnesses it clearly. For the holy divine Essence so spoke with the human being, and so showed human beings their own reality, that they acknowledged to Him, by presential and experiential knowledge, His Lordship and their servanthood. The basis of that acknowledgement is their being made to bear witness over themselves: ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’.
In presential knowledge, being made to bear witness over oneself occupies the place that the middle term (al-ḥadd al-awsaṭ) occupies in acquired knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). For example, if someone says, ‘The world is originated, because it is changing’, the means of proving that the world is originated is its being changing (‘The world is changing; everything changing is originated; so the world is originated’). In the locus in which the human being witnessed God’s Lordship and his own servanthood by presential knowledge, the middle term of that experiential knowledge is the sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’. That is, when God Almighty showed human beings their own selves, one by one, each of them saw himself as a mirror of the Lordship of the Real Almighty and of his own servanthood; he found himself, by presential knowledge, to be nothing but connection (ʿayn al-rabṭ) to God, and found God Almighty to be the sole Maintainer and Sustainer (al-qayyim wa-l-muqawwim) in this universe.
7. The capacity of every human being to answer “Yes indeed”. The covenant must take place in a locus in which every individual human being is able to say ‘Yes indeed’ and to acknowledge the Lordship of the Real Almighty and his own servanthood. For the apparent meaning of His words ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness”’ is that all the Children of Adam said ‘Yes indeed’, without exception, and with no one departing from it.
8. No possibility of being heedless of it, and so on. In the locus of the covenant, inattention, forgetfulness, heedlessness and being veiled are not possible. For if the locus were such that someone could argue before the Lord of the worlds, excusing himself on the grounds that he had been heedless and forgetful, or had been behind a veil, this would be at odds with God’s argument on the Day of Resurrection: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’.
It should be noted that there are many differing views on the locus in which the covenant was taken; they will be set out at the end of the exegetical discussion.
How the Covenant Was Taken
To uncover how the covenant was taken in the verse under discussion, we must set out the kinds of covenant-taking:
1. Creative (takwīnī). This is like the special connection that exists between Creator and creature in the order of existence: the creature is a servant of the Creator, under His governance and nurture, and this never fails. The creative covenant in the order of creation admits of no failure, and it is general. Its evidence is five groups of Qurʾānic verses that indicate the submission, compliance, prostration, glorification and praise of the heavenly and earthly phenomena: ‘while to Him submits whoever there is in the heavens and the earth’;(34) ‘He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’;(35) ‘To Allah prostrates whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth’;(36) ‘Whatever there is in the heavens and in the earth glorifies Allah’;(37) ‘There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification. Indeed, He is all-forbearing, all-forgiving’.(38) These five groups of Qurʾānic verses, which relate the tongue of creation, make plain that there is no being in this vast universe that is not subject to God alone, and this law admits of no failure or disobedience.
The order of creation goes back to the order of cause and effect, which has no exceptions; nothing — inanimate things, plants, animals, jinn, humans and angels — is set apart from its universality or singled out within it. Nor, therefore, is it a basis for argument, and for this reason it falls outside the scope of the verse under discussion, since the subject of this verse is argument (iḥtijāj).
2. Representation (tamthīl). A representation that has no corresponding reality in the outside world may be used to reveal the importance of a matter, as in His words ‘Had We sent down this Quran upon a mountain, you would have seen it humbled [and] go to pieces with the fear of Allah. We draw such comparisons for mankind, so that they may reflect’,(39) where the two sentences ‘so that they may reflect’ and ‘but no one grasps them except those who have knowledge’(40) make plain the benefit of this representation for those given to reflection.
God did not send down the Noble Qurʾān upon a mountain in the outside world so that the mountain would be humbled before its greatness, go to pieces and be levelled. That is why the mountain will not be called to account on the Day of Resurrection, as the human being will be, for not following the law. In the order of creation, however, the mountain, like all other beings, is submissive, obedient, prostrating, glorifying and praising the Real Almighty.
The verse under discussion is not a case of representation, because it has an external reality, and God presents an argument so that no one can plead on the Day of Resurrection that he was heedless, or that he was tainted by the polytheism he inherited from his forebears.
3. Legislative (tashrīʿī). This is the locus of reasoning, recompense, punishment, praise, blame, reward, penalty and final outcome, and of Hell and Paradise, in the order of legislation. In this order, argument is made sometimes by rational proof and sometimes by revelation and transmitted proof. All the arguments between servant and master in jurisprudential discussions, and those concerning rights and ethics, have their place in this order.
It is apparent that the verse under discussion belongs specifically to the order of legislation. For the argument makes known that the purpose of taking the covenant is to close off every pretext for the Children of Adam, so that none of them can excuse himself on the Day of Resurrection by heedlessness, or by having lived in an environment whose forebears were polytheists. Attending to the difference between creation, representation and legislation thus makes known that this verse is an instance of legislation, not of representation or creation. Hence al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s statement on this verse, which applies it to creation or representation,(41) is incomplete; and al-Zamakhsharī’s approach of taking it as representation is likewise incorrect,(42) because the verse explicitly relates an argument. If the verse were in the language of representation, no one could rightly be burned [in the Fire] on the basis of a representation; and if it belonged to the order of creation, disobedience would not be possible for anyone in creation. Rather, the verse speaks the language of legislation, of argument and ratification, and of warning and deterrence from Hell.(43)
It should be noted that there are other possible readings of this blessed verse, such as:
a. Applying the verse to rational proof (theological, philosophical and so on).(44) This application is likewise incomplete. For on the basis of rational proofs one group says ‘Yes indeed’; but the group who regard rational proofs as myths and make sense and experience the criterion of knowledge — ‘They say, “There is nothing but our life of this world, and we shall not be resurrected”’(45) — do not acknowledge Him, and say instead, ‘You are not our Lord.’ Their logic rests on knowledge through the senses, and they have declared that they will not believe in anything that is not fully seen — like the logic of the Children of Israel, who said to Moses (a.s.), ‘We will not believe you until we see Allah openly’: ‘we will not believe you until we see Allah visibly’.(46) Indeed, whoever makes sense and experience the basis of his knowledge, and has not seen something, will not believe in anything, whether he was an Israelite in the time of Moses (a.s.) or a Marxist in the twentieth century.
In sum, the criterion of knowledge consists of four things: the witnessing of the heart, rational proof, revelation and divine inspiration, and sense and experience. Whoever confines his way of knowing to sense and experience alone is among those who refuse the truth, not among those who accept it. So if such people are asked, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, they answer naʿam — that is, ‘[Yes,] You are not our Lord.’(47)
b. Applying the verse to the language of miracles, signs, clear proofs, the Book and the Sunnah.(48) This application is likewise incorrect. For in the face of miracles and clear signs, some say balā and some say naʿam, or some say ‘No’ and some say naʿam; but the verse speaks a language in which all of them said balā, and no one turned away from it. The language of absolute acceptance was the language of the fiṭrah.
The Focus of the Acknowledgement in the Locus of the Covenant
Some of the great masters of gnosis have held that the focus of the acknowledgement in the verse is the principle of Lordship, not tawḥīd. For He said, ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed”’; had the focus of the acknowledgement been tawḥīd, He would have said, ‘Am I not your only Lord?’ Since God knew that a group of human beings would associate partners with Him, He made the principle of Lordship the focus of the acknowledgement.(49)
This view, too, is not correct. For the language and context of ‘Am I not your Lord?’ are those of tawḥīd: that is, ‘I alone am your Lord’ — not ‘Do you acknowledge that I have Lordship or not?’. The acknowledgement in the verse is not of Lordship in a sense broader than the unity of Lordship (al-tawḥīd al-rubūbī); rather, the verse is specifically about the unity of Lordship. First, because God used it to argue against the polytheists, and warned them against pleading heedlessness, or their polytheist forebears, to justify their polytheism. Second, because [otherwise] the polytheist would say: ‘I act on the measure of what I pledged. I acknowledged the principle of God’s Lordship and said “Yes indeed”; but we acknowledged a Lordship compatible with polytheism, and today we acknowledge a Lordship that admits polytheism.’
This statement of al-Shaykh al-Akbar, which al-Ālūsī reports, is likewise out of keeping both with the exegesis of the verse and with the noble verse itself, even though al-Ālūsī does not accept all that he reports. There is a gulf between this statement and gnosis (ʿirfān). Some become so absorbed in epistemological thought that they lean to one side, while their hands are empty in the valley of gnosis.
Al-Ālūsī said: ‘Quṭb al-Ḥaqq wa-l-Dīn al-ʿAllāmah al-Shīrāzī mentioned … — in sum: that the Prophet’s (s.a.w.) answer, when he was asked about the verse, was in the “style of the wise” (uslūb al-ḥakīm); that is, he (blessings and peace be upon him) was asked to explain the covenant of state (al-mīthāq al-ḥālī), and he answered by explaining the verbal covenant (al-mīthāq al-maqālī) in the finest way.’(50) But taking the verse to refer to inscribed forms (al-ṣuwar al-murtasimah) goes against its apparent meaning, and taking it to refer to the fixed essences (al-aʿyān al-thābitah) goes against what one would expect; and since the eternal fixed entities (al-thawābit al-azaliyyah) held by the Muʿtazilah are false in themselves, the meaning of the verse cannot be taken to refer to them. Al-Ālūsī, after reporting the statement of al-Khalkhālī, adds: ‘His statement rests on the difference between fixity (thubūt) and existence (wujūd), and there is a long dispute over this; but we accept it, for we do not mind, and are not ashamed, to acknowledge the truth, and God Almighty has said, “Allah is not ashamed of [expressing] the truth”’(51) — whereas the falsity of such things has been established in its proper place, and false statements must be avoided.
Taking the Verse to Concern Commitment, Not the Bearing of Testimony
Every testimony has three stages: (1) the actual occurrence; (2) the bearing (taḥammul) of the testimony at the time the event occurs; and (3) the giving of the testimony in the courts of justice. In customary testimony, the testimony is given in the courts of law and in the presence of the judge, whereas the testimony set out in the verse under discussion is given in the court of divine justice.
Granting that the sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed”’ is not about the third stage, is it about the first stage — that is, the taking of the covenant and the human being’s commitment — or about the second stage, the bearing of testimony?
If it is about the first stage, it indicates well the presential knowledge of the covenant and of oneself, and even of God; but if it were not about the first stage, it would be difficult to derive this scholarly understanding from the noble verse. The followers of the first theory explained it as follows: so that the human being may understand His Lordship and the human being’s servanthood, God sometimes brings a proof, as in ‘In the earth are signs for those who have conviction, and in your souls [as well]. Will you not then perceive?’,(52) and at other times uncovers the human being’s reality to him and asks him, ‘Am I not your Lord, and are you not My servant?’ The human being, who sees nothing in himself but his being a mirror of the Real Almighty, acknowledges this and says, ‘Yes indeed, You are my Lord and I am Your servant’; and the verse ‘and made them bear witness over themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed”’ refers to this reality.(53)
It might perhaps be said that this meaning fits the expression ‘He made them witness themselves’, and not the sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ [understood] so as to suit the stage of bearing testimony;(54) the verse would then mean: when God Almighty took the covenant from the human being and bound him to it, He made the human being himself a witness to that covenant, so that he could neither escape it nor deny it; for the Day of Resurrection is the place where that testimony is given: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’. On this basis the verse would contain no indication of the human being’s presential knowledge of the covenant and of himself, let alone of his presential knowledge of his Lord Almighty.
One of the most effective ways of deciding between the views, questions and answers mentioned is to reflect twice over on the import of the verse under discussion and to look closely at the order of its sentences. The import of the verse is that God showed the human being his reality — ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ — and then took the pledge from him: ‘Am I not your Lord?’. What this order — the taking of the covenant placed after the making to bear witness — requires is that the making to bear witness comes before the covenant, and that the verse is apparently about the first stage, that is, the very taking of the divine covenant and the binding of the human being to it, not the second stage, which is the bearing of testimony. The making to bear witness in that sentence means showing the human being his identity so that he may know it.
The Human Being’s Presential Knowledge in the Locus of the Covenant
In the locus in which the covenant was taken, the human being knew himself, the taking of the covenant, and God (s.w.t.), by presential knowledge, as follows:
1. The human being’s presential knowledge of himself and of the taking of the covenant. According to the apparent meaning of the verse, in the locus in which the covenant was taken God Almighty uncovered the human being’s reality to him, and the human being saw that the foundation of his existence is nothing but connection to God and dependence on Him. The verse’s indication of the human being’s presential knowledge of himself and of the locus in which the covenant was taken is therefore complete: ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ means that God Almighty said to the human being, ‘Look at yourself, consider your identity, and see what you are acknowledging and what you are pledging yourself to.’ When the human being looks at himself and witnesses it, he finds that God has ratified his servanthood. So the sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’, in the sense of ‘and He made them witnesses over themselves’, means that the human being knows himself. And if the question of knowledge is analysed with respect to the self, it is presential knowledge itself; for the knower knows the known either without an intermediary or through one. The first is presential knowledge, in which the knower is present to the known; the second is acquired knowledge, in which he knows it by means of the form of the thing.
If the veil of heedlessness were lifted from the human being and he witnessed himself, he would see his relational and dependent identity, bound to the First Principle — just as God’s sincere awliyāʾ lifted that veil and saw nothing but Him: ‘Can anything other than You have a manifestation that You do not have?’ Likewise, when true believers are sincere towards God, are intimate with Him and turn to Him with pure intentions, this veil is lifted from them.
The polytheists, whose hearts’ insight is blind in times of ease and comfort — ‘Indeed, it is not the eyes that turn blind, but it is the hearts in the breasts that turn blind!’(55) — and whose hearts have been blackened by sins — ‘No, that is not the case! Rather, their hearts have been sullied by what they have been earning’(56) — have the veil of their heedlessness lifted in times of danger. They then see their identity inclining towards God, and their essential dependence, and so they call on God sincerely, neither under compulsion nor for show: ‘When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(57)
2. The human being’s presential knowledge of God Almighty. According to His words ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’, God (s.w.t.) showed the human being his reality in the locus in which the covenant was taken. So when he looked at his relational identity and his essential dependence, he saw God Almighty with the eye of the heart. The proof is that if a being’s mode of existence is that of being nothing but connection to God, with no reliance on itself or on any other contingent being, then this witnessing lies within the witnessing of God Almighty (fī ṭūl shuhūd Allāh); for it is impossible to witness the connection without witnessing ‘that to which it is connected’. Consequently the human being cannot see himself as nothing but connection to and dependence on God without seeing his Lord, for the dependent cannot be seen without seeing that on which it depends. A creature whose reality of existence is nothing but connection differs immensely from the meanings of particles (al-maʿānī al-ḥarfiyyah), which are viewed sometimes instrumentally and relationally and sometimes independently.
It is worth mentioning that compulsion has no meaning in the mode of existence of the innate covenant, which is the mode of existence of presence and witnessing; the faith there is pure faith. In the mode of existence of this world, however, preoccupation with this world causes forgetfulness.
The conclusion is that, according to the verse under discussion, in the locus of the covenant in which God made the human being know his reality, his reality was present in the very event of the taking of the covenant, and he witnessed it. He likewise sees both parties to the covenant; that is, he knows the covenant presentially, because he is present in the very event. And he likewise knows God (s.w.t.) and has presential knowledge of Him, because he sees both parties to the covenant.
The sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ concerns the making to bear witness in the locus in which the covenant was taken, not the locus of testimony or the locus of bearing testimony.(58) The question then becomes how God took the acknowledgement from the human being: was it by presential knowledge, or by other kinds of knowledge? Did He establish a clear proof or not? What did He make clear to them, so that they said ‘Yes indeed’?
The making to bear witness in the verse is the experiential state in which a person, on seeing himself, witnesses God’s Lordship and his own servanthood. It is not like His words ‘In the earth are signs for those who have conviction, and in your souls [as well]. Will you not then perceive?’,(59) which concern inferential, acquired knowledge, the fruit of theological and philosophical discussion.
To understand the purpose of the noble verse better, let us bring the intelligible near by means of the sensible (comparison, tashbīh). One may say: if we set a mirror before a bright reality, the mirror sees that reality, points to it and submits before it. If we turned the face of the mirror so that it saw itself, and asked it, ‘What do you see?’, the mirror would say, ‘I have found a luminous reality, and I point to it.’ That is, God is reflected in the mirror of the human being’s reality, and the human being’s reality, like all the other divine signs, is a mirror reflecting God Almighty. The difference is that the mirror has no power to see itself, so it does not answer the question ‘Whom did you see, and what did you reflect?’; it is silent, for it cannot see itself so as to say, ‘There is nothing in me but the owner of the image.’ The human being, however, is a mirror whose face God turned towards itself so that it might know its own essence; he saw his own reality, and so he answered the question ‘Am I not your Lord?’ with: ‘They said, “Yes indeed.”’
The Creator Almighty said to the human being: Remember this acknowledgement, lest on the Day of Resurrection you make the excuse that God did not show you Himself, or argue that you grew up in a polytheistic environment. He constantly reminds him that he is a sign of Him, and that He is the owner of his image.
In this light, the Master, the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.), described creation as a mirror of God Almighty in which the Real is seen: ‘and the mirrors bear witness to Him, not by being present [to Him].’(60) The whole world of contingent beings is a mirror of the Real, and the divine Most Beautiful Names are seen in it.
The Subject of “We Bear Witness” and Its Meaning
Views differ on the subject of ‘We bear witness’ (shahidnā): (1) The sentence ‘We bear witness’ is God’s speech, meaning: ‘We bear witness, O Children of Adam, that you said “Yes indeed”.’(61) (2) It is the statement of the angels, meaning: the angels bore witness that the Children of Adam made a pledge and a covenant with God.(62) (3) It is the statement of the Children of Adam, meaning: ‘By looking over ourselves we have witnessed Your Lordship and our servanthood, and we are among those who bear witness to it.’(63) On this view, it is understood that acknowledgement is being called testimony, since the sentence ‘We bear witness’ in reality means the acknowledgement that was expressed with the word ‘testimony’.
Clarification: Regarding the use of the word ‘testimony’ in cases of acknowledgement and confession, the principle in testimony is that the witness is someone other than the one for or against whom testimony is given. In a court of law, a statement in someone’s favour or to his detriment is called testimony; but the accused’s statement about himself is called acknowledgement and confession, not testimony. Hence His words ‘on the day when witness shall be given against them by their tongues, their hands, and their feet concerning what they used to do’(64) and similar verses, from which it can be derived that real answerability belongs to the human being’s spirit, not to his tongue, hand and feet. Although the human being took usury and unlawful wealth with his hand, walked the path of sin with his feet, and lied and backbit with his tongue, all of these are instruments of the human spirit, and the real sinner is the human being. In this picture the apparent meaning of testimony is preserved: the testimony of the foot, the hand or the tongue is not called acknowledgement but real testimony, because the members and limbs are the witnesses, and the one against whom testimony is given is the human spirit that committed the sins, the limbs being its instruments. In cases like these the apparent meaning of testimony holds, because the witness and the one testified against are distinct.
When a person states something against himself, this is called acknowledgement; and if the word ‘testimony’ is applied to such a case, it is by way of this kind of reflection and deliberation: the person’s self is regarded as separate from himself, and he then states something against it — which in reality is acknowledgement. Hence the Noble Qurʾān expresses such testimony as confession and acknowledgement: ‘Thus they will admit their sin. So away with the inmates of the Blaze!’(65)
In sum, the accused’s statement against himself is expressed as acknowledgement and confession; and if, in view of the analysis of testimony, it is called testimony in this situation, what is meant is testimony by deed, not testimony by word. The unbelievers’ testimony against their own unbelief — ‘while they are witness to their own unfaith’(66) — is likewise testimony by deed;(67) for the deeds of the polytheists testify to their deviation from tawḥīd, and those who submit before idols acknowledge their unbelief in deed and bear witness to it; otherwise there is no court in which they could acknowledge it and testify to their unbelief.
How the Acknowledgement Was Taken
How did God take the acknowledgement (iqrār) from the human being in the locus where the covenant was taken? Did He establish a proof, or did He show him something? How did the human being affirm God’s Lordship and acknowledge his servanthood to God? If we take the sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ as concerning specifically the station of making [them] bear witness (ishhād) (showing the human being his identity), the answer is clear: God Almighty showed the human being his own reality. If the human being saw his essence and reality, then he is certainly a dependent being who sees no attachment for himself to anything other than the Lord of the worlds. And if a thing is nothing but connection (ʿayn al-rabṭ) to something, witnessing this connection is not possible without witnessing that to which it is connected.
This matter is not like the meaning of a particle (al-maʿnā al-ḥarfī), whose consideration lies in the hands of the one who considers it. In the science of Arabic letters it has been said that particles — such as min (“from”), ilā (“to”) and ʿalā (“on”) — are not independent in conveying their meaning; they exist to bind the connection between two independent meanings — that is, two nouns, or a noun and a verb — unless [the particle] is considered independently, in which case it conveys a nominal meaning. For example, min is considered independently as signifying beginning; in this case the word min is a noun for that particle, and under this consideration all the rules of the noun apply to it. So whether a particle is connective or not depends on the human being’s consideration and regard; it does not arise from the particle’s essential identity. But the human being’s being nothing but connection, and his dependence — and likewise that of all other contingent beings — do not depend on anyone’s consideration; rather, the reality of their kind of existence is such that independence can never be considered in it. Whoever looks at the human being with an independent view has not seen the human being’s reality; he has been mistaken about him and has confused the application. For being nothing but connection to God Almighty is essential to the human being, and to every other contingent being, and is their very identity.(68)
In sum: what human beings have laid down may be instrumental at one time and principal at another; but that whose existence is founded on connection to God Almighty does not admit of the independent view. Whoever regards it with an independent view has either feigned ignorance of it or erred in the application; and if anyone has regarded himself as independent, he has in reality been heedless of his own identity. For the human being’s being nothing but connection is essential (dhātī) to him — essential, of course, in the sense of identity, not essential [in the sense] of quiddity, because quiddity is lower than identity.
On the basis of these two points — first, that the human being’s identity is nothing but connection to God Almighty: ‘O mankind! You are the ones who stand in need of Allah, and Allah—He is the All-sufficient, the All-laudable’;(69) and second, that this connection is not in anyone’s hands, such that he might regard it instrumentally at one time and independently at another — whoever has found the identity of the human being would certainly find God. If someone knows himself and does not know his Lord, then either he has erred in the application, or he has seated a second [being] in His place, imagining it to be God Almighty: ‘Have you seen him who has taken his desire to be his god’;(70) for no one can truly know himself and yet not know his Lord. The noble ḥadīth ‘Whoever knows himself has known his Lord’(71) carries this same sense — not that if someone knows [himself] now, he will know God Almighty in the future; for it did not say ‘will know his Lord’. For this reason, in cases such as these God is not described as the agent; rather, it is said that God Almighty is the sustainer (muqawwim) of the human being. For this is subtler than the concept of creatorship and finer than the title of agent, because the focus of the discussion is identity and God, not humanity and existence, such that causality and being caused, creatorship and being created would come up. When the talk is of identity and God Almighty, creatorship, causality and agency come back to sustaining (taqwīm).
God Almighty is qayyim and qayyūm: ‘Allah—there is no god except Him—is the Living One, the All-sustainer’;(72) and the human being is sustained by religion and by divine care. For this reason the Noble Qurʾān describes religion — inasmuch as it is the very manifestation of divine care — as qayyim: ‘That is the upright religion’ (al-dīn al-qayyim).(73)
The Basis of the Acknowledgement of God’s Lordship
God Almighty took the acknowledgement from the Children of Adam in a special way, and they likewise confessed to Him His Lordship and their servanthood to Him. The basis of this acknowledgement is the making [them] bear witness over themselves: ‘and made them bear witness over themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’. This making [them] bear witness over themselves occupies, in presential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī), the position of the middle term in acquired knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). In acquired knowledge, if someone were to say, ‘The world is originated, because it is changing’, his way to proving the world’s origination would be change, by the proof that the world is changing and everything changing is originated. It is likewise in experiential knowledge: since the human being witnessed God’s Lordship and his own servanthood to Him, the middle term by analogy (tanzīlī) in experiential knowledge was the making [them] bear witness over themselves: ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’.
After this making [them] bear witness, God Almighty said to the Children of Adam: Witness yourselves. When they saw themselves, He said to them: ‘Am I not your Lord?’; and joined to their seeing themselves, at that same moment, was their acknowledgement of the Lordship of God Almighty and of their servanthood to Him, which is their saying: ‘They said, “Yes indeed!”’. On this basis, what occupies the position of the middle term in the acknowledgement of Lordship to God and of servanthood to Him is the witnessing of oneself.
If we wished to set out this presential knowledge in the language of acquired knowledge, we would say: since God showed every single person to himself and asked him, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, and they all answered, ‘Yes indeed!’, the witnessing (shuhūd) of oneself sufficed for the acknowledgement of God’s Lordship — through a mode of witnessing in which the human being sees in whose hand the reins of his affairs lie. In that locus all human beings saw the reins of their affairs in the hand of God, the One, the Unique; all of them saw themselves, and the one who holds their reins. There is no inference there, such that the three logical terms would be considered in it; rather, it needs a mirror. The Children of Adam saw in the mirror of their own selves the Lordship of God and servanthood to Him: when they witnessed themselves, they found themselves nothing but connection to God Almighty, and [found] that the sole being who is the maintainer (qayyim) and sustainer (muqawwim) of the human being is God alone, and that the sole place to which the human being is attached is God Almighty.
There, the more transparent and clear a mirror was — like the mirror of the Household of Infallibility and Purity (a.s.) — the better its owner perceived God’s Lordship and his own servanthood. The statement of the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.), ‘I would not worship a Lord whom I have not seen’,(74) is a clear indication of the transparency of that mirror. Likewise the gnostic chant, ‘My God, it suffices me as glory that I be a servant to You, and it suffices me as pride that You be a Lord to me. You are as I love, so make me as You love’,(75) is a sign of this transparency.
When Imam al-Sajjād (a.s.) converses intimately with his Lord, he sees himself before his Lord as the least of beings, as though he were a small particle or less: ‘and I am, moreover, the least of the least, the lowliest of the lowly, and like a particle or less’.(76) Imam Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn (a.s.) found his reality; and whoever attains this knowledge finds himself to be like a small particle, or lower than that. Others too are in the same state, except that they have not perceived the reality.(77)
The Resemblance of the Locus in Which the Covenant Was Taken to the Scene of the Resurrection
Just as on the Day of Resurrection each one bears witness over his own deeds — ‘Read your book! Today your soul suffices as your own reckoner’(78) — so in the locus of the covenant each individual is a witness over his own reality: he sees himself, and sees the witness to his acknowledgement.
At the scene of the Resurrection all the former and latter generations are gathered together: ‘Say, “Indeed the former and latter generations will all be gathered for the tryst of a known day”’;(79) yet they all come singly, with no tie to one another: ‘Certainly you have come to Us alone, just as We created you the first time’.(80) All are raised from the dust; father and son are scattered forth from the dust with no kinship between them: ‘there will be no ties between them on that day’;(81) and the regulations of social agreements,(82) such as social relationships, are likewise absent: ‘a day on which there will be no bargaining, neither friendship’.(83) So too in the mode of existence (nashʾah) of the covenant: although the Lord of the worlds gathers them together, each of them bears witness over himself alone, sees himself and bears witness to what he acknowledges. The sentence ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ is equivalent in meaning to this expression: ‘not over others; rather, He made each one a witness over himself’ — whether ‘witness’ is in the sense of one who is informed and overseeing, or in the sense of proof. That is: God made each one informed of himself, and in the second [sense] no one [else] has any part.
Arguing from Heedlessness and Inheritance, and Its Forms
Two scenes are conceivable for the polytheists at the scene of the Resurrection: 1. Heedlessness: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’. 2. Inheritance: ‘or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them”’. To close the door of pretext-making to the polytheists, He took these two pretexts away from them, so that no excuse remains for them. The word ‘or’ (aw), the separator between(84) the two sentences, has made the proposition a disjunctive one excluding the absence of both (munfaṣilah māniʿat al-khulūw), in which both can be combined. That is, had there been no pledge at the scene of the taking of the covenant, they might have been able to argue by both of them or by one of them: they would make their heedlessness, or the polytheism of their forebears, or both, a pretext with which to excuse themselves. But by taking the covenant from them He closed this door against them.
Discussion of these verses reveals that no one, in any situation, has the excuse of saying, ‘I was heedless’, or ‘I grew up in a polytheistic environment and the questions of tawḥīd did not reach me’, or ‘I was brainwashed’; because that Lordly pledge lay hidden within all of them and the fiṭrah was illuminated by it. Had it not been for this pledge, the light of the fiṭrah would have dwindled. By taking the covenant of the fiṭrah from all human beings, God Almighty took from them the door of pretext and excuse.
Arguing from heedlessness and inheritance can be conceived in several ways:
1. If no covenant were taken from the Children of Adam — in the manner of a universal negative proposition — the result would be the pretext of heedlessness, and it would be valid for everyone to excuse himself by heedlessness on the Day of Resurrection.
2. No pledge is taken from the earlier generations, and the pledge is taken only from the coming generations; then it would be valid for the earlier generation to fall back on heedlessness as its excuse.
3. The covenant is taken only from the earlier, preceding generation, and no covenant is taken from the coming generation. The result is that if the earlier generation, as a result of its anger and lust, deviated without excuse — ‘Our wretchedness overcame us’(85) — deliberately and knowingly, and associated partners with its Lord, then there is no excuse for them, because they are heedless;(86) and likewise — in the case of the earlier generation’s deviation — they could argue from the polytheistic inheritance that came down to them from their fathers, and so excuse their polytheism thus: ‘We were raised in a polytheistic environment, and we inherited polytheism from our fathers and forefathers.’
And to close off these arguments or excuses, whether in collective or individual form, or twofold or single.(87) God Almighty has said: I have taken the covenant from all individual human beings, so no single human being has any excuse on the Day of Resurrection, whether he grew up in a family that persisted in polytheism, or studied in the assemblies of the polytheists and was brought up in their societies, or [grew up] in communities of faith and tawḥīd: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness.” [This,] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’.
The Necessity of Taking the Covenant
From the way the noble verse argues, it is derived that the taking of the covenant — like the principle of revelation and prophethood — is something necessary for human society; for in the absence of the pledge and covenant, it would be valid for human beings to argue on the Day of Resurrection by heedlessness or by having grown up in a polytheistic society — just as it is valid for those to whom we did not bring(88) the message of revelation to excuse themselves on the Day of Resurrection, in the presence of the Lord, [by asking] why He did not send us a messenger whom we might follow so that we would not go astray: ‘Why did You not send us an apostle so that we might have followed Your signs before we were abased and disgraced?’(89)
Just as God Almighty gave a demonstration of the necessity of revelation and prophethood — ‘apostles, as bearers of good news and warners, so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles; and Allah is all-mighty, all-wise’(90) — so too He gave a demonstration of the necessity of taking the covenant: ‘We bear witness.’ [This,] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘Indeed we were unaware of this’.
By virtue of the proof of the necessity of prophethood and the general mission, the principle of revelation and prophethood is something necessary: [without it] human beings do not attain complete guidance, and it is not possible for him to argue on the Day of Resurrection;(91) for reason (ʿaql) is necessary for the guidance of human beings, but not sufficient for it. Just as without reason the divine proof is not attained — because the principle of the Origin and His attributes, and the necessity of revelation and the need for the prophets (a.s.), are posited and made clear by reason — so too, with reason alone, without revelation and prophethood, God’s conclusive proof is not complete, and the servant’s argument against the master on account of his not sending messengers would be valid.
In other words, what reason acknowledges is of benefit in two things: 1. Identifying the principle of the Origin and His attributes, the necessity of revelation, and human beings’ need for the prophets. 2. The servant’s conclusive argument against the master. That is: just as reason identifies the principle of the Origin and His attributes, and identifies the necessity of revelation and the need for the prophets, so it can be the pivot of argument and argue in the servant’s favour thus: ‘My Lord, You created me in this life a wayfarer, and You laid down for me a goal and a path by which I proceed towards that goal; why then did You not send a guide to direct me to the right way?’
An argument like the one set out in verse 165 of Sūrat al-Nisāʾ and verse 134 of Sūrat Ṭā Hā concerning revelation and prophethood has come in the verse under discussion concerning the taking of the covenant, where the pledge was taken from human beings so that [man] would not be able to argue on the Day of Resurrection, and would not say, ‘I was heedless’, or ‘I was brought up in an environment that inherited polytheism from its forebears’: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this,” or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them”’. On the basis of this argument, the focus of this covenant (presential making to bear witness) differs from the focus of reason (acquired demonstration) and of revelation; and the taking of the experiential covenant cannot be regarded as the same as inferential reason, or as revelation and prophethood.
Reminder: That covenant mentioned is necessary, but the sending down of the heavenly Books and the sending of the prophets (a.s.) are two necessary complements to it. Perhaps this is the secret of expressing divine revelation as tadhkirah (‘reminder’) and of describing the Noble Qurʾān as ‘the Reminder’ (al-mudhakkir): it is for the sake of reminding [people] of the pledge of the covenant. After the proof has been established, the mere taking of the covenant after making them bear witness (ishhād), with respect to each individual independently, suffices. But if the import of the verse under discussion is the preservation of the three elements — the multiplicity of individuals and progenies, the independence of each one, and the gathering in the locus of the covenant — then something resembling the event of the Return (al-maʿād) must have taken place before the mode of existence of this world. The concern with the complement of the covenant that comes by way of the messengers (a.s.) can be gleaned from His words ‘Did not any warner come to you?’(92)
The Closing Part of the Verse of the Progeny Is Not at Odds with the Verses on Heedlessness
The verse we are dealing with indicates the denial of heedlessness of all individuals absolutely: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’. A great number of other verses, however, make known that a group of human beings live lives buffeted by heedlessness and do not use the heart, nor the inner ear and eye, to know God and obey Him; rather, they are like cattle, or even more astray: ‘they have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, they have ears with which they do not hear. They are like cattle; indeed, they are more astray. It is they who are the heedless’.(93) Heedlessness is also spoken of at the Resurrection, and some of them are addressed [with the words] that their affair has passed in heedlessness: ‘You were certainly oblivious of this. We have removed your veil from you, and so today your eyesight is acute’;(94) ‘Mankind’s reckoning has drawn near to them, yet they are disregardful in [their] obliviousness’;(95) ‘Indeed many of the people are oblivious to Our signs’.(96)
In reply it should be said that the verse under discussion is in harmony with the verses mentioned, because heedlessness is of two kinds: voluntary heedlessness and involuntary [heedlessness]. Involuntary heedlessness does not come after knowledge. It is like that of someone walking in the darkness of night who does not know whether there is a well or a huge rock in his path, and so fears falling into the well or colliding with the rock. The root of this heedlessness, which is coupled with ignorance, is his ignorance of the thing he is heedless of, and there is no shortcoming on the part of the heedless one.
Voluntary heedlessness comes after knowledge. It is like that of someone who has been shown a scene or a reality and who, on entering the arena of fun and play, amuses himself, is distracted, becomes attached to the play and goes to excess in it, and so becomes heedless of what he knows. Heedlessness such as this comes about through a person’s bad choice. On this basis, heedlessness at root is sometimes a veil cast over the thing one is heedless of (involuntary heedlessness), and at other times a veil cast over the heedless person(97) (involuntary heedlessness).(98)
God (s.w.t.) affirms that what has been disclosed to the human being is little and what has not been disclosed is abundant; but you are not charged with it, and they are not asked about it.(99) For in the world of the Unseen there are mysteries and hidden things that none but God Almighty knows: ‘Knower of the Unseen, He does not disclose His [knowledge of the] Unseen to anyone, except to an apostle He approves of’.(100) We ordinary individuals are not asked about those hidden secrets, and we bear no responsibility with regard to them. But in the sphere of the servants’ obligation, God Almighty has left no secret concealed: ‘rectitude has become distinct from error’.(101) All that relates to this world, felicity, wretchedness, the grave, the Resurrection and the future of humanity, the Lord of the worlds has made clear, concealing none of it. Nor did the Most Noble Prophet (s.a.w.) withhold from us the explanation of these matters; he conveyed to us all the commands and whatever he received, for he is not miserly in explaining the reports and the unseen things: ‘and he is not miserly concerning the Unseen’.(102) So in the world of obligation there is no hidden secret; but in the world other than that of obligation there are hidden things and abundant mysteries [concealed] from the Children of Adam.
The human being is not one of the angels, and his life is not like theirs, such that it would continue always in the pursuit of knowledge, research and worship. Hence his body needs rest, and he is in want of food and drink, amusement and the like, so that he may draw from these things the energy to carry on with these scholarly and devotional matters. If play and diversion become fundamental for the human being — ‘the life of this world is mere diversion and play, glamour and mutual vainglory among you and rivalry for wealth and children’(103) — he gradually becomes heedless of research and study; and at the hour of the examination the veil of his heedlessness is removed from his eyes, not from reality. For reality is not veiled but uncovered; it is the player who has been heedless of it and has covered his eyes with the veil.
The awliyāʾ of religion sought various ways to remove this veil from the ordinary human being in this world, but they did not do so; and the veil will be removed from them at the Resurrection. Yes! Whoever does not, by his own choice, find guidance to the path of God will be dragged to God by force, just as whoever has not seen the reality of creation and legislation will see it intensely on that day: ‘Seize him, and fetter him!’(104) This seeing does not come to him free of cost; rather, as a result of the removal of the veil, his sight is acute: ‘We have removed your veil from you, and so today your eyesight is acute’.(105) Ḥadīd (‘acute’) means sharpness and precision of sight, by which he sees the realities but cannot believe in them. He is therefore tormented by this, like someone who sees water while thirsty but cannot drink from it. So there is no veil over the realities of the world; if a group passes [its life] in heedlessness, this is because of the veil that they themselves have woven over their eyes. Otherwise, God Almighty and the religious realities are not hidden in this world, and He is nearer to the human being than anything; indeed, He is nearer to the human being even than his own self: ‘and We are nearer to him than his jugular vein’.(106) If the human being were nearer to himself than God is, this would mean limitation for God, and it would then not be valid to describe Him with the likening description (al-waṣf al-tashbīhī) mingled with transcendence (tanzīh): ‘He is in things without intermixture.’(107) So God Almighty is nearer to the human being’s self than the human being himself; and the human being is aware of the reality of God Almighty before he becomes aware of his own reality. For the human being’s self, his understanding and his awareness are nothing but connection (ʿayn al-rabṭ) to God Almighty, and no connection is witnessed or understood except after the witnessing of that to which it is connected.
The Ruling on Heedlessness
In explaining the secret and the ultimate aim of taking the covenant, the verses under discussion set down two sentences: (1) ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’; (2) ‘or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them. Will You then destroy us because of what the falsifiers have done?”’. The ruling is made clear in the second sentence — ‘Will You then destroy us because of what the falsifiers have done?’ — and its meaning is this: Did you not say that no one bears another’s burden — ‘no bearer shall bear another’s burden’(108) — so for what reason have we been made to bear the burden of our forefathers? What is our sin, when we grew up in an environment immersed in polytheism and they gave us a bad upbringing? Why then are we taken to task for the wrong those people did — misguidance — and punished with a severe punishment?
A ruling such as this must be implied in the first sentence, namely: we were heedless — ‘Indeed we were unaware of this’ — and the heedless person is not punished, as you act; so this obliged you to refrain from punishing us, on the ground that obligation falls away from the charge of the heedless person. This ruling has been elided in the first sentence, as the occurrence of its counterpart in the second sentence shows.
It is worth mentioning that the word al-mubṭil (‘falsifier’) may be transitive, in the sense of invalidating a deed, or it may have another indication;(109) but in the verse under discussion the verb is intransitive, in the sense of one who does what is false,(110) even if it implicitly carries within itself the sense of transitivity.
The Multiple Aims of Relating the Story of the Taking of the Covenant
The word wa (‘and’) in wa-laʿallahum yarjiʿūn (‘so that they may come back’) is conjunctive and is joined to something elided, like the wa in His words wa-li-yakūna min al-mūqinīn (‘that he might be of those who possess certitude’).(111) The meaning of the verse under discussion thus becomes: We relate the clear and manifest signs for many aims, and one of these aims is the people’s return from deviation and their steadfastness upon the divine pledge; that is, their return to their sound fiṭrah and their original identity.
Among the fundamental discussions raised in the Noble Qurʾān is the abundance of excellent sciences and knowledge bestowed by God upon the person of the Most Noble Prophet (s.a.w.). Since others were unable to bear them, and because those sciences were not necessary for them, they were not taught them. The Qurʾānic expressions He used in certain important discussions — such as the showing of the malakūt to Abraham the Friend (a.s.) and the taking of the covenant from the Children of Adam — deserve deep reflection.
The presence of the conjunctive wa at the close of the account of this story deserves attention and scrutiny. What the apparent [construction] requires is that the wa be omitted in both sentences; but the mention of the conjunctive wa, and the joining of wa-li-yakūna min al-mūqinīn to something elided, reveals that the showing of the malakūt to Abraham the Friend (a.s.) had [several] purposes, one of which was the certitude of the Prophet Abraham the Friend (a.s.): ‘Thus did We show Abraham the dominions of the heavens and the earth, that he might be of those who possess certitude’.(112) Likewise, the joining of the sentence wa-laʿallahum yarjiʿūn to something elided is the best witness that the detailed relating of the story has multiple purposes, the mention of one of which was of benefit to people generally: ‘Thus do We elaborate the signs, so that they may come back’.
These two verses are two clear and evident proofs that Qurʾānic knowledge is not for the generality of people but is specific to the Prophet (s.a.w.) and the People of the House (a.s.), and that none but they attain the essence and all the dimensions of the realities of the Qurʾān.
The Views of the Exegetes on the Locus in Which the Covenant Was Taken
The basis of the exegetes’ discussion of this verse has been devoted to explaining the locus in which the covenant was taken. The views on this matter are many, and we shall confine ourselves to mentioning seven of them:
First. The Taking of the Covenant in the World of Particles
A group of them reckoned that the import of the verse of the progeny is what has come in some narrations, where it is named the World of Particles (ʿālam al-dharr). Along these lines, al-Shaykh al-Ṭabrisī (may God have mercy on him) reported from some exegetes the meaning of this verse: ‘God Almighty brought forth the progeny of Adam from his loins in the form of particles (dharr) and presented them to Adam, and said, “I am taking from your progeny their covenant that they worship Me and associate nothing with Me, and upon Me is their sustenance.” Then He said to them, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed, we bear witness that You are our Lord.” Then He said to the angels, “Bear witness”, and they said, “We bear witness.”’(113)
The followers of this theory relied on narrations [to show] that His words ‘When your Lord took…’ indicate the World of Particles. But some of these narrations are marfūʿ and some are mawqūf (unsupported); and many of the pillars of the art of exegesis have rejected this interpretation and regarded it as contrary to the apparent meaning of the Noble Qurʾān.
The two Shaykhs, al-Ṭūsī and al-Ṭabrisī (may God have mercy on them both), raised objections against the theory of the World of Particles:
1. Because God Almighty said, ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam’, and did not say ‘from Adam’; He said ‘from their loins’, and did not say ‘from his loins’; and He said ‘their descendants’, and did not say ‘his descendants’. God Almighty then told that He did this lest they should say that they had been unaware of that, or excuse themselves by the polytheism of their fathers, having grown up on their religion. This requires that they have polytheist fathers, so the apparent meaning does not include Adam’s immediate offspring (walad Ādam li-ṣulbih).
2. This progeny drawn out from Adam’s loins: either God made them rational beings, or He did not. If He did not make them rational, it is not valid [to say] that they knew tawḥīd and understood God Almighty’s address. If He made them rational and took the covenant from them, they must remember it and not forget it; for the taking of a covenant is not a proof against the one from whom it is taken unless he remembers it, so we must remember the covenant. And [this is] because it is not permissible that a great many, a vast multitude, of rational beings should forget something they had known and discerned, so that not one of them remembers it, even if the time has been long. Do you not see that the people of the Hereafter know many of the conditions of this world, so much so that the people of Paradise say to the people of the Fire, ‘We found what our Lord promised us to be true’?(114)
3. Accepting the World of Particles entails accepting the false doctrine of the transmigrationists.
4. The theory of the World of Particles relies on narrations that are either weak or marfūʿ.(115)
After the details of the objections mentioned, they will be set out and summarised under several headings.
a. The incompatibility of the theory of the World of Particles with the Noble Qurʾān. The interpretation of the verse of the World of Particles goes against the explicit wording of the apparent meaning of the verse in transparent respects:
First: The Noble Qurʾān expresses it as God taking the progeny from the sons of Adam (a.s.) — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’ — not from Adam (a.s.) himself.
Second: According to the apparent meaning of the noble verse, God (s.w.t.) took their progeny from the loins (aṣlāb) of the sons of Adam (a.s.), and from their backs (ẓuhūr) — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’ — and not, as that interpretation states, from the loins of Adam himself.
It is worth mentioning that ‘from their loins’ is a substitute (badal) for ‘from the Children of Adam’, and that dhurriyyah (‘progeny’) is used for the plural, for the singular, and for both. The singular use is as in ‘Grant me a good offspring from You!’,(116) where the Creator (s.w.t.) granted John (a.s.) to Zechariah (a.s.); and the plural use is as in His words ‘and we were descendants after them’.(117)
Third: The verse speaks of the progeny of the Children of Adam — ‘their descendants’ — not of the progeny of Adam. So whoever holds that the import of the verse is the World of Particles, as stated in some narrations, has overturned, in the sentence ‘from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’, four of the apparent meanings of this verse without evidence or proof. For the apparent meaning of the verse is: first, ‘from the Children of Adam’, not from Adam; second, ‘from [the] loins’, not from a loin; third, ‘from their loins’, not from his loins; and fourth, ‘their descendants’, not from his descendants.
What deserves to be mentioned and attended to is that this objection is permanent and cannot be removed.(118) For it is possible that the verse has related the story in detail while the narrations have summarised it. It is like the story of the creation of the human being, which He summarised in His words ‘He created you from dust’,(119) and at other times [related] in details and stages: ‘It is He who created you from clay’;(120) ‘Certainly We created man from an extract of clay’;(121) ‘Indeed, We created them from a viscous clay’;(122) ‘Certainly We created man out of a dry clay [drawn] from an aging mud’;(123) ‘He created man out of dry clay, like the potter’s’.(124) Just as there is no contradiction between these verses — because some of them speak of the origin of the human being’s creation from dust and others of the stages of his creation from dust — so likewise the verse under discussion does not conflict with the narrations. For the existence of the progeny has stages: the narrations speak of the first stage of bringing into existence, that is, the taking of the progeny from the loins of Adam, while the verse under discussion concerns the intermediate and final stages, that is, the stages through which the sons of Adam came forth, beginning from his loins and his descendants — not all of them without intermediary from the loins of the person of Adam (a.s.). Of course, the narrations of the World of Particles are weak and unreliable.
Fourth: It goes against the apparent meaning of ‘When … took’. For idh is an adverb of past time and, by the evidence of other verses such as ‘And mention in the Book Mary, when she withdrew’,(125) it depends on the verb udhkur (‘remember’); that is, remember the time in which that event occurred — it commands remembrance of that time. The taking of the covenant took place in a locus such that the human being is able to remember it; yet no one remembers anything of the World of Particles, and however much people search their memory, they do not remember even a little of that world.
It may be said that not remembering the World of Particles is not a proof of its non-existence, because the human being, in moving from that world to the world of nature, has left behind him many transformations, some of which are enough to make him forget that period and what happened in it. The reply is: it is true that a long interval of time after an event, and the transformations that follow it, may contribute to the forgetting of that event. But this forgetting happens partially (fī al-jumlah), to some individuals, not totally (bi-l-jumlah) and to everyone; unless the interval of time between the World of Particles and this world be greater than the interval of time between this world and the Hereafter, and unless the events and transformations after the World of Particles and before the occurrence of the terrifying event of death, and the grave and the barzakh up to the rising of the Resurrection, and after that up to the entry into Paradise or Hell.(126)
The Noble Qurʾān describes the Day of Resurrection as ‘the Greatest Catastrophe’ (al-ṭāmmah al-kubrā), on which the human being will remember his endeavour: ‘When the Greatest Catastrophe befalls — the day when man will remember his endeavours’.(127) It also tells us of the conversation of the people of the Gardens with the people of the Fire, in which the people of Paradise call out to the people of the Fire: We have found what our Lord promised us; have you found what He promised you? — ‘The inhabitants of paradise will call out to the inmates of the Fire, “We found what our Lord promised us to be true; did you find what your Lord promised you to be true?” “Yes,” they will say’.(128) And the people of Paradise, conversing in friendship among themselves, ask about the conditions of their companions in this world: ‘One of them will say, “Indeed I had a companion …” He will say, “Will you have a look?”’;(129) then he raises his head and sees him in the midst of the fire of Hell: ‘Then he will take a look and sight him in the middle of hell’.(130) So if there were a World of Particles, and the taking of the covenant had occurred [in it], a small number of people would have remembered it.
The address of udhkur (‘remember’) and of ‘When your Lord took’ is not restricted to the person of the Noble Prophet (s.a.w.). From the reason given at the close of the verse — ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection … or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah]”’ — it is known that all individual human beings are addressed at the beginning and the end of the two verses.
b. The incompatibility of the World of Particles with the aims of taking the covenant. The Noble Qurʾān counts two aims for the taking of the divine covenant from the Children of Adam:
First: Warding off the argument of human beings [based] on heedlessness. According to the apparent meaning of the verse, the taking of the progeny of the Children of Adam and making them bear witness over themselves — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness”’ — is in order to close the door on whoever wishes to say, ‘We were heedless of God’s Lordship and of our servanthood to Him’: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’. So in the setting of compliance (ẓarf al-imtithāl) — that is, this world — the one charged must remember it. For the covenant is taken so that the one charged should not transgress in the setting of compliance, not so that he be reminded of that covenant in the setting of judgement. Three worlds must therefore be posited: the world of the taking of the covenant, the world of obligation, and the world of judgement.
In the world of judgement at the Resurrection, the truth is clear and illumined — ‘On that day, Allah will pay them in full their due recompense’(131) — and there is no necessity to remind [people] of the world in which the covenant was taken, or to show the compact, nor any need for them. For God at the Resurrection is, if not more manifest than in the mode of existence of the covenant, then no less so.
In the world of obligation and the mode of existence of this world, which is the world of diversion, play and heedlessness, God’s proof must be conclusive. So if the pledge was taken in the world of the covenant, and the human being has forgotten it in the world of obligation, which is the place of compliance, what is the benefit of this undertaking? Every benefit that results from that covenant is for the sake of the one charged recalling that pledge in the setting of compliance; yet no one charged remembers that pledge.
It may perhaps be said that the making to bear witness, the taking of the covenant and the confession of those who pledged themselves are a preliminary to the covenant itself, and if all those details have vanished from human memory, this does no harm. If a person rationally grasps the covenant itself and attends to it, he remembers it; so this much that he remembers of the taking of the covenant suffices. But the answer is: if the human being arrives at the goal by thought, then this rational grasp is itself a proof from God, and there is then no need for the taking of the covenant; so what is its benefit?
In the view of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (may God have mercy on him): ‘Moreover, this reason, without which no proof is complete, no making to bear witness is of benefit and no taking of a covenant is valid — even in the supposed World of Particles — is practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī), which the human being attains only in this setting in which he lives a social life, so that occurrences of good and evil recur to him, his emotions and inner feelings are stirred towards attracting benefit and repelling harm, and actions follow one upon another for him out of knowledge and will, so that he errs and hits the mark until he is trained in distinguishing right from wrong, good from evil, and benefit from harm. The setting they affirm — I mean what they describe of the World of Particles — is not a locus of practical reason, since the conditions and causes of its attainment are not present in it.
And if they suppose it to be a locus for it, with its causes and conditions present in it — as appears from what they describe, relying on what is in the apparent meaning of the narrations: that God called them there to tawḥīd, and some of them answered Him with a tongue with which their heart agreed, while others answered Him having concealed unbelief; that He sent prophets and successors (awṣiyāʾ) to them, and some believed them while others called them liars; that what happens here runs only according to what happened there; and other such things that they have mentioned — this would be to affirm a natural mode of existence before this natural mode of existence in this world, like what is affirmed by those who hold to cycles and recurrences (al-adwār wa-l-akwār).’(132)
The Master’s statement that practical reason appears only in the world of this world and was not [present] in the world of the taking of the covenant is incomplete; for practical reason has two technical senses:
First: Practical reason as opposed to theoretical. Practical wisdom is perceived by practical reason, and theoretical reason perceives theoretical wisdom. In other words, the reason that perceives existence and non-existence is theoretical reason, and the reason that perceives what ought and ought not to be done is called practical reason.
Second: All perceptions and thoughts belong to theoretical reason, the thinking reason that perceives existence and non-existence and likewise perceives what ought [to be done]. The ‘ought’ of jurisprudence, of rights and of ethics is connected with the perception of the sciences, and its name is theoretical reason. The function of practical reason, however, is action, not perception. Practical reason is the human being’s capital and the power on which he relies in worshipping God Almighty and earning His Gardens, according to the saying of Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.): ‘That by which the All-Merciful is worshipped and by which the Gardens are earned.’(133)
According to the second technical sense, will, sincerity, intention, resolve (ʿazm),(134) inclination, love and so on all have their place in practical reason, while conception, assent and certainty (jazm)(135) belong to the division of theoretical reason. Practical reason is the executive faculty, and theoretical reason is the legislating and perceiving faculty. The human being’s certain perceptions go back to theoretical reason, while resolve, determination, will, sincerity and every practical function go back to practical reason. What signs the covenant is theoretical reason in this sense, because that place is the place of perception. On this basis, if practical reason — in the second sense — was not, as it seems, manifest there in the world of the covenant, there is no obstacle in that; nothing prevents that which is a party to the consideration and perception being theoretical reason — in the second sense — existing in that world.
Second: No argument from the polytheism of fathers. According to the apparent meaning of the noble verse, the covenant was taken in such a manner, and in such a setting, that no one could make the polytheism of his fathers a proof [excusing] his misguidance. If that locus were the World of Particles and the human being was taken from the loins of Adam (a.s.), which polytheist would dare to plead that his father Adam (a.s.) was a polytheist? On this basis, the progeny must be taken from the loins of the Children of Adam, not from the loins of Adam, so that such an argument should not be available — and the taking of the covenant has ruled it out completely.
c. The problem of transmigration. The theory of the World of Particles, and the application of the locus of the covenant to it, resembles the claim of transmigration (tanāsukh). As has come in the noble narrations: when God Almighty created Adam, He wiped his back and brought out those of his progeny who would be until the Day of Resurrection, in the manner of particles from his sperm;(136) then He clothed them with a spirit such that they were able to perceive; then He made the particles bear witness over them, having made their reality plain to them, and took acknowledgement from them; then He returned them to their first state.(137)
If the import of the verse is what has been said, how then can the doubt of transmigration be answered? For those who believe in transmigration hold something resembling this: that human beings were living a life before this present life in other bodies, and after death, in order to obtain the result of their good and evil deeds, were transferred into the bodies of new-born children! And if the believers in transmigration were asked how it is that no one remembers anything of those cycles, they would say that the interval of time has made them forget all of it.
It is worth mentioning that there are particular proofs for the refutation of transmigration, which have been set out in their place,(138) and there is no necessary connection between the theory of the World of Particles and the doctrine of transmigration. That is, one cannot accept the claim that, because the two theories share certain respects, accepting the existence of the World of Particles entails accepting transmigration — unless the element that is the pivot of the demonstration of mutual exclusion (burhān al-tamānuʿ), that is, the middle term, is present in both, as appears from some of its formulations.(139)
Attempts to Defend the Theory of the World of Particles
1. Its harmony with the verse and the narration. Some who tried to explain the verse by the narration put forward arguments for the harmony between the two:
a. The absence of divergence. In the verse of the progeny He spoke of the progeny of the Children of Adam: ‘their descendants’; and the narration expresses the progeny of Adam as ‘his progeny’, because Adam is the root, and his back and his progeny are the original source from which all his descendants appear. Hence the narration mentions the original source, and they are the individuals, while in the verse they are the branches.(140) Just as the verse took Adam (a.s.) as a given, so the narration took the Children of Adam as necessarily [included]. So the harmony of the verse with the narration is that Adam was taken from the Children of Adam, and from the Children of Adam his posterity:(141) ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’. Both are true, because God Almighty brought out the Children of Adam in the form of small particles, and He took small particles from the semen of Adam (a.s.) and from the semen of the Children of Adam. In this way the divergence between the verse and the narration is removed.
b. The multiplicity of the covenant. The verse and the narration are both affirmative, and they can be two proofs that the covenant is multiple. That is, in one locus God (s.w.t.) brought out the progeny of the Children of Adam from the loins of Adam (a.s.) and took the covenant from them; and in another locus He brought out every individual from the back of his father and took the pledge from him. So the covenants are multiple. If some narrations allude to the noble verse, this is on account of the correspondence between the two covenants; likewise, the imports of the verse and the narration support one another — not that the verse has explained the narration. So there is no conflict between the verse and the narration, because the covenant is multiple, and the narration is not an explanation of the verse, since the purport of each of them differs from that of the other.
c. The language of state and the language of speech. A group, unable to solve the problem of the previous world, said, concerning the mention of this narration under the verse under discussion, that the verse relates the language of state, while the narration sets out the language of the speech of the covenant.(142) The language of state means that God created all individual human beings, poured intellect upon them inwardly, supported them with revelation from outside, and made for them the signs of the horizons and of the souls, so that it is as if God Almighty said to them, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, and all of them said, ‘Yes indeed’ — meaning the ground [for it]. That is, by showing them the signs of the horizons and the souls, God said ‘Am I not your Lord?’, and the matter is so plain that it is as if the human being says: ‘Yes indeed!’ So this conversation was in the language of state and preparedness, and it was set out in the language of speech in the mode of existence of the World of the Covenant, in another world.
2. Refuting the problem of the forgetting of the locus in which the covenant was taken. It was stated earlier, in refuting the theory of the World of Particles, that if there had been a locus before this world in which the covenant had taken place, then all of them, or a number of them, would have to remember that situation, just as they will remember the events of this world in the hereafter; yet this does not happen. The proponents of the view of the World of Particles have given answers:
a. The pledge was instantaneous. The taking of the covenant in the World of Particles is an event specific to that world and is not to be measured against the events of this world. Worldly deeds are repeated over the long span of a human being’s life and become a settled disposition (malakah), and for this reason human beings will not forget them at the Resurrection. The taking of the covenant, however, happened in a single instant, and the event did not recur; so it is not unlikely that matters like these are forgotten.
This answer is mistaken. As was said earlier, according to the requirement of the apparent meaning of the verse ‘When … took…’, the taking of the covenant and its existence are continuous before this world; it admits of being remembered in this world, and God will argue with it in the hereafter. In the present state, if someone removed the dust of heedlessness from the pages of his heart, he would repeat the saying ‘Yes indeed’ — as happens when danger threatens the human being: the dust departs from the heart and the guided human being perceives that scene. This is not by way of its bringing him a benefit or a result, nor by way of rushing hastily into an act, so that he shoots an arrow in the darkness in the hope that it may hit, nor in the manner of the drowning man clutching at every straw; rather, he calls on his Lord, believing in Him and putting exclusive faith in Him.
b. The masters of gnosis remember the event. It should not be said that no one remembers the story of the taking of the covenant, for a number of the masters of gnosis remember it. [One of them,] when asked whether he remembered it, said: ‘It is as if it is now in my ear.’ And another of them, regarding it as near, said: ‘This covenant was yesterday.’(143)
Concerning this answer, it must be considered [whether] the remembrance, by some of the Children of Adam at one of the stages, of the occurrence of the acknowledgement of the unity of Lordship and of submission to the servanthood of God can be reckoned a remembrance of the World of Particles; otherwise, it may be that it concerns specifically the operation of the fiṭrah.
c. Remembering the principle of the covenant. What matters is remembering the principle of the covenant, not its locus — like someone who makes a pledge in an official place and, after years have passed, remembers that principle but does not know where the pledge was made. The principle of the covenant, which is belief in the Lordship of God and confession of servanthood to Him, is from the human being. The reflective human being finds it in his depths but does not remember its locus; and forgetting that locus does not impair [the question of] the existence or non-existence of the World of Particles.
In rejecting this answer it may be said that, as was made clear above, the more general concomitant does not establish the particular thing of which it is the concomitant. That is, remembering the principle of the covenant is not a proof specifically of the World of Particles; rather, perhaps it is from the trace of the language of the fiṭrah.
d. The World of Particles is unlikely, not impossible. That the World of Particles is forgotten is evidence that it is unlikely, not that it is impossible; and in rational discussions unlikelihood is not a proof of negation.
It should be known, first, that in the previous discussions proofs were put forward for rejecting the taking of the verse as referring to the World of Particles; it was not a mere [claim of] unlikelihood. Second, where a firm proof is established for the reality of something, unlikelihood is not a proof of that thing’s non-existence.
3. The existence of reliable narrations. The statement of al-Ṭabrisī (may God have mercy on him) and others, who speak of the World of Particles as weak or rejected, is incorrect, because among these narrations there may be a reliable or sound narration.(144)
Regarding what was said in this answer, it should be pointed out that the narrations must accord with the universal lines of the teachings of the Qurʾān, the Sunnah of the Infallibles (a.s.) and firm rational proofs; yet some of these narrations that concern the World of Particles do not.
Second. The Locus in Which the Covenant Was Taken
Some have considered it possible that the locus in which the covenant was taken is the mode of existence of this world, and that what is meant by the taking of the covenant is the bestowal of the rational faculty, so that, by using it correctly, every rational person acknowledges the Lordship of God and his own servanthood to Him.(145)
This theory is not consistent with the apparent meaning of the noble verse, in several respects:
1. Its lack of fit with the locus in which the covenant was taken. According to the requirement of the apparent meaning of the verse, the locus in which the covenant was taken preceded the world of nature and the mode of existence of this world, because the two words idh and akhadha (“when” and “took”) both [refer] to the past; whereas reason and inference have their place only in the mode of existence of this world.
2. Its incompatibility with the generality of the noble verse. On the basis of the apparent meaning of the noble verse, the covenant was taken from all the Children of Adam, and all of them said ‘Yes indeed’: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’. If what is meant by this covenant is the use of the rational faculty among human beings, this cannot be reconciled with the fact that in every age and land human beings are divided into two groups: a believing, monotheist group and an unbelieving, atheist group. Undoubtedly it cannot be said that the second group are madmen and fools; for what is meant by reason in this theory is the reason that is the pivot of religious obligation and of argument — not the reason that always says ‘Yes indeed’, acts in servanthood to the All-beneficent, and is a means to earning Paradise: ‘[Reason —] he said: “That by which the All-beneficent is worshipped and Paradise is earned.”’(146)
The possibility that the covenant was taken from the believers only is definitely not compatible with the apparent meaning of the verse; for the apparent meaning of the verse is all-inclusive generality (al-ʿumūm al-istighrāqī), and no expression could convey this intent more clearly than His words ‘from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’. Had He used the expression ‘from the human being’ instead of that expression, or had He not mentioned the expression ‘from their loins, their descendants’ and sufficed with saying ‘from the Children of Adam’, it would have been possible that this proposition is a particular affirmative and that the covenant was taken from the prophets and the successors (a.s.) only. So what is meant by ‘from the Children of Adam’ in the noble verse is the Prophet of God Adam (a.s.) and all his progeny, with or without intermediary; just as this meaning is intended in some narrative and literary expressions, such as ‘the children of Adam’ (wuld Ādam) in ‘Death has been marked upon the children of Adam’.(147)
3. Its incompatibility with the reason given at the end of the noble verse. According to the apparent meaning of the noble verse, on the Day of Resurrection God does not accept the excuse of anyone who excuses himself by relying on one of the two arguments mentioned at the end of the verse. So no one may validly argue by his heedlessness — ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’ — or say, ‘We found our fathers unbelievers’: ‘or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them”’. If, however, the noble verse were applied to the use of the rational faculty, the field would be open for both excuses; for one group of them can say, ‘We were not among the people of reasoning, and so we were afflicted with heedlessness, inadvertence and forgetfulness’; and another group says, ‘Our reason was affected by our fathers and by the environment in which we spent [our lives], and so we could not acknowledge the Lordship of God and submit to His servanthood.’ So the verse under discussion is not like the verse ‘Do you not exercise your reason?’,(148) which is a rational argument; nor like the verse ‘apostles, as bearers of good news and warners, so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles’,(149) which is a transmitted argument; nor like the verses stating explicitly that the angels of punishment say to the people of Hell, ‘Did not the warnings of the prophets (a.s.) or of the conveyors reach you?’: ‘“Did not any warner come to you?” They will say, “Yes, a warner did come to us…”’.(150) Rather, it is a second proof, which does not admit inadvertence, forgetfulness or heedlessness, such that an argument like ‘Indeed we were unaware of this’ could be applied to it; and it neither sets nor passes away, such that it would yield to an excuse like ‘Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah]’.
4. Its not according with the presential knowledge drawn from the noble verse. On the pattern of this verse, the human being’s testimony to God’s Lordship and to servanthood to Him was through presential knowledge. For the import of His words ‘and made them bear witness over themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ is that God made the human being know [this] by seeing his own reality and knowing it; and knowledge of the self without the mediation of any form or concept is presential knowledge itself. The use of the rational faculty and the establishment of demonstration, by contrast, are achieved only with the help of the acquired knowledge that the human being obtains gradually: ‘Allah has brought you forth from the bellies of your mothers while you did not know anything. He made for you hearing, eyesight, and hearts so that you may give thanks’.(151)
5. Its lack of fit with the other verses. If what is intended by the taking of the covenant is the path of demonstration and rational inference, the meaning would be that reason suffices to secure the human being’s felicity in this world and the next; and once this most worthy purpose was realised, there would remain no need for the divine fiṭrah of tawḥīd. Yet the Noble Qurʾān and the Prophetic Sunnah stress the necessity of the fiṭrah of tawḥīd in the human being: ‘So set your heart as a person of pure faith on this religion, the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind (There is no altering Allah’s creation; that is the upright religion, but most people do not know.)’;(152) ‘Every child is born upon the fiṭrah; then his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Magian’;(153) and they regard the sending of the apostles and the sending down of revelation, to repel the human being’s argument, as a necessary matter: ‘so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles’.(154)
After these problems have been raised, no one can say that the locus of the covenant of the verse of the progeny is the very locus of the rational faculty, which speaks in the language of inference and demonstration.
Third. Taking the Covenant in the Locus of Revelation
Some exegetes have considered it possible that the covenant was taken in the locus of revelation and prophethood; that is, God Almighty took the covenant from the human being concerning His Lordship and [the human being’s] servanthood to Him through the tongue of the prophets (a.s.) and by way of revelation.(155)
This theory likewise goes against the apparent meaning of the verse, for two reasons: 1. According to the apparent meaning of the verse, the locus in which the covenant was taken was before the mode of existence of nature, because idh and akhadha are for the past; whereas the locus of revelation and prophethood — the calling of people to God’s Lordship and to the human being’s servanthood to Him — exists only in the world of this world.
2. According to the apparent meaning of the verse, all human beings were present in the locus in which the covenant was taken; the covenant was taken from all of them, and all of them answered with acceptance: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’; whereas in this world human beings are born gradually, and after people hear the message of revelation, some of them believe and some disbelieve: ‘Indeed We created man… Indeed We have guided him to the way, be he grateful or ungrateful’;(156) ‘A part [of mankind] He has guided and a part has deserved [to be consigned to] error’.(157)
It is derived from some noble verses that in the various ages and eras, from Noah (a.s.) to the Seal of the Apostles, Muḥammad (s.a.w.), the majority of people often insulted the prophets (a.s.) — ‘How regrettable of the servants! There did not come to them any apostle but that they used to deride him’(158) — accused them of folly and charged them with lying: ‘The elite of his people who were faithless said, “Indeed we see you to be in folly, and indeed we consider you to be a liar”’ (Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 66). How, then, can the covenant before which the heads of the Children of Adam bowed in submission, saying ‘Yes indeed! We bear witness’, be applied to the language of revelation and of the prophets (a.s.), given the great number of those who opposed them?
Fourth. Taking the Covenant in the Locus of Representation
Some for whom understanding the noble verse was difficult, who had been deprived of the success of making use of the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.), and for whom referring some verses to others had become too narrow, denied the reality of the taking of the covenant and of the acknowledgement. They took the verse under discussion as representation (tamthīl) and believed in the negation of the acknowledgement and of the taking of assent; rather, it appeared to them [that there was] only the taking of the covenant.
According to their belief, its meaning is that He set up for them proofs of His Lordship and His oneness, and their intellects and insights — which He composed in them and made a means of distinguishing between misguidance and guidance — bore witness to it; so it is as if He made them bear witness over themselves, established it firmly in them, and said to them, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, and as if they said, ‘Yes indeed.’(159)
This group put forward proofs and evidences for their claim, and said [that it is] like the verse under discussion, what occurs in His words ‘and He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’,(160) where in reality there was no command, and neither the earth nor the heaven spoke; rather, ‘Come’ stands in the position of a command, and the response of the heavens and earths, ‘We come’, stands in the position of compliance with that command.(161) Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī considered this interpretation the finest of the exegeses of this noble verse.(162)
In rejecting this theory it must be said that the Noble Qurʾān has used representation in some places, and a verse can be taken as representation; but such a taking needs a justification. For the exegesis of the verses of revelation consistently turns on the axis of the apparent meaning of words: if a word is apparent in representation, or is surrounded by a contextual indication, it is taken as representation — like verses accompanied by words such as ‘We draw such comparisons for mankind’,(163) ‘Allah draws a parable’(164) or ‘That is how Allah draws comparisons’;(165) but if it is apparent in ordinary dialogue, its apparent meaning is acted upon.
On this pattern, it is not valid to take the verse under discussion, and the verse cited as evidence for it, as representation, for two reasons:
1. The verse ‘and He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’(166) discloses a real dialogue, not a representational one. For things in the universe have perception and are submissive — ‘while to Him submits whoever there is in the heavens and the earth’(167) — and they glorify and praise the Real Almighty — ‘Each knows his prayer and glorification’(168) — and God really spoke with them: ‘and He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’.(169) The contextual indication for taking it as representation is absent; and pure rational possibility, the apparent meaning of the reliable transmitted proof, and the mere probability of representation are not justifications for taking the verse as representation.(170)
2. According to the requirement of the apparent meaning of the verse under discussion, the taking of the covenant — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam’ — the making to bear witness — ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ — the taking of the acknowledgement — ‘Am I not your Lord?’ — their submission in ‘They said, “Yes indeed!”’, and the acknowledgement over themselves — ‘We bear witness’ — are all real, and serve to complete the proof, so that no one who makes excuses can excuse himself on the Resurrection by the excuse of heedlessness, or plead the polytheism of the forebears and say: ‘lest you should say on the Day … before [us]’. The proof is not completed by representation and narrative, and arguing with it is not feasible.
On the other side, in what scene did people’s faith in the calls of the prophets (a.s.) occur, and [where] did they say ‘Yes indeed’ to the call of reason, so that it would be valid to set it out in the form of narrative and representation? In the face of revelation and reason, people are always divided into two groups, believers and unbelievers: ‘How regrettable of the servants! There did not come to them any apostle but that they used to deride him’;(171) ‘And who will [ever] forsake Abraham’s creed except one who debases himself?’.(172)
Note: Just as there is a difference between the station of iḥsān, expressed by ‘as if’ (ka-anna), and the ‘station of lofty witnessing’, expressed by ‘that’ (anna), so too there is a vast divergence between the theory of reality, real making-to-bear-witness and concrete acknowledgement in the exegesis of the verse under discussion — which is the preferred view — and the exegesis of the verse as representation and imagination (takhyīl) — the view preferred by al-Zamakhsharī(173) and others(174) — because they spoke on the assumption of ‘as if such an address had taken place’.
The point is that there is a difference between taking the verse as the locus of the fiṭrah and taking it as the locus of reason and inference; and there is another difference between taking the verse as ‘that’ and concrete realisation, and taking it as ‘as if’, representation and imagination.
Fifth. Taking the Covenant in the Locus of the Malakūt
The master ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (may God have mercy on him) used the method of the exegesis of the verse by the verse, with the help of the verses containing the themes of the pledge, the taking of testimony, the covenant and the malakūt, [to determine] the locus in which the covenant was taken in the verse under discussion. After reporting and refuting the best-known views of the exegetes on this matter, he said, in invalidating the theory of the World of Particles and establishing the theory of the malakūt: But what makes this meaning impossible is that it entails the human being’s having his worldly personhood twice in this world, one after the other, which entails a thing’s being other than itself through becoming multiple; and this is impossible.(175)
The master, al-Sayyid (may God have mercy on him), in setting out the theory of the taking of the covenant in the locus of the covenant, points to two matters:
1. The existence of the human being or of anything else, in the extension of its journey to God and its return to Him, in worlds of differing order and different rule, is not impossible; it is among what the Noble Qurʾān affirms, even though the unbelievers who say [otherwise] dislike it: ‘They say, “There is nothing but the life of this world: we live and we die, and nothing but time destroys us”’.(176)
God has affirmed for the worldly human being the attributes of the life of the hereafter and of the barzakh, with the properties particular to each of them, just as He has affirmed — ‘There is not a thing but that its sources are with Us, and We do not send it down except in a known measure’(177) — that everything has an existence with Him in His treasuries, and that measures attach to it only when He sends it down to this world. So the human being, before his worldly existence, with the ampleness that he has, has another existence with God Almighty and in His treasuries; and God brought the human being from that world to this world.
2. He has also affirmed, by His words ‘All His command, when He wills something, is to say to it “Be,” and it is. So immaculate is He in whose hand is the dominion of all things’(178) and His words ‘and Our command is but a single [word], like the twinkling of an eye’,(179) and by verses resembling them, that this gradual existence of things — the human being among them — is a command from God that He pours upon the thing and casts to it with the word ‘Be’, an instantaneous outpouring and a non-gradual casting. So the existence of these things has two faces. One face is towards this world, and its rule is that it is attained by going out from potentiality to actuality gradually, and from non-existence to existence little by little; it appears deficient, then goes on perfecting itself until it perishes and returns to its Lord. The other face is towards God (s.w.t.), and according to this face they are gradual matters,(180) and everything they have, they have in the first moment of their existence, without bearing any potentiality that drives them to actuality.
This face is other than the previous face, even though they are two faces of one thing, and its rule is other than the rule of that one, even though its complete conception needs a subtle mind. We have explained it somewhat in the previous discussions, and the full account of it will come, God willing, in its explanation.
The requirement of these verses is that the human world, with all the ampleness it has, has an existence, all together, with God (s.w.t.) — and it is that which is next to His side and which He pours out upon its individuals — in which its individuals are not absent from one another, nor are they absent in it from their Lord, nor is He absent from them. How could an act be absent from its agent, or a making be cut off from its maker? This is what God (s.w.t.) calls the malakūt, saying: ‘Thus did We show Abraham the dominions of the heavens and the earth, that he might be of those who possess certitude’;(181) and He points to it with His words: ‘Indeed, were you to know with certain knowledge, you would have surely seen hell [in this very life]. Afterward you will surely see it with the eye of certainty’.(182)
As for this worldly face of the human world, which we witness, it is that which separates the individuals and scatters the states and acts by distributing them over the segments of time and applying them to the passage of nights and days; and the human being is veiled from his Lord by turning his face towards material earthly enjoyments and sensory pleasures. It is subordinate to the previous face and posterior to it; and the position of that mode of existence relative to this mode of existence, in its being subordinate to it, is the position of ‘Be’ and ‘it is’ in His words ‘to say to it “Be,” and it is’.(183)
It becomes clear thereby that this worldly human mode of existence is preceded by another human mode of existence identical to it, except that the individuals existing in it are not veiled from their Lord. In it they witness His oneness (s.w.t.) in Lordship by witnessing themselves — not by way of inference, but because they are not cut off from Him and do not lose Him — and they confess it, and every truth [that comes] from Him. As for the filth of polytheism and the stains of sins, these belong to the rules of this worldly mode of existence, not of that mode of existence in which there is nothing but His act (s.w.t.), which subsists through Him. So understand that.
If you reflect on these verses, then go back to His words ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’ [to the end of] the verse and reflect on it well, you will find it pointing to the detail of the matter to which these verses point in summary: it points to a prior human mode of existence in which God separated the individuals of this species and distinguished between them, and made them bear witness over themselves: ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’.
As a result, according to the many Qurʾānic verses, the human being has two aspects of existence, the mulkī (visible) and the malakūtī, and both are in God’s hand: ‘Blessed is He in whose hands is all sovereignty’;(184) ‘So immaculate is He in whose hand is the dominion of all things, and to whom you shall be brought back’.(185)(186)
The mulk and the malakūt: every existent is two faces of one coin. But the worldly mulk is material, moving, gradual, veiled from the Real and heedless, and it exists by the word ‘it is’: ‘All His command, when He wills something, is to say to it “Be,” and it is’;(187) while the divine malakūt is immaterial, fixed and instantaneous, of the people of witnessing of the Real, obedient to its Lord, and does not admit heedlessness; it is poured forth by the word ‘Be’, and it has given a covenant to God Almighty: ‘Did I not exhort you, O children of Adam…’;(188) ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness.”’
The mulk and the malakūt are not separate in respect of time; they are coupled in time. Yet they are two modes of existence and two existential [levels], like ‘existence’ and ‘bringing into existence’, which are never separate; but ‘bringing into existence’ precedes ‘existence’. The divine face, the bringing-into-existence [face], and the ‘Be’ of every existent is its malakūt; the worldly, existential face and the ‘it is’ of every existent is its mulkī dimension; and the kind of precedence and posteriority, of preceding and following, [between them] is of the type of the preceding and following of ‘Be’ and ‘it is’ in His words ‘to say to it “Be,” and it is’.(189) So the difference between the malakūt and the mulk is the difference between ‘Be’ and ‘it is’ in His words ‘All His command, when He wills something, is to say to it “Be,” and it is’; that is why He said, with the fāʾ of derivation: ‘So immaculate is He in whose hand is the dominion of all things, and to whom you shall be brought back’.(190) But in the malakūt, which is the place of immateriality, fixity and instantaneity, materiality, change and gradualness are removed by declaring the Real Almighty transcendent; while at the stage of the mulk, which is the place of gradualness, change and materiality, there is familiarity with the effects of beauty and of likening [Him to creatures] (tashbīh), and with God’s blessedness and exaltation: ‘Blessed is He in whose hands is all sovereignty’.(191)
In any case, the verse under discussion alludes to a precedence that is secured by this analysis (the theory of the malakūt); that preceding [thing] still exists, and the relation between the preceding and the following persists. So the Noble Qurʾān, by reminding [him] of the locus of the covenant that exists now, reminds the human being, through removing the dust from the heart, so that he may remember it and his relation with it may be strengthened. For the human being has a malakūtī colouring, and in it he always says ‘Yes indeed’ — not that he sufficed with it in what preceded; rather, right now he still repeats ‘Yes indeed’ in the malakūtī face.
In addition to this, it is possible for the human being to see the malakūt of things: ‘Thus did We show Abraham the dominions of the heavens and the earth’;(192) and the Lord of the worlds has invited [him] to look at it and witness it: ‘Have they not contemplated the dominions of the heavens and the earth…’.(193) Among the conditions of attaining this witnessing is removing the rust from the hearts: ‘No, that is not the case! Rather, their hearts have been sullied by what they have been earning’;(194) and as a result he becomes one of the people of certitude — ‘that he might be of those who possess certitude’(195) — and [attains] the seeing of Paradise and Hell: ‘Indeed, were you to know with certain knowledge, you would have surely seen hell’,(196) as happened to Ḥārithah ibn Mālik ibn al-Nuʿmān, who said: ‘O Messenger of God (s.a.w.), I have become a true believer’;(197) and it is likewise attained by the Godwary.(198)
On this basis, everyone is able, upon securing [certain] conditions — such as removing the dust from his inner being — to see the second face of the coin and to witness the pledge and the covenant that God pledged with his malakūt. It is valid for God to say to the mulkī dimension of each person — which is the world of nature, the mode of existence of multiplicity and the world of sense: ‘You, in the mode of existence of the malakūt, by that face through which you were connected with the Lord of the worlds, made a pledge’ — as the Persian poet said:
در روز الست، بلی گفتی / امروز، به بستر لا خفتی(199)
[Translator: “On the Day of Alast you said ‘Yes indeed’; today you have lain down in the bed of ‘No’.”]
That malakūtī face is not strange, nor separated from you, nor another world; rather, the malakūt is another layer of your existence and a second face of your coin, whose reins are in God Almighty’s hand.
It is worth mentioning that what was raised against the statement of the affirmers in the exegesis of the verse, according to what they understood of the meaning of the World of Particles from the narrations, as has gone before, does not arise against it. For this meaning, drawn from the other verses, and the prior mode of existence they establish, do not separate in time from this worldly human mode of existence; rather, it is with it and encompasses it, but precedes it with the precedence that is in His words ‘“Be!” and it is’;(200) and none of the drawbacks mentioned arise against it.
Nor does there arise against it what we raised against the statement of the deniers, in their interpreting the verse by the state of the existence of the human species in this worldly mode of existence — namely, going against His words ‘When your Lord took’, then the figurative usage in the making to bear witness, by intending by it a making known from Him, and in the address in His words ‘Am I not your Lord?’, by intending the indication of state, and likewise in His words ‘They said, “Yes indeed”’ and His words ‘We bear witness’. Rather, the setting is a setting prior to this world and other than it, the making to bear witness is in its real sense, and the address is in its real sense.
Nor can it be objected that this is of the kind of loading the verse with a meaning it does not indicate; for the verse does not refuse it, and the other verses point to it when some are joined to others.
As for the narrations, it will be seen that some of them indicate the principle of the realisation of this human mode of existence, as the verse does; and some of them mention that God unveiled this human mode of existence for Adam (a.s.) and showed him this world, which is the malakūt of the human world, and what took place in it of making to bear witness and taking of the covenant, just as He showed Abraham (a.s.) the malakūt of the heavens and the earth.(201)
The Positive Features of the Theory of the Malakūt and the Critique of It
The theory of the malakūt contains many of the features that are drawn from His words ‘When your Lord took’:
1. Its being in harmony with the apparent meaning of the noble verse. This theory is in harmony with the apparent meaning of idh and akhadha, which indicate the precedence of the locus of the covenant, and the precedence of that world is preserved. It is likewise immune from the drawbacks of the other theories, such as transmigration and … .
2. The possibility of remembering. This theory is consistent with the implied verb udhkur (“remember”) and with the command to remember. For the locus of the malakūt, like the mulk, is likewise set forth in this world, and the human being’s relation to it persists; and it allows anyone, even the atheist and the polytheist, to remove the dust of his heedlessness, witness it and remember the divine covenant — let alone the monotheists, who are among the people of the remembrance of God Almighty! For the polytheists likewise, when danger surrounds them and the material means and causes are blocked, affirm the oneness of God; and, by the Noble Qurʾān’s confirmation of them, they call on God putting exclusive faith in Him: ‘they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(202) This is the very turning of the human being to the malakūt, since every human being may enjoy this state; and it is the best witness to the possibility, for all, of remembering the covenant of Lordship for God and of servanthood to Him, and of its continuance.
3. The generality of the covenant. In this theory the inclusiveness of the covenant for all people is likewise preserved, as evidenced by all human beings’ being characterised by the malakūt and their passing through the stage of ‘Be’; all of them were apparently present in the locus, responded with reason and awareness, and said ‘Yes indeed’.
4. Immunity from error and heedlessness. The mode of existence of the malakūt is free of error, heedlessness and forgetfulness; so the argument of God (s.w.t.) at the Resurrection is in its place, and it does not allow anyone to say, ‘I was heedless’, or ‘I grew up in a polytheistic environment’. This is consistent with what has come at the end of the verse: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection…’.
Despite its soundness, however, this theory is open to discussion in several respects:
a. Its not being specific to the Children of Adam. The malakūt, like the mulk, is not specific to the human being only — ‘So immaculate is He in whose hand is the dominion of all things’;(203) ‘There is no living being but He holds it by its forelock’(204) — rather, the absolute order of existence has a malakūtī dimension: ‘Have they not contemplated the dominions of the heavens and the earth…’.(205) For if the heavens and the earth are not restricted by qualifications such as ‘what is in them’ and ‘what is between them’, what is intended by them is the whole order of existence; and the absence of the two qualifications in the verse ‘Have they not contemplated…’ discloses that what is intended is the whole existential order, and the description of God’s malakūt for it. In the mode of existence of the malakūt, everything is a witness over itself, acknowledges God’s Lordship and confesses its servanthood to Him; so every existent in that mode of existence, like the human being, has a firm relation with the Lord of the worlds.
b. Its not securing the ordered multiplicity. The import of His words ‘When your Lord took…’ is the ordered multiplicity of the Children of Adam, realised through generation and reproduction, one of them being a father and the other a child: ‘from their loins, their descendants’. The apparent meaning of this multiplicity is not like the multiplicity in the world of the hereafter, where all raise their heads from the dust, as if all of them were born of dust: ‘and from it shall We bring you forth another time’;(206) ‘Say, “Indeed the former and latter generations will all be gathered for the tryst of a known day”’.(207) But the multiplicity in the malakūt is like the multiplicity in the hereafter: it is without order. All are connected with God Almighty at the same time with a malakūtī colouring; and this multiplicity does not accord with the ordered multiplicity drawn from the verse: ‘from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants’.
c. The absence of any role for polytheism in the malakūt. The theory of the malakūt is likewise not consistent with the end of the verse. For the hoped-for goal of taking the covenant from the human being is to close the door to arguing against Him by heedlessness and by the polytheism of his forebears: ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this,” or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us]…”’. Yet the malakūtī face is not afflicted by polytheism, heedlessness never overshadows it, and there is no fatherhood and sonship there, such that one of them could cling to this pretext and argue by his heedlessness, or [say], ‘Our fathers were polytheists, so we associated partners following them.’
d. The failure of taking the covenant in the locus of witnessing to serve the aim of preserving the covenant in the locus of heedlessness. If the Creator (s.w.t.) took the pledge from the human being, the question arises here: what argument is this, in which the proof against them is taken in the locus of witnessing, ‘Be’, for the locus of heedlessness, ‘it is’?
Clarification: The locus of ‘Be’ is not a place for heedlessness and the veil; it is the place of presence and witnessing. But the locus of ‘it is’, according to the five spans of life, from childhood to old age, is a place of diversion, play, adornment, rivalry and vainglory: ‘Know that the life of this world is mere diversion and play, glamour and mutual vainglory among you and rivalry for wealth and children’.(208) Then the covenant is taken at the stage of ‘Be’, which is the stage of witnessing, for the stage of ‘it is’, in which heedlessness prevails. So how can this be justified, and what argument would there then be?
On account of this doubt and other doubts that reject the theory of the malakūt, we have no course but to say that for human beings — who are born into this world by that face, ‘it is’, who have multiplicity, being children and fathers, and for whom polytheism is possible — there are three paths in this mode of existence of religious obligation, two of which admit failure and one of which does not. The two paths that admit failure are rational demonstration, of which the Noble Qurʾān has adduced a great deal, and which some believe in and others accuse of being myth; and the other path, the miracles of the prophets and the wonders of the awliyāʾ (a.s.), which one people believe and another people accuse of sorcery and soothsaying.
The sole, confined path that does not admit failure is the inspired soul (al-nafs al-mulhamah) — ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’(209) — and the path of the fiṭrah and the heart, at which stage no one denies the Lordship of the Real; rather, all of them say ‘Yes indeed’. For those who deny this reality, when danger befalls them, turn to a reality that can save them from their predicament, and so they call on God putting exclusive faith in Him — not out of fear and compulsion, but out of sincerity: ‘they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(210)
Yes! If what is meant by the malakūt is the fiṭrah itself, or if its interpretation can be extended to the theory of the fiṭrah and referred back to it, then at that point it is possible to believe in it.
Sixth. Taking the Covenant from the Spirits
According to the requirement of some narrations, God created the spirits two thousand years before the bodies — more or less than this:(211) ‘Our Lord, Blessed and Exalted is He, created the spirits before the bodies by two thousand years.’(212)
Perhaps there are multiple covenants, and the spirits gave a covenant in a particular mode of existence; but the import of the verse under discussion does not establish this. Rather, it concerns specifically the mode of existence of multiplicity and humanness, in which, in detail, all the progeny of the Children of Adam were created from the backs of their fathers, and the acknowledgement was taken from every individual of them. So to take the covenant-taking of the verse as the taking of the pledge from the spirits is at odds with the apparent meaning.
The point is that it is possible that the human being made a pledge in the previous loci and said ‘Yes indeed’; there may be a reliable transmitted proof supporting the affirmation of this, and there is no conflict between it and the verse under discussion. But the verse under discussion was not revealed concerning the World of Spirits, and it has no relation to the spirits’ pledging — even though the proposition that a covenant was taken from the human being at every one of the previous stages of his existence is unobjectionable.
According to a narration from Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.), he said: ‘When Abraham and Ishmael (a.s.) were commanded to build the House and its building was completed, Abraham sat on one of its corners, then called out: “Come to the Ḥajj! Come to the Ḥajj!” (halumma al-ḥajj). Had he called out, “Come [all of you] to the Ḥajj!” (halummū ilā al-ḥajj), none would have performed the Ḥajj but those who were on that day human beings already created. But he called out, “Come to the Ḥajj!”, and the people in the loins of the men answered: “At your service, O caller of God! At your service, O caller of God, Mighty and Majestic is He!” So whoever answered ten times will perform the Ḥajj ten times; whoever answered five times will perform the Ḥajj five times; whoever answered more than that, then according to that number; whoever answered once will perform the Ḥajj once; and whoever did not answer will not perform the Ḥajj.’(213)
This noble ḥadīth applies to the World of Spirits and does not apply to the mode of existence of the fiṭrah and the mode of existence of multiplicity of which the verse under discussion speaks; for a portion of them did not answer the call of Abraham (a.s.), whereas the verse we are dealing with speaks of the response of all and of all saying ‘Yes indeed’, and it is the very stage of ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’.(214)
Seventh. The Taking of the Covenant
The taking of the covenant in the locus of the fiṭrah is the very way of the heart, of the fiṭrah and of witnessing (shuhūd); for this [view] is free of the problems of the other theories and is in harmony with the apparent meaning of the verse. Everyone can travel the way from which the dust has been removed a little, and, on travelling it to His side [lit. ‘to its/His side’], they say ‘Yes indeed’. That is why God Almighty commands each one to remember God’s covenant — ‘When your Lord took…’ — so that you may see to whom you submitted in the depths of your heart.
This theory necessarily requires that God Almighty took from the Children of Adam, in the locus of the fiṭrah, the pledge (ʿahd) of His Lordship, and that all of them acknowledged their servanthood to Him in response to His Lordship. This pledge was not in the language of inference and reason, nor in the language of revelation and miracle; it was in the language of the fiṭrah, and all responded to Him by saying, ‘Yes indeed.’ One group of them, however, acknowledged it firmly, and the other group feebly and weakly. Strength and weakness in accepting the pledge pertain to the affairs of this world; otherwise, all people have acknowledged the principle of Lordship and believed in it.
The mode of existence (nashʾah) of the fiṭrah is not confined to the past; it exists in the present and in what is to come as well, and all are present together. If any one of them were to remove the dust from his inward being, he would be able to find a way to that mode of existence and could recall it.
Clarification: The human being is a noble and pure reality, such that the purpose of sending the prophets (a.s.) has been condensed into bringing him felicity in this world and the Hereafter; and he enjoys an honoured standing with the Lord of the worlds. For this reason God Almighty has opened before him all the rational, transmitted and innate (fiṭrī) ways to secure this goal:
1. The rational way. Many verses speak, under various headings, of the human being’s exercise of reason, such as: ‘none takes admonition except those who possess intellect’,(215) ‘those who possess knowledge’,(216) ‘for those who have insight’,(217) ‘for those who have sense’,(218) ‘an oath … for one possessing intellect’(219) — all of these verses disclosing the individual human being’s capacity to think and encouraging him to make use of his reason; and in many places they call on everyone, in various expressions, such as: ‘Do you not exercise your reason?’,(220) ‘So do you not reflect?’,(221) ‘Will you not then take admonition?’,(222) ‘Do they not contemplate’,(223) ‘for a people who reflect’,(224) ‘for a people who exercise their reason’,(225) and so on, to exercise reason and to contemplate more.
2. The way of revelation. When God (s.w.t.) sent the prophets (a.s.) and sent down revelation to them, He completed His proof against all people, so that none of them could excuse himself by saying, ‘We did not see a prophet, and we were unaware of the path of felicity’: ‘apostles, as bearers of good news and warners, so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles; and Allah is all-mighty, all-wise’.(226)
Most of the acknowledgements of the people of the Fire on the Day of Resurrection bear witness to this, such as those who say, in answer to the angels of punishment: had we believed in the guidance of the divine messengers (a.s.) and in revelation, or had we responded to their directions and their rational admonitions, we would not have been among the company of the people of the Fire: ‘its keepers will ask them, “Did not any warner come to you?” … And they will say, “Had we listened or applied reason, we would not have been among inmates of the Blaze”’.(227)
3. The way of the fiṭrah. The way of the fiṭrah and of the heart is a way connected directly to God Almighty. In all circumstances it accompanies every human being — the learned and the layman, the child and the old — in the manner of a universal affirmative and a real proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥaqīqiyyah) for all human beings in all ages, in all lands and in all generations; and it rejects any change in its reality. The verse under discussion points to this way, and it is in harmony with the verse ‘So set your heart as a person of pure faith on this religion, the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind…’(228) and ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it’.(229)
The Noble Qurʾān makes all people eager to travel this way; were they to attain knowledge and certainty and act in accordance with it, the ground would be prepared for them to see the Unseen, Paradise and the Fire: ‘Indeed, were you to know with certain knowledge, you would have surely seen hell’.(230) This differs from what the philosophers or the theologians say; for they do not see the truth, but rather understand it. Yet whoever has seen Hell and its blaze is better than the philosopher and the theologian. The best example of this is Ḥārithah b. Mālik b. al-Nuʿmān, who said: ‘It is as though I am looking at the Throne of my Lord, set up for the reckoning…’;(231) even though this is the middle of the way — the stage of ‘as though’ (ka-anna), not the stage of ‘that’ (anna), that is, of actual realisation.
Even if those who travel this way are rare, it is nonetheless more worthy of being travelled and of being brought to its end.
The Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) described the people of this way in these words: ‘They and Paradise are like one who has seen it, so they are reclining on its couches; and they and the Fire are like one who has seen it, so they are being chastised in it.’(232)
According to what has been explained of the three ways — the rational, the speculative (naẓarī)(233) and the innate — God Almighty has spoken to the human being in several loci and in various languages, so as to complete the proof against humankind as a whole and to leave no one any excuse or justification. These three loci are as follows:
a. The locus of reason and inference. In accordance with the many verses, God Almighty has given the human being the gift of reason and the capacity to think, and has wanted him to make use of his rational faculty: ‘Do you not exercise your reason?’,(234) ‘So do you not reflect?’;(235) He has set out for him many proofs in this regard: ‘Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real’;(236) and in many verses, after establishing the proof, He has said: ‘There are indeed signs in that for a people who reflect’,(237) ‘There are indeed signs in that for people who exercise their reason’.(238)
b. The locus of transmission and revelation. Although God’s argument through reason is necessary, it is not sufficient. That is why God sent the messengers far and wide with the Books, to make the proof firm against every single individual of humankind: ‘Certainly We sent Our apostles with manifest proofs, and We sent down with them the Book…’,(239) so as to remove from people any argument against God after the prophets (a.s.) had warned them and given them good news: ‘apostles, as bearers of good news and warners, so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles; and Allah is all-mighty, all-wise’.(240)
c. The locus of the taking of the covenant. It is understood from the reasoning at the end of the verse that, in addition to the necessity of reason and revelation, the taking of the covenant is a necessary matter that had to be carried out. Had there been no revelation and no messages of the prophets (a.s.), humankind would have lost the way and would have argued on the Day of Resurrection to establish that it was excused; likewise, had the taking of the covenant not taken place for all human beings, or for some of them, their argument against God on the Day of Resurrection would have been valid.
In the matter of the taking of the covenant, God Almighty applied reasoning like that which He set up for the necessity of revelation and prophethood. In proving general messengership and the sending down of revelation, He said that He had sent the messengers to convey God’s proof to people, and so that no one would have any argument against God: ‘apostles, as bearers of good news and warners, so that mankind may not have any argument against Allah, after the [sending of the] apostles’. In the story of the taking of the covenant He mentioned similar reasoning: that He took His covenant from the human being so that no argument would be available to him on the Day of Resurrection with which to argue against God on the ground of heedlessness — ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness.” [This,] lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’ — or to say that because of our upbringing in a polytheistic environment we were raised on polytheism: ‘or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us]”’.
This reasoning makes clear that the sphere of the taking of the covenant is distinct from the sphere of reason and revelation. Each of these three loci has its own particular place, and none of them makes humankind able to do without the other way.
The other evidence for the essential distinction between the taking of the covenant and the proof of reason and revelation is that all humankind responded positively to that covenant and committed themselves to it, whereas they are dispersed and fragmented in the face of revelation and the fiṭrah.(241) This — their consensus and agreement in the taking of the covenant, and their disagreement and dispersion in the face of revelation and reason — is among the things that disclose the complete difference between them.
On the basis of the taking of the covenant, all humankind acknowledged [Him] in answer to ‘Am I not your Lord?’ by saying ‘Yes indeed’. Yet none of the verses on reason, revelation and prophethood states explicitly that all humankind responded to the judgement of reason and to the constitution of the sacred law. Rather, despite the full measure of proof and rational inference having been attained, and despite the miracles and wonders of the prophets (a.s.) and the manifestation of the truth, some believed in it and some disbelieved in it.
The Characteristics of the Way of the Fiṭrah
The taking of the covenant by way of the fiṭrah has the following characteristics:
1. Not being subject to change. The way of the fiṭrah admits neither of heedlessness nor of disappearance: ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind … There is no altering Allah’s creation’.(242) The phrase ‘There is no altering Allah’s creation’ indicates the negation of the genus; that is, the human being cannot by any means whatsoever change his fiṭrah. He can, however, weaken it or betray it (dassāhā) — ‘and one who betrays it fails’(243) — just as he can make it grow and build it up: ‘one who purifies it is felicitous’.(244) What is meant by the changes of the soul (the qualities and particularities of the soul’s spiritual states) in His words ‘Indeed Allah does not change a people’s lot, unless they change what is in their souls’(246) is betraying, weakening and the like, not changing the fiṭrah. That is why the monotheistic human fiṭrah closes to the human being the door of every excuse on the Day of Resurrection — ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this”’ — despite his upbringing in a polytheistic environment; for these external factors are not effective in changing the fiṭrah. For this reason, when the polytheists were stranded at sea and the danger of drowning surrounded them, they would call upon God, sincere towards Him, without compulsion;(247) and the Noble Qurʾān endorsed the tawḥīd and the true sincerity they had in that state: ‘When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(248) But once they reached the shore, they returned to their polytheistic life and their rites of the Age of Ignorance.
Objection: By the import of the well-known ḥadīth accepted by all — ‘Every child is born upon the fiṭrah; then his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Magian’(249) — can those who are born in a polytheist house and raised on that, and so become Jews, Christians or Magians, argue that we grew up in a polytheist family, suckled milk from the breasts of a polytheist woman, learned polytheism in the schools, spent our lives in a polytheistic society, and were ignorant of the monotheistic teachings: ‘Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah]’? Likewise the state of someone born in a land whose creed is communist, whose family, school and surroundings were enveloped in atheism, and who passed the stages of his upbringing, in childhood and youth, in an atmosphere of atheism: what, then, is God’s argument against him?
Answer: The fixed and unchanging fiṭrah, from which God took the covenant, remains preserved and declares: God took the covenant from you, and you bore witness and acknowledged it; so you cannot clear yourself on account of your being in a polytheistic environment, in the family and in society, by saying, ‘Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah]’.
2. Universality. The way of the fiṭrah and of the heart is present to the human being in his various states, and in all individual human beings in all ages and all lands — even in those who deny God with the tongue and outwardly, and who have contented themselves with material life: ‘They say, “There is nothing but the life of this world: we live and we die, and nothing but time destroys us”’.(250) In dangers they call upon the One who holds the reins of all powers, and their hearts acknowledge this — as with the polytheists who, when they board a ship on a sea voyage beset with danger, become occupied with the remembrance of God with tawḥīd and sincerity: ‘When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(251)
From the farthest point, or the nearest, or the middle, or from any quality (ṣifah)(252) in this universe, everyone whom affliction has surrounded turns towards a single direction, and that is God Almighty. First, His power over every person and every thing in this universe is equal. Second, He knows best what all are looking to. Third, He is able to meet their needs. Fourth, His attending to one direction does not make Him heedless of the other directions; so when He attends to the drowning man and wills to rescue him, He is not heedless of the clouds of the sky: ‘O He whom nothing distracts from anything, and no hearing from [another] hearing’.(253) He is the One who knows all needs, and nothing prevents Him from His knowledge or His power.
Every human being relies, in his innermost core, on such a power — ‘Indeed, He embraces all things!’(254) — so that wherever he may be, and whatever he asks of Him, He can pour it upon him without limit, whether he is on earth or in heaven, and whether his need is one of knowledge or of action. He is God, whom the human being witnesses by way of his heart and his fiṭrah, not One whom he establishes by rational proof. For a rational demonstration is either the demonstration from order or the demonstration from origination and contingency; and the demonstration from contingency is either quidditative (māhawī) or from dependence (faqrī), as set down in the books of philosophy and theology. Not everyone is able to grasp it, and one may forget its premises and its syllogistic middle term; whereas the way of the fiṭrah and of the heart is the way of witnessing God’s infinite power.
The Difference between the Way of the Fiṭrah and [the Ways of] Reason and Revelation
The way of the fiṭrah differs from the way of reason and revelation in several respects, which we shall list:
1. The difference in the manner of acceptance. Rational and transmitted proofs are not assented to by all people, unlike innate inference; for in the mode of existence of the taking of the covenant all took it in and acknowledged its import: ‘They said, “Yes indeed”’. The revealed covenant from God (s.w.t.), by contrast, is accepted by one party while others refuse to assent to it: ‘How regrettable of the servants! There did not come to them any apostle but that they used to deride him’;(255) and the inferential and demonstrative covenant derived from the Qurʾānic verses, some of them dismiss as myth and superstition: ‘When Our signs are recited to him, he says, “Myths of the ancients!”’,(256) and none but a small handful of people believe in it.
The polytheists of the age of Abraham the Friend (a.s.) are the best witness to this. They did not yield to all the rational proofs he recited to them — that the sun, the moon and the star set, and that what sets is not worthy of Lordship; this self-evident proposition stirred nothing in them, and their creed did not change. Before that, the inference of Abraham the Friend (a.s.) had been by rational proof, when he confronted the idol-worshippers: ‘when he said to his father and his people, “What are these images to which you keep on clinging?”’(257) What could these wooden images, carved by hands, possibly do, and what has befallen you that you venerate them? Do they benefit you? ‘He said, “Then, do you worship besides Allah that which cannot cause you any benefit or harm? Fie on you and what you worship besides Allah! Do you not exercise your reason?”’(258) Had acquired knowledge been effective, its effect would have appeared in that situation. But when Abraham (a.s.) raised that axe — ‘So he broke them into pieces—all except the biggest of them—so that they might come back to it’(259) — and said, arguing against the idol-worshippers, ‘How can you take as lord (turabbūn) what has no means in its hand to defend itself? So ask them; perhaps they will answer you’ — ‘Ask them, if they can speak’.(260)
Within a few moments those people came back to themselves — ‘Thereat they came to themselves’(261) — and the truth became clear to them; they saw themselves to be wrongdoers and the truth to be with Abraham (a.s.): ‘and said [to one another], “Indeed it is you who are the wrongdoers!”’(262) Those people returned to their fiṭrah and ascribed their wrongdoing to one another; yet they did not declare openly that the truth was with Abraham (a.s.), though they knew it inwardly. So they went back to the path of misguidance a second time, turned the truth upside down, and seated falsehood in place of the truth: ‘Then they hung their heads. [However, they said,] “You certainly know that they cannot speak”’.(263) The language of the fiṭrah, then, differs completely from the language of inference by reason and transmission, such that it may at times come about that people in general go along with it and answer it.
2. Preceding knowledge and [preceding] ignorance. Rational inference was preceded by non-existence and ignorance; at the beginning of his birth the human being was empty of any acquired knowledge: ‘Allah has brought you forth from the bellies of your mothers while you did not know anything’.(264) The word ‘anything’ (shayʾan) in the sentence ‘you did not know anything’ is an indefinite noun in the context of negation. It is understood from it that the newborn lacks the kinds of knowledge that come by way of the senses and sensory experience, such as the eye and the ear, and is in a prior state of ignorance even concerning the proposition of the conjunction of contradictories, which is the most self-evident of self-evident truths: he does not know that the conjunction of contradictories and their joint removal are impossible — even though the [impossibility of the] conjunction of contradictories is clearer than the self-evident, and is the primary [truth].(265)
With respect to innate acquired knowledge (according to the logicians’ terminology), the newborn child is ignorant even of the conjunction of contradictories. When he reaches the threshold of perception, the first thing he learns is the impossibility of the conjunction of contradictories — even if he cannot express it — and then he comes to know all other things by way of the ear, the eye and the heart: ‘He made for you hearing, eyesight, and hearts so that you may give thanks’.(266) By way of the fiṭrah and the heart, however, no one is born into this world ignorant; rather, he carries a vision: ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind’,(267) and the inspired soul: ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’.(268) At every rank in which the human being grows towards perfection, his soul rises(269) and becomes able to perceive the teachings; and the first thing it perceives is God’s grace (fayḍ) and the encounter with Him. For the inclination towards God is deposited in the human form, as the Noble Messenger (s.a.w.) commanded: ‘Do not beat your children for their crying; for their crying is, for four months, the testimony that there is no god but God; for four months, the invocation of blessings on the Prophet and his Family; and for four months, supplication for his parents.’(270)
This noble ḥadīth has a subtle explanation, which Mullā Muḥsin al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (may God have mercy on him) set out in ʿIlm al-Yaqīn,(271) as did the teacher ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (may God have mercy on him) under His words ‘So set your heart as a person of pure faith on this religion’,(272) in the discussion of narrations;(273) the two of them narrated it with differences of expression: at the very first moment the child perceives his Lord; then the connection between himself and his Lord (the message); and then the channels of his sustenance — that is, his mother and his father — by means of divine providence, and he prays for them. So the newborn, who does not understand the self-evident — indeed does not understand even the primary — finds God, the message, and the intermediary of divine grace.
This way is not the way of reason and inference but the way of the heart and the fiṭrah; and the verse of the taking of the covenant indicates this.
It has been reported in this field from God’s Prophet Jesus (a.s.): ‘Knowledge is not in heaven, that it should come down to you, nor in the depths of the earth, that it should come out for you; rather, knowledge is moulded in your hearts. Adopt the manners of the spiritual ones, and it will appear to you.’(274)
On this basis, the way of reason follows ignorance, whereas the way of the fiṭrah is preceded by knowledge. Knowledge, then, has two ways:
a. The seminary sciences, and the academic and inferential sciences, which are received by way of the two ears and the two eyes and come to the human being as a guest after ignorance.
b. The innate sciences, which are not preceded by ignorance; rather, God (s.w.t.) has stored them within every individual. They are created together with the human being, and they are the host of the other sciences and of the human being: ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’.(275) One must therefore set out early and strive to bring the guest knowledge and the host knowledge into harmony; otherwise, things may take possession of that vessel which cover over the original host and take its place, and so speak in its stead.
3. Knowledge of the Origin, prophethood, the Return, and so on. The independent innate sciences do not know only vice and virtue, and the Origin and the Return. For the soul of every individual is inspired with vice and virtue, and knows the Origin who commands virtue and forbids vice, and knows that revelation and prophethood are two intermediaries of the divine grace; for God (s.w.t.) has taught the human being the moral habits through the tongue of the prophets and the awliyāʾ (a.s.). Likewise he knows the Return; for the habits of vice which God has forbidden, and which are not in harmony with the human being’s inner order, are the provision for a person’s entry into Hell, while the habits of virtue which God Almighty has commanded are in harmony with the order of the inner soul and prepare the ground, in the Resurrection, for the human being’s entry into Paradise.
God Almighty created the human soul with this innate provision of knowledge: ‘Every child is born upon the fiṭrah.’(276)
In accordance with what has gone before concerning the creation of the human being, and the crystallisation or effacement of the fiṭrah, there are two stages:
a. A stage in which God has granted a spirit of balanced creation, in which there is no deficiency. Balanced creation is the very inspiration of the soul that the Lord of the worlds inspired. Humankind learns inspiration from God, and the focus of this learning is His teaching [it] vice and virtue, not conventional (iʿtibārī) sciences. The Teacher is God Almighty, the learner is the human soul, and the title of the lesson is divine inspiration centred on vice and virtue. In the lesson of inspiration God Almighty said, ‘Am I not your Lord?’, and all answered: ‘They said, “Yes indeed”’.
b. A stage that begins with the human being’s arrival in the outward mode of existence: one group is an instance of His words ‘one who purifies it is felicitous’,(277) and another group is covered by His words ‘and one who betrays it fails’.(278) Some of them enjoy a pure inspired soul, and others have an inspired soul that has been obliterated. No one is ignorant within himself of the universals of good and evil, even if he must become aware of the particular lines after that. So no one is born a liar from the beginning of life; the child drifts towards whatever meets his need, and in the folds of his life he comes upon deviation and so learns it. Before the human being splits into two groups, God Almighty, at the stage of creation, created all the souls and spirits of the Children of Adam balanced in creation.
The Reply to the Objections to the Theory of the Fiṭrah
If we take the noble verse to turn on the fiṭrah, the objection of transmigration (tanāsukh) — as was explained in the first theory — would fall away, as would [the problems of] the representation [view] of the Muʿtazilah(279) and of conflict with the narrations. For the narrations can be interpreted without strain or difficulty, whereas the verse under discussion does not yield to interpretation in any way whatsoever. This verse must therefore be made the root, so that the narrations may be presented to it. If a narration is not made to stand opposed to the verse, [but] falls under its divisions, it can be made an explanation, a commentary, a clarification, a qualification, a specification or a contextual indicator (qarīnah) of the verse; if it comes to stand opposed to the verse, it is without effect.
Objections and questions may be raised concerning the fiṭrah. Therefore, having set out the different views on determining the position of God’s taking the covenant from the human being (the locus of the taking of the covenant) — in view of the adverb of time idh (“when”), which points to the omitted verb udhkur (“remember”), a command to remember that locus — and having chosen the theory of the fiṭrah, we must answer the following questions:
The first question: What is the relation between this verse and the Ascension (miʿrāj) of the Prophet (s.a.w.)?
The answer: The well-known Ascension of the Prophet (s.a.w.) was exclusive to him, and it came about through a special journey in two parts, the earthly and the heavenly; its earthly part took place by night, from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque. The verse of the progeny, however, is exclusive neither to the Prophet (s.a.w.) nor to any other infallible one; nor, likewise, is it exclusive to a particular age, a particular land or a particular lineage.
The second question: Were all human beings alike in the proper fashioning (istiwāʾ) of their innate creation and in the inspiration of vice and virtue (al-fujūr wa-l-taqwā)?
The answer: Yes! The threshold (niṣāb) needed for moral obligation (taklīf), from the standpoint of reason and the fiṭrah, is present in all individual human beings, from the prophets and the awliyāʾ (a.s.) and …; the superior stage was the lot of the prophets (a.s.) and the infallible Imams (a.s.), and those who benefit from this grace (fayḍ) bear many responsibilities on their shoulders.
God has imposed a responsibility in return for every blessing. For example, at the dawn of Islam He said to ordinary individuals that each single Muslim among you must stand firm against ten individuals: ‘If there be twenty patient men among you, they shall overcome two hundred’;(280) so if you numbered twenty persons and the enemy facing you at the encounter numbered two hundred, you must stand firm. Then He said that every fighter is to face [two] fighters from the opposing front: ‘Now Allah has lightened your burden, knowing that there is weakness in you. So if there be a hundred patient men among you, they shall overcome two hundred’.(281) In the first case, the fighter in the way of God (mujāhid) has no right to flee the battlefield if ten fighters (mujāhidīn) confront him. Then He lightened [this], saying that the Muslim mujāhid must stand firm against two fighters from the front of polytheism; if [they] exceed this number, he has the right to leave the field of battle, and this is neither counted against him as [flight from] the advance (al-zaḥf) nor reckoned a major sin. This ruling is different, however, in the case of the Noble Messenger (s.a.w.): if all the people of the earth attacked him and rose against him, he has no right to retreat: ‘So fight in the way of Allah: you are responsible only for yourself’;(282) even if no one helped him in the war, he must face [them] alone. This is among the exclusive characteristics of the Prophet (s.a.w.).(283)
When God favoured the Prophet (s.a.w.) with a blessing, He required of him in return an extreme responsibility; and the threats mentioned concerning him (s.a.w.) are not mentioned concerning any of the others who slip: ‘Had he faked any sayings in Our name, We would have surely seized him by the right hand and then cut off his aorta, and none of you could have held Us off from him’.(284)
In accordance with this threat, were anyone to make disgraceful use of the social acceptance granted [him] by God Almighty, he would be afflicted with a punishment that does not afflict the unbeliever. A small band set up a trade in religion; a group set about fabrication and distortion in the Torah; and others set about the maskh, naskh, faskh and raskh of the Gospel:(285) ‘pervert words from their meanings’,(286) ‘write the Book with their hands and then say, “This is from Allah,” that they may sell it for a paltry gain’.(287) A group openly claimed prophethood, yet God Almighty did not punish them. Those who have claimed prophethood hardly number fewer than the prophets;(288) despite this, God Almighty did not threaten them but granted them respite: some died an ordinary death, another met his end in wars, and …; for they were of the ranks of the common people, and their words found no acceptance among the public. But one whose counterfeit religious authority has become entrenched among the people, and who has deceived the people by donning this divine office, is not granted safety from His punishment by the Lord of the worlds, because the common people take [their religion] from him at the expense of the divine commands. For this reason God Almighty exposes him swiftly: if the scholar’s foot slips, it may be that God does not grant him respite, whereas if someone else did that same deed, God Almighty would leave him and grant him respite.
The third question: Are those born insane alike [with others] in the proper fashioning of their creation with respect to the spirit?
The answer: Yes! God (s.w.t.) has inspired all, even the insane, from their birth; but because they are ailing, they have no knowledge of what they know, and if they were treated, they would recall those particulars.
We do not know whether or not the insane have pleasant dreams. A surgical operation may be performed on one of the organs of an anaesthetised person, yet he sees a good dream in the world of imagination, because he is in a state of bewilderment and has not lost consciousness. The insane person likewise has states like these, but he does not act on what he knows.
The fourth question: If the taking of the covenant was innate and comprehensive, taking it from children who die at a young age would be futile, and futility does not issue from the Lord of wisdom. In reality, the Noble Qurʾān aims at dispelling two pretexts in general by means of a single proof — ‘lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed we were unaware of this,” or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us]”’ — whereas one who died at a young age is exempt from this argument.
The answer: The benefit resulting from the taking of the covenant is not only the warding off of punishment on the Resurrection; it has other abundant blessings, one of which is securing and completing the creative order. Since children, inasmuch as they lie on the path of the perfecting of existence like all other beings, likewise have submission (islām), compliance, glorification, prostration, willingness and desire, the pledge was taken from them in a manner suited to their states. God Almighty takes the pledge from each being — inanimate thing, plant, animal, heaven and earth — in a manner suited to it, and they pledge to Him a creative pledge, as God Almighty said: ‘He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’.(289) So the covenant is taken from the child in this way; it need not be taken from him in the way suited to rational and legally responsible beings; the verse of the taking of the covenant from the progeny is unrestricted (fīhā iṭlāq) and includes each thing according to its [capacity]. Yes! The verse ‘He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!”’ relates a pledge; and the child, likewise, is himself in the rank of those from whom the pledge was taken, just as God commanded the earth, ‘O earth, swallow your water!’,(290) and the earth obeys the command of its Lord; so likewise is the case of the child. Accordingly, every being is obedient to God Almighty according to the existential capacity it has.
The same holds for inanimate things: inanimate things that turn into plants, plants that turn into animals, the clot that turns into a lump of flesh, and the lump of flesh that turns into bones — whenever any of them rises to a higher rank, more pledges are taken from it; but those pledges are in the tongue of creation. When any being attains a new life, that is a newly arising grace for it; and whatever enters a new domain pledges a pledge suited to that domain.
There is likewise a pledge in the case of the insane, as evidenced by the fact that the Qurʾān has denied that any being is deficient in creation. A human being may be deficient in his organs and limbs, but the spirit is not deficient in its creation; for God Almighty swore, ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it’(291) — an oath by the human spirit, which the Creator Almighty created properly fashioned in its creation. So the spirit is not deficient in creation. He then followed it with the explanatory fāʾ (al-fāʾ al-faṣīḥiyyah),(292) which explains what precedes it, saying in explanation of the fashioning of the soul: ‘and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’;(293) that is, the fashioning of the soul is by the inspiration of vice and virtue in the spirit of the human being, both the rational and the non-rational, such as the insane. Both are included in His words ‘and breathed into him of My spirit’,(294) so there is no difference between them in this matter.
So if someone asks, ‘What is the purpose of taking the covenant from the insane human being who remains in this condition to the end of his life, or from the newborn who dies at a young age?’, the answer is that the benefit hoped for from this must be sought in the order of the universe. It has been reported concerning children that it is the being of God’s Prophet Abraham the Friend (a.s.) that nurtures them, perfects them and makes them among the people of Paradise;(295) and we have no knowledge of the future.
Yes! If we confine the benefit of this pledge to the argument on the Day of Resurrection alone, perhaps it would be permissible to accept this objection; but if we refer the taking of the covenant back to a creative aspect in the human being — ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’(296) — then this pledge is also beneficial for all, even children and the insane.
It is worth mentioning that if this covenant were in the tongue of revelation and reason, this objection would not arise at all; for in that case the covenant is taken from the rational and those possessed of intellect, and so this question is not raised with regard to reason and revelation.
The fifth question: If the covenant was taken from all individual human beings, there ought not to be any oppressed (mustaḍʿafūn); how, then, are the verses about the oppressed to be explained?
The answer: The oppressed in the Noble Qurʾān are of several kinds:
1. Those oppressed on earth who are powerful in the malakūt. This group, though outwardly oppressed on earth, are powerful in the malakūt, and they will be freed in the near future from the domination of those who hold sway; by the favour of the Lord of the worlds they will bring the arrogant (al-mustakbirūn) under [their] authority and rule over them: ‘And We desired to show favour to those who were abased in the land, and to make them imams, and to make them the heirs’.(297) Far from suffering from cultural bankruptcy, this group leads the cultural movements in society.
2. The politically and militarily oppressed. They are a people who constantly took refuge in God and implored Him to deliver them from the evil of the oppressors in their land: ‘who say, “Our Lord, bring us out of this town whose people are oppressors”’.(298) These are monotheists over whom the arrogant have gained domination, and God Almighty has urged the Muslims to rise to their aid and not to hold back from jihād in the way of God and from helping the oppressed: ‘Why should you not fight in the way of Allah and the oppressed men, women, and children, who say, “Our Lord, bring us out of this town whose people are oppressors, and appoint for us a guardian from Yourself, and appoint for us a helper from Yourself”?’(299)
3. The negligent oppressed. Through their ill choice in the first instance, this group allowed the cultural apparatus (al-ʿuddah al-thaqāfiyyah)(300) to dominate them, and religious beliefs crumbled among them, until they were dyed with the dye of the arrogant and bore their ideas. Those who are unable to perform their religious rites in the lands of unbelief have no proof permitting them to remain there; for although they could have lived in the lands of the Muslims, they preferred to live in the regions of unbelief and polytheism, claiming [to seek] comfort and ease in the life of this world.
These people have no answer to give at the time of death. When the angels of punishment ask them about their state — ‘Indeed, those whom the angels take away while they are wronging themselves, they ask, “What state were you in?”’ — they say that they were oppressed in the land — ‘They reply, “We were oppressed in the land”’ — and [that] we did not have the ability to perform the religious rites; we did not know the direction of the qiblah, so we could not perform the prayer, and we had no call to prayer (adhān) and iqāmah to be proclaimed! The angels then say to them: If you were not among the people of jihād, having no hand with which to strike for jihād, why did your feet not help you to leave those lands, so that you might take other lands for residence and life: ‘They say, “Was not Allah’s earth vast enough so that you might migrate in it?”’. The recompense of this oppressed one, who moved to a land for the sake of comfort of living and became unable in that land to carry out the rites of his religion, is Hell: ‘The refuge of such shall be hell, and it is an evil destination’.(301)
The old men, the women and the children have been excepted from these, and so they are not cast into Hell, because they lack the ability for jihād and the capacity for emigration: ‘Except the oppressed among men, women and children, who have neither access to any means nor are guided to any way. Maybe Allah will excuse them, for Allah is all-excusing, all-forgiving’.(302) As for those whose movement was prompted by a sweet but false eagerness for comfort, and whose condition then came to be like that of the arrogant, on the Resurrection their ruling will be the ruling of the arrogant.
4. The intellectually and culturally oppressed. Nothing of the general lines of religion has reached this group, and the rulings of religion and the teachings of Islam have not reached them; for this reason God refrains from punishing them for abandoning the prayer: ‘We do not punish [any community] until We have sent [it] an apostle’.(303) But none of them has a pretext for denying the principle of tawḥīd, because they perceive God’s Lordship and their servanthood to Him in their reality. If a person were not heedless of himself, he would constantly remember God’s Lordship; for creed (al-ʿaqīdah) means a knot (ʿaqd) — a knot between faith and the self — and when one of the parties to the knot is not forgotten, the knot is not forgotten, since it is the knot of faith with the very self of the one who ties it. But if he forgets himself, he will forget God and the knot, just as forgetting God is a cause of their being made to forget themselves and to ignore themselves: ‘Do not be like those who forget Allah, so He makes them forget their own souls. It is they who are the transgressors’.(304)
Some Muslims in various parts of the world still know nothing of Islam except the saying ‘There is no god but God’ (lā ilāha illā Allāh); they know nothing of the prayer, fasting, the Ḥajj and the other obligations, and they have not heard of the Qurʾān. In these situations, anyone who has mastered the language of the people of that place, or is able to master it, is responsible for guiding them, given that through the blessings of the Islamic Revolution knowledge has become possible for them. These people, in addition to their political and cultural oppression, are intellectually and culturally oppressed.
Points and Subtleties
1. The Separation of Knowledge from Faith, and the Secret of It
From some of the related verses, matters are derived showing that there is no necessary connection between knowledge and faith, and that someone can know the truth yet not believe in it:
a. Deliberate denial, with knowledge of the miracles of the Prophet Moses (a.s.). Pharaoh met all the miracles of Moses (a.s.) with the accusation that they were sorcery and conjuring: ‘Pharaoh said to him, “O Moses, indeed I think you are bewitched”’.(305) Moses (a.s.) answered Pharaoh’s accusation, saying: You understand well that the miracles are a means of opening people’s eyes and making them aware, and that none but God Almighty has sent them down: ‘He said, “You certainly know that no one has sent these [signs] except the Lord of the heavens and the earth, as eye-openers, and I, O Pharaoh, indeed think you are doomed”’.(306) According to this verse, Pharaoh knew that these miracles had been sent down by God Almighty, yet he did not believe in them.
b. Denial of the miracles out of ignorance and arrogance. When the clear divine miracles came to the transgressing people of Pharaoh, they grew arrogant despite being convinced that they had been sent down by God; arrogantly and wrongfully, they refused to accept them and described them as the sorcery of Moses (a.s.): ‘But when Our signs came to them, as eye-openers, they said, “This is plain magic.” They impugned them, wrongfully and out of arrogance, though they were convinced in their hearts [of their veracity]. So observe how the fate of the agents of corruption was!’(307)
c. The deliberate opposition of the scholars of the Jews and the Christians to Islam. The opposition of the scholars of the Jews and the Christians to manifest Islam came from knowledge and awareness. After the truth of the Noble Messenger (s.a.w.) had become clear through the arguments, the debates and the proofs he (s.a.w.) put forward, they persisted in their error out of envy and rancour: ‘Indeed, with Allah religion is Islam, and those who were given the Book did not differ except after knowledge had come to them, out of envy among themselves. And whoever denies Allah’s signs [should know that] Allah is swift at reckoning’.(308)
Other verses have likewise proclaimed this truth: the human being may oppose the truth deliberately and knowingly; even though the truth is as clear to him as the sun at midday, he is too arrogant to believe in it: ‘and none differed in it except those who had been given it, after the manifest proofs had come to them, out of envy among themselves’.(309)
The secret of the separation of faith from knowledge is that faith is an act of the self and, in both its origination and its continuance, a voluntary matter; that is, a person is able to bar himself from believing in what he knows, or to turn back from it after having known it. Knowledge, however, is not a voluntary act of the self. Its principles and premises are voluntary and lie within the human being’s domain, but once its premises are present, the human being’s attainment of knowledge is compelled and necessary.
On this basis, when the Noble Qurʾān recounts the verses that relate rational or transmitted arguments, it does not state that all human beings have become convinced of what reason and revelation have guided to; but concerning the taking of the covenant it says that all human beings acknowledged it: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness”’. This particularity of the locus of the taking of the covenant is a firm proof that this locus is separate from the locus of reason and revelation.
In sum:
1. Faith and rational assent are both acts of the self, and of the kind of action, not of thought; even so, because this act is of the soul, it has a share of immateriality, and by it, it has a share of immateriality,(310) so it is accompanied by knowledge; and this knowledge is of the kind of presence (ḥuḍūr), not of acquisition (ḥuṣūl).
2. Every act, whether of the heart or of the body, is a voluntary matter, such that there is a distance there between the self and that act, and [there is] the will: if the agent did not will, the act would not be realised in practice.
3. Knowledge is purely the self’s being informed, and apart from its principles nothing else is within the knower’s choice. Hence faith admits of separation, but knowledge is inseparable.
2. The Difference between Witnessing Knowledge, Demonstrative Knowledge and Qurʾānic Knowledge
The basic difference between witnessing (shuhūdī), demonstrative (burhānī) and Qurʾānic knowledge is that in witnessing knowledge what is witnessed is the very reality. Since it is not measured against anything [else], and is not of the kind that relates and shows something else, there is no room in it for correctness and error, or for truth and falsehood, which are found in acquired knowledge. Although the human being may sometimes confuse the connected imaginal [form] (al-mithāl al-muttaṣil), mixed with jumbled dreams, with the separate imaginal [form] (al-mithāl al-munfaṣil) that exists in the body of reality, at the time of witnessing and in the state of presence the possibility of confusion is negated and has no room; for it does not relate anything else, so as to be erroneous or correct.
In demonstrative knowledge, the self-evident proposition, which is the capital for acquiring theoretical matters, is clear and protected from defect and error; and the theoretical proposition that terminates in the self-evident is clear for one who has traversed the path from the self-evident matter to the theoretical, and then traversed the path back from the theoretical matter to the self-evident. Such a person attains certainty, and in that state it does not admit of error; for the path from the self-evident matter to the theoretical matter exists and is protected [from error], even though the traveller may take another path, or may slip on the original path itself, so that the matter becomes confused for him.
The Qurʾānic knowledge of the Prophet (s.a.w.), who is infallible in every respect, is of the kind of witnessing knowledge, not acquired knowledge; and when he relates it to others, it must be examined from two perspectives. The first perspective is the speech itself: it is without doubt, with nothing less or more; it is the very speech of God: ‘Nor does he speak out of [his own] desire: it is just a revelation that is revealed [to him]’.(311)
The second perspective is the manner in which the speech of God is conveyed to people. On the one hand, people in general hear the speech of revelation sent down upon the Prophet (s.a.w.) in an ordinary way, and this hearing through the ear is not a revelatory reception — unlike what the angel receives from God, and unlike what the Messenger (s.a.w.) receives from God through the angel or without intermediary; and this manner is among the characteristics of revelation.
It has been mentioned, regarding the kinds of divine address in His words ‘It is not [possible] for any human that Allah should speak to him except through revelation or from behind a veil, or send a messenger’,(312) that the messenger mentioned in the verse includes [one] other than the angel. The prophets (a.s.) are likewise messengers who convey the speech of God to people in general in their societies, and God speaks to human beings in this way, by sending messengers to them. But the two matters must be distinguished: first, that the speech is the speech of God without any doubt, because it is a miracle; and second, the manner of address and of delivering the speech, which is not of the kind of revelation. This makes clear the difference between, on the one hand, the Qurʾānic proof, which yields certainty under the shade of inimitability (iʿjāz), and the word of the infallible one, and, on the other, the demonstrative and gnostic proof. Of course, the infallibility of the speech of God Almighty and the infallibility of the Messenger (s.a.w.) are not two proofs of the infallibility of the mujtahid who receives the revealed speech, perceives it, breaks it down and analyses it. Hence mujtahids judge one another mistaken, through the clash and multiplicity of views, and with this multiplicity they enter the fields of jurisprudence, exegesis and ḥadīth — unlike the infallible chain of the prophets (a.s.), who came with the mark ‘confirming what was before it’; by this that noble chain was illuminated. The point is that those two infallibilities (the infallibility of the speech and the infallibility of the transmitter and the speaker) do not entail a third (the mujtahid’s fatwa, the exegete’s understanding, the theologian’s analysis and …), even though [the third] is a divine proof that is binding and excusing (munjizah wa-muʿadhdhirah), and with certainty it corresponds to reality in many cases.
Discussion of the Narrations
1. The Narrations of the World of Particles and the Verse of the Taking of the Covenant
Zurārah, from Abū Jaʿfar (a.s.): He said: … And I asked him about the words of God, Mighty and Majestic: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ — to the end of the verse. He said: ‘He brought out from the back of Adam his progeny until the Day of Resurrection, and they came out like particles (dharr); He made Himself known to them and showed them Himself; and were it not for that, no one would know his Lord …’(313)
Note: We have already presented, in the critique of the theory of the World of Particles, some of the objections raised against taking the verse under discussion to refer to the narrations of the World of Particles.
2. The Taking of the Covenant and the Blending of the Fiṭrah with Tawḥīd
ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sinān, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.): He said: I asked him about the words of God, Mighty and Majestic: ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind’(314) — what is that fiṭrah? He said: ‘It is Islam. God originated them [upon it] when He took their covenant upon tawḥīd. He said, “Am I not your Lord?” — and among them were the believer and the unbeliever.’(315)
Zurārah said: I said to Abū Jaʿfar (a.s.): May God set you right! The words of God, Mighty and Majestic, in His Book: ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind’? He said: ‘He originated them upon tawḥīd at the covenant, upon knowledge of Him, that He is their Lord.’ I said: And did they address Him? He said: Then he lowered his head, and then said: ‘Were it not for that, they would not know who their Lord is, nor who their Provider is.’(316)
Note: a. Every exegete ought to give his attention to the exegetical narrations, so as to arrive at the correct meaning and draw on the abundance of the narrations. The narrations that have come on the exegesis of the verses under discussion suggest to us that the verses of the taking of the covenant are closely related to the verses of the fiṭrah, and that these two groups of verses are not unrelated to the verses on the human soul’s being inspired with wickedness and piety. The two narrations mentioned, for example, are two firm witnesses to the complete relationship between the taking of the covenant and the verses of the fiṭrah.
b. The mode of existence (nashʾah) of the taking of the covenant is a setting neither for faith and unbelief nor for testing and choice. What the sentence ‘and in it are the believer and the unbeliever’ means is that, in that mode of existence, some of them are such that, were they to return to the mode of existence of choice, they would disbelieve a second time through their ill choice.
c. According to the second narration, had there not been the mutual address with God and experiential knowledge (al-maʿrifah al-shuhūdiyyah) of Him in the locus of the taking of the covenant, the human being would, in the locus of unbelief and faith, have been heedless of God’s Lordship and of His being the Provider, and would have seen nothing but natural causes and material means.
d. The monotheistic human fiṭrah is firmly related to the locus of the taking of the covenant. God has called the human being — who is in this world and at the stage of ‘it is’ (yakūn), with the aspect of multiplicity, and of fatherhood and sonship among them, preserved, and in the state of their freedom to be monotheists or polytheists — to guidance and felicity by three ways. Of these three ways, two admit of failure (takhalluf) and one does not. The two ways that admit of failure, so that some believe by them and others disbelieve, are, first, the way of reason and proof, and second, the way of transmission and revelation. The evidence of this failure is that a number of people accuse the heavenly books, the miracles of the prophets (a.s.) and the marvels (karāmāt) of the awliyāʾ of being myth, magic and soothsaying.
The way that does not admit of failure is the monotheistic fiṭrah bestowed on all, which no one denies; it is the way of the taking of the covenant on tawḥīd and on submission to God Almighty: ‘It is Islam; God originated them [upon it] when He took their covenant on tawḥīd.’
That every believer or polytheist turns sincerely to God Almighty at the time of danger — ‘they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’(317) — is a clear proof that the monotheist and the polytheist alike have been originated upon tawḥīd, and that all people know God Almighty: ‘known to every ignorant one’.(318) In the locus of the taking of the covenant, all witnessed the unity of Lordship (al-tawḥīd al-rubūbī) by way of address and direct seeing: ‘He originated them upon tawḥīd at the covenant, upon knowledge of Him, that He is their Lord. I said: And they addressed Him? He said: He lowered his head.’
In the locus of the covenant, where God inspired all human beings with [discernment of] wickedness and piety — ‘by the soul and Him who fashioned it, and inspired it with [discernment between] its virtues and vices’(319) — He made clear to the human being his own reality — ‘and made them bear witness over themselves’ — and all acknowledged God’s Lordship and servanthood to Him: ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ In the arena of the life of this world, however, the five manifestations appeared — play, diversion, adornment, mutual vainglory and rivalry: ‘Know that the life of this world is mere diversion and play, glamour and mutual vainglory among you and rivalry for wealth and children’.(320) Once these things had taken shape, one group nurtured their monotheistic fiṭrah, and so they triumphed and prospered: ‘one who purifies it is felicitous’;(321) while others stained the radiant divine form with the darknesses of wickedness — ‘No, that is not the case! Rather, their hearts have been sullied by what they have been earning’(322) — persisted in sin and so locked their hearts — ‘or are there locks on the hearts?’(323) — closed the doors so that the compassionate warnings of the messengers (a.s.) could not penetrate — ‘It is the same to them whether you warn them or do not warn them, they will not have faith’(324) — and deprived themselves and their hearts of the compassionate admonitions of God’s awliyāʾ: ‘They said, “It is the same to us whether you exhort us or not”’.(325) These people have placed the keys of their hearts — and the heart is God’s sanctuary: ‘The heart is God’s sanctuary, so do not let anyone other than God dwell in God’s sanctuary’(326) — in the hand of Iblīs. Finding welcome and inclination in them, Iblīs filled their hearts, flooding them with love of this world, with unbelief and with things Iblīsian: ‘Indeed the satans inspire their friends to dispute with you’;(327) and through this passage he brings them out of the light of tawḥīd into the darknesses of polytheism: ‘As for the faithless, their awliya are the fake deities, who drive them out of light into darkness’.(328)
In many verses God Almighty has warned the human being not to fall into this perilous pit; and His awliyāʾ (a.s.) likewise, in their noble ḥadīths, have said that a human being should not forget God Almighty — ‘Do not be like those who forget Allah, so He makes them forget their own souls. It is they who are the transgressors’(329) — and that they should hold fast to watching over themselves, so that [their souls] do not slip out of their control — ‘O you who have faith! Take care of your own souls’(330) — and that they should remember God much — ‘O you who have faith! Remember Allah with frequent remembrance’(331) — and that they should not neglect taking account of the self: ‘He is not of us who does not take account of himself.’(332)
3. The Taking of the Covenant on Tawḥīd, Prophethood and Wilāyah
From Dāwūd al-Raqqī, who said: I asked Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.) … He said: ‘… When God willed to create the creation, He scattered them before Him and said to them, “Who is your Lord?” The first to speak were the Messenger of God (s.a.w.), the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) and the Imams, God’s blessings be upon them, and they said, “You are our Lord.” So He made them bear knowledge and religion. Then He said to the angels, “These are the bearers of My religion and My knowledge, and My trustees among My creation, and they are the ones who will be questioned.” Then He said to the Children of Adam, “Acknowledge God’s Lordship, and these persons’ wilāyah and [the duty of] obedience [to them].” They said, “Yes, our Lord, we acknowledge.” God said to the angels, “Bear witness.” The angels said, “We bear witness” — that they should not say tomorrow, “Indeed we were unaware of this,” or lest you should say, “Our fathers ascribed partners [to Allah] before [us] and we were descendants after them. Will You then destroy us because of what the falsifiers have done?” O Dāwūd, our wilāyah is affirmed upon them in the covenant.’(333)
— From Abū Jaʿfar (a.s.): ‘… So prophethood was established for them. And the covenant was taken from the resolute ones (ulū al-ʿazm): “that I am your Lord, Muḥammad is My Messenger, ʿAlī is the Commander of the Faithful and his successors after him are those in charge of My command and the treasurers of My knowledge, and that al-Mahdī is the one by whom I shall aid My religion, make My rule manifest and take vengeance on My enemies, and by whom I shall be worshipped, willingly or unwillingly.” They said, “We have acknowledged, O Lord, and borne witness.” Adam neither denied nor acknowledged. So the resolve (ʿazīmah) was established for these five of the prophets regarding al-Mahdī, and Adam had no resolve to acknowledge it; and that is His words, Exalted is He, concerning Adam: “Certainly We had enjoined Adam earlier; but he forgot, and We did not find any resoluteness in him.”(334) … Then obedience, disobedience and wilāyah were established.’(335)
Note: a. These two narrations and the two preceding headings do not touch on devotional, jurisprudential, rights-related or moral discussions; rather, they are narrations that explain and expound the verses of the taking of the covenant and clarify the relationship between the covenant and the fiṭrah.
Clarification: The human being has a single, fixed reality: so it was in the distant and near past, and so it will likewise be in the distant and near future, in one tune. The innate religion — ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind. There is no altering Allah’s creation’(336) — secures this fixed hue (ṣibghah) in the human being, while the parts of the human being that are not fixed but changing — such as the connection with nature — are secured by the changing laws and paths: ‘For each [community] among you We had appointed a code [of law] and a path’.(337)
The principle of prayer, fasting, zakāh, ḥajj and jihād is among the unchanging matters in religion, but the particulars of each of these acts of worship are among the matters open to change. They belong to the part of the laws and paths whose quantity and manner are conveyed by the law-bringing prophets, while the prophets other than the resolute ones are promoters and conveyors of the laws of those prophets.
The covenant was taken on the innate religion and on the original lines of beliefs, ethics and rights, which are fixed parts of religion and which all the prophets (a.s.) have confirmed: ‘confirming what has been [revealed] before it’.(338)
In sum, the discourse of the verses of the fiṭrah revolves around religion — ‘So set your heart as a person of pure faith on this religion, the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind’(339) — and religion is a collection of principles and universal branches. The taking of the covenant was therefore not confined to the matter of the unity of Lordship, and God Almighty’s Lordship and servanthood to Him; rather, it extended even to the prophethood of the prophets (a.s.), especially the prophethood of the Prophet of Islam (s.a.w.), and to the wilāyah of His awliyāʾ (a.s.), especially the wilāyah of the Master, the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.).
On this basis, the narrations reporting that the covenant was taken on the messengerships of the prophets (a.s.), especially the messengership of the Seal, Muḥammad (s.a.w.), and on the wilāyah of the Commander of the Faithful and the Imams (a.s.) — ‘O Dāwūd, our wilāyah is affirmed upon them in the covenant’(340) — do not conflict with the sentence ‘Am I not your Lord?’ or with the taking of the covenant on God Almighty’s Lordship. For whoever has affirmed God Almighty’s Lordship and acknowledged servanthood to Him has acknowledged the prophethood of the prophets (a.s.) and the wilāyah of God’s awliyāʾ (a.s.), which are two of the accepted conditions of tawḥīd.
In the ḥadīth qudsī we read: ‘The wilāyah of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is My fortress; whoever enters My fortress is safe from My punishment.’(341) And in the ḥadīth of the Golden Chain (Silsilat al-Dhahab), narrated from Imam al-Riḍā (a.s.), we read: ‘“There is no god but God” is My fortress; whoever enters My fortress is safe from My punishment. When the mount moved off, he called out to us: “With its conditions, and I am among its conditions.”’(342) These two [ḥadīths] do not mean that salvation from divine punishment comes through independent fortresses (tawḥīd, and the wilāyah of the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) and of the other infallible Imams (a.s.)). Rather, it is a single fortress and no more — the impregnable fortress of tawḥīd — and the fortress of the Commander of the Faithful and of the Imams of his progeny (a.s.) is the gate through which one comes to the fortress of tawḥīd. Whoever deviates from their wilāyah therefore has no path to the pure and most exemplary tawḥīd, for the true monotheist is he who submits to God Almighty’s command in the matter of wilāyah.
b. The narration of Dāwūd al-Raqqī makes it clearly evident that the first to acknowledge God Almighty’s Lordship were the Prophet (s.a.w.), the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) and the pure Imams; and God Almighty commanded all the Children of Adam to acknowledge wilāyah and obedience to them in addition to acknowledging His Lordship, and they all acknowledged it. From this we learn that the Children of Adam, although they are progeny of one another, exist in that mode of existence — unlike the visible world, in which the progenies exist one after another — in a form of unity, and of a multiplicity consistent with being gathered together.
c. The end of the second narration means that the divine pledge — like gift, prophethood and messengership — has ranks, and that bearing its highest rank lies within the capacity of the resolute prophets (a.s.); a prophet who has not been honoured with that exalted station cannot bear the pledge of the highest rank. So if a text tells of a shortcoming of Adam (a.s.) or of another prophet, it can be [read as] referring to a station for which that prophet was not responsible, and not as regards his general station.
4. The Taking of the Covenant in the Locus of the Spirits
From Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.): ‘A man came to the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) while he was with his companions, greeted him, and then said to him, “By God, I love you and take you as my master.” The Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) said to him, “You have lied.” He said, “Indeed, by God, I love you and take you as my master”, and he repeated it three times. The Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) said to him, “You have lied; you are not as you said. God created the spirits two thousand years before the bodies, then He presented to us those who love us; and by God, I did not see your spirit among those presented. So where were you?” The man fell silent at that and did not reply to him.’ And in another narration, Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.) said: ‘He was in the Fire.’(343)
Note: This narration makes no mention of the taking of the covenant or of the verse of the fiṭrah; rather, in one respect it is at odds with the narrations of the taking of the covenant, since it is understood from it that some of them were not present when the matter of wilāyah was mentioned: ‘By God, I did not see your spirit among those presented’; ‘He was in the Fire.’ Yet in the light of the preceding narrations it has become clear that all the Children of Adam were present in the locus of the taking of the covenant, that the covenant was taken on the wilāyah of the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.), and that all acknowledged it.
It is possible that this noble narration, which states explicitly that the spirits were created before the bodies, does not apply to the verse under discussion or to the taking of the covenant in the locus of the fiṭrah, and that it may be a proof that another covenant was taken in a mode of existence specific to the spirits. For the apparent meaning of His words ‘When your Lord took…’ is that the covenant was taken at a time when God had created the human being in a detailed form — not in the form of spirits only — and that the taking of the covenant was in the locus of argument and legislation; and the locus of argument requires the spirit and the body together.
In any case, if this narration does not accord with the verse under discussion, that does not mean denying the soundness of its content; rather, should its meaning prove to be in keeping with the rational and the transmitted [proofs] and not contrary to the universal principles, it would be relating a matter other than what the verse under discussion conveys.
5. The Truthful Pledge of All Humanity
From Abū Baṣīr, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), concerning the words of God ‘“Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’: ‘I said: Did they say it with their tongues? He said: Yes, and they said it with their hearts…’(344)
Note: The apparent meaning of the verse of the ‘progeny’ and of this narration is that all the Children of Adam said ‘Yes indeed’ with their hearts and their tongues, and that they were truthful in their pledge to Him. So the narration from Ibn Muskān, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.) — ‘… Among them is he who acknowledged with his tongue in the [World of] Particles (dharr) but did not believe with his heart; so God Almighty said, “but they would not believe something they had denied before”’(345)(346) — being contrary to the apparent meaning of the verse and of the aforementioned narration, must mean that God knew in the locus of the covenant that a group of people, when they descend to this world and become occupied with the visible (mulkī) side, will deny His Lordship. They are like those who call on God sincerely at sea when dangers surround them — ‘When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’ — but who, when He delivers them from the danger and brings them to the shore, return to polytheism once more: ‘but when He delivers them to land, behold, they ascribe partners [to Him]’.(347) If one is unable to reconcile these two narrations in meaning with the apparent meaning of the Noble Qurʾān, the turn will come for final reconciliation and preference, and the point of reference in that is the Qurʾān and the definitive Sunnah.
6. Witnessing God in the Locus of the Taking of the Covenant
From Abū Baṣīr, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), who said: ‘I said to him: Tell me about God, Mighty and Majestic: will the believers see Him on the Day of Resurrection? He said: Yes, and they saw Him before the Day of Resurrection. I said: When? He said: When He said to them, “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!” Then he was silent for a while, and then said: And the believers indeed see Him in this world, before the Day of Resurrection. Do you not see Him at this moment of yours? Abū Baṣīr said: I said to him: May I be made your ransom, shall I relate this from you? He said: No; for if you relate it, a denier who is ignorant of the meaning of what you say will deny it, and then reckon that that is anthropomorphism (tashbīh) and unbelief. Seeing with the heart is not like seeing with the eye. Exalted is God above what the anthropomorphists and the heretics ascribe to Him.’(348)
— From Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), concerning the words of God, Mighty and Majestic: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ ‘I said: Was this by direct seeing (muʿāyanah)? He said: Yes; the knowledge became fixed and they forgot the standing (al-mawqif), and they will remember it. Were it not for that, no one would know who his Creator and his Provider is. Among them is he who acknowledged with his tongue in the [World of] Particles but did not believe with his heart; so God Almighty said, “but they would not believe something they had denied before”.’(349)(350)
Note: a. Direct seeing here means witnessing (shuhūd). According to this noble narration, in the locus of the covenant all humanity witnessed God Almighty and His unity of Lordship with the eye of the heart, not with the physical eye: ‘Eyes do not perceive Him by the witnessing of sight, but hearts perceive Him by the realities of faith.’(351) Hence the root of the knowledge of God is fixed and established in the hearts, while what came about through witnessing at this standing has been forgotten: ‘the knowledge became fixed and they forgot the standing’. The evidence for this is the turning to the One God when the dust is cleared away and hope in outward means is lost: ‘When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him’.(352)
Were it not for this experiential knowledge, no one would have known his Creator and his Provider: ‘Were it not for that, no one would know who his Creator and his Provider is’. For by acquired knowledge alone one can establish a proof of the principle of God’s existence and of His names and attributes, and proof produces nothing but a mental concept; and mental concepts are, without doubt, not God Almighty: ‘Everything that you distinguish with your imaginations, in its most subtle meanings, is created, made, like you, and returned to you.’(353)
God the Exalted is not a mental concept, nor can knowledge of Him be attained in full by acquired knowledge, since:
First: mental concepts are among the products of the soul: either the soul produced them, or [they came] by teaching, or they were cast into it from outside the mind; and in both cases the concepts are a product and an offspring of the soul. But God (s.w.t.) ‘He neither begat, nor was begotten’;(354) so He is neither begetter nor begotten of anyone.
Second: mental forms and concepts become absent and pass away, so that they are present at one time and absent or passed away at another; but God Almighty neither becomes absent nor passes away.
Third: mental forms and concepts multiply as those who perceive them multiply; but God Almighty is One, Unique, and admits of neither partner nor multiplicity.
Fourth: externality is the very Essence of God Almighty, and the external existent never enters the mind; concepts exist only in the mind, and however far they extend, they produce another concept, not an external instance.
On this basis, the results of rational proofs are mental concepts that tell of God Almighty — concepts that are signs pointing to Him, not Him — and in the light of these proofs it is disclosed to the human being that there is a Lord. By way of witnessing, and in the shade of faith, every individual is able, according to his capacity, to witness God (s.w.t.) and to find Him; for whoever knows the worth of his own self will without doubt come to know the Maintainer, the Sustainer and the Self-Subsisting for it, who is the Living and Self-Subsisting absolutely: ‘Allah—there is no god except Him—is the Living One, the All-sustainer’.(355)
b. Experiential knowledge admits no lying and does not yield to hypocrisy. The group who did not believe with their hearts — ‘and did not believe with his heart’ — are therefore those who, were they to come to this world, would not believe with their hearts.
c. Satan is of the jinn — ‘He was one of the jinn, so he transgressed against his Lord’s command’(356) — and the jinn, like the human being, have a body and a spirit; but the degree of immateriality of their spirit does not reach that of the human spirit, and for this reason no prophet is sent from among the jinn. His words (s.w.t.) ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam…’ do not include the jinn, so their saying ‘balā’ and ‘naʿam’ falls outside the discussion of the fiṭrah and the taking of the covenant.
7. Explaining the Reality of the Human Being by Representation
— From Zurārah: ‘A man asked Abū Jaʿfar (a.s.) about the words of God, Majestic and Mighty: “When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes indeed!’” to the end of the verse. He said, while his father (a.s.) was listening: My father narrated to me that God, Mighty and Majestic, took a handful of the soil from which He created Adam (a.s.), and poured on it sweet, fresh water, then left it for forty mornings; then He poured on it salty, bitter water, and left it for forty mornings. When the clay had fermented, He took it and rubbed it vigorously, and they came out like particles (dharr) from its right and its left. He commanded them all to enter the Fire. The companions of the right entered, and it became coolness and safety for them; and the companions of the left refused to enter it.’(357)
Note: There is no charge (taklīf) in the mode of existence of the covenant. The aforementioned narration and its like explain the human being’s reality in the form of representation (tamthīl); that is, the human being is such that, were he to come to the mode of existence of testing, one group of them would take the path of good through their good choice and be among the companions of the right, while another group, through their ill choice, would take the path of error and corruption and be among the companions of the left (al-mashʾamah).
In any case, this narration is not connected with the verse of the progeny; and perhaps these narrations are what led some to take the matter of the taking of the covenant as representation.
8. The Bestowal of Perception in the Locus of the Covenant
From Abū Baṣīr, who said: ‘I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.): How did they answer while they were particles (dharr)? He said: He placed in them that by which, when He asked them, they answered Him — meaning in the covenant.’(358)
Note: a. The Creator Almighty bestowed perception and awareness on the human being in the locus of the taking of the covenant, so that he would be able to answer what he was asked and pledge himself to it.
b. The phrase ‘meaning in the covenant’ is either Abū Baṣīr’s report from Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.) or his own words, explaining what the Imam (a.s.) meant.
9. Knowing the Right and the Left
— From Abū Umāmah: the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) said: ‘When God created the creation, decreed the decree and took the covenant of the prophets, while His Throne was on the water, He took the people of the right in His right hand and took the people of the left in His other hand; and both hands of the All-beneficent are right.’(359)
Note: a. The covenant specific to the prophets (a.s.) is a matter apart from the general covenant that was taken from the Children of Adam, even if both took place in a single locus.
b. God Almighty is transcendent above any need of members and limbs, and He has no hand. The expression ‘both hands of the All-beneficent are right’ means that every act issuing from Him is joined with good fortune (yumn) and blessing. The perfect, infallible human being (a.s.) is the manifestation of God’s Most Beautiful Names and attributes, and His vicegerent. Consequently all his deeds are attended by good fortune and blessing, and both his hands are surrounded by good fortune and blessing. This meaning has come from Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.) concerning Abū Ibrāhīm, Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim (a.s.), of whom he said: ‘The master of this affair: both his hands are right.’(360) On this basis, the believer’s left hand has the ruling of his right hand; for the believer obeys God with his left hand as he obeys with the right, so there is no difference between his two hands — just as for the hypocrite and the unbeliever there is no difference between his two hands: he commits sin with the right as he commits it with the left.
In sum, what is meant here is not the hand, right or left. The people of good fortune, blessing and felicity (maymanah) will be among the companions of the right, and the people of ill omen and ugliness will be among the companions of the left (al-mashʾamah).
10. The Secret of the Spirits’ Familiarity with One Another
From Ḥabīb, from one who narrated it to him, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), who said: ‘What do you say about the spirits: that they are mustered troops, so that those of them that recognised one another became familiar, and those of them that did not recognise one another differed? He said: I said: We do say that. He said: It is so. God, Mighty and Majestic, took the covenant from the servants while they were shadows (aẓillah), before birth; and that is His words, Mighty and Majestic: “When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves” to the end of the verse. He said: So whoever acknowledged it to Him on that day, his familiarity comes here; and whoever denied it on that day, his opposition comes here.’(361)
Note: The believers’ familiarity with one another depends on the common measure among them, which is the real acknowledgement of God Almighty’s Lordship and of servanthood to Him; others differ from them because they lack that common measure with them. Of course, what is meant by denial in the locus of the taking of the covenant is the appearance of disagreement in the locus of this world; otherwise, in that locus all acknowledged.
11. The First to Say ‘Yes indeed’
— From Ṣāliḥ ibn Sahl, from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), who said: ‘Some of Quraysh said to the Messenger of God (s.a.w.): By what did you precede the prophets, when you were sent as the last of them and their seal? He said: I was the first to acknowledge my Lord and the first to answer when “Allah took a compact concerning the prophets” “and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes indeed!’”; and I was the first to say “Yes indeed”, and so I preceded them in acknowledging God.’(362)
Note: a. It is derived from this noble ḥadīth that the covenant common to all humanity, in all its strata — the prophets (a.s.), the truthful ones, the martyrs and humanity at large — took place in a single locus, even though it is possible that the covenant specific to the prophets (a.s.), especially the resolute prophets (a.s.), took place in a second locus.
b. Al-Ālūsī has reported: ‘The discussion of His words, Glorified is He, “When your Lord took” etc., in this respect, is made unnecessary by what we mentioned in the course of its exegesis from the words of the people of God, may God Almighty sanctify their secrets — except that some of them mentioned that the first particle to answer with “Yes indeed” was the particle of the Prophet (s.a.w.); and likewise it was the first to answer from the earth when God, Glorified is He, addressed the heavens and the earth with His words, Majestic and Exalted: “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”;(363) and it was from the soil of the Kaʿbah, which is the first of the earth to be created, and from which it was spread out, as has come from Ibn ʿAbbās (may God Almighty be pleased with them both); and that required that his (s.a.w.) burial place be in Mecca, since his noble soil was from it.’(364)
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned point is consistent with the theory according to which everything has a malakūt, and the malakūtī face of everything is the root of knowledge. To guard against confusion, however, it must be said that accepting the aforementioned point does not mean accepting the theory of those who claimed that the locus of the taking of the covenant in the verse under discussion is the locus of the World of the Malakūt. The two discussions must therefore be kept separate: the first is the matter of the command to the heaven and the earth to come, and the second is the taking of the covenant of God’s Lordship and of the servanthood of the Children of Adam. In the first point — that some soil had precedence — what is raised is that everything has a malakūtī face; and in the second point — that the Seal of the Messengers (s.a.w.) was the first of those who said ‘Yes indeed’ — what is mentioned is the point of the fiṭrah.
12. The Testimony of the Black Stone to the Taking of the Covenant
From ʿUbayd Allāh al-Ḥalabī, from Abū Jaʿfar and Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.), who both said: ‘ʿUmar performed the ḥajj in the first year in which he performed it while he was caliph. That year the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār performed the ḥajj, and ʿAlī (a.s.) performed the ḥajj that year with al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (a.s.) and with ʿAbd Allāh ibn Jaʿfar. He said: When ʿAbd Allāh entered iḥrām, he put on a waist-wrapper and a mantle dyed red with red-ochre clay; then he came along, and ʿUmar looked at him while he was saying the talbiyah, wearing the waist-wrapper and the mantle, and walking beside ʿAlī (a.s.). ʿUmar said from behind them, “What is this innovation in the Sanctuary?” ʿAlī (a.s.) turned to him and said to him, “O ʿUmar, it is not fitting for anyone to teach us the Sunnah.” ʿUmar said, “You have spoken the truth, O Abū al-Ḥasan; no, by God, I did not know that it was you.” He said: That was one [incident] in that journey of theirs. When they entered Mecca they circumambulated the House, and ʿUmar touched the Stone and said, “By God, I know that you are a stone that neither harms nor benefits; and were it not that the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) touched you, I would not have touched you.” ʿAlī (a.s.) said to him, “Hush, O Abū Ḥafṣ, do not do [this]; for the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) did not touch [it] except for a matter that he knew. Had you read the Qurʾān and learned of its interpretation what others have learned, you would have known that it harms and benefits; it has two eyes, two lips and an eloquent tongue, bearing witness for whoever comes to it in fulfilment.” ʿUmar said to him, “Then show me that in the Book of God, O Abū al-Ḥasan.” ʿAlī (a.s.) said, “His words, Blessed and Exalted is He: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed! We bear witness.”’ When they acknowledged obedience — that He is the Lord and they are the servants — He took the covenant from them for the ḥajj to His Sacred House. Then God created a parchment finer than water and said to the Pen, ‘Write the fulfilment (muwāfāh) of My creatures at My Sacred House.’ The Pen wrote the fulfilment of the Children of Adam on the parchment. Then it was said to the Stone, ‘Open your mouth.’ He said: So it opened it, and He made it swallow the parchment. Then He said to the Stone, ‘Keep [it], and bear witness for My servants to [their] fulfilment.’ So the Stone descended, obedient to God. O ʿUmar, is it not so that when you touch the Stone you say: ‘My trust I have discharged and my covenant I have kept, that you may bear witness for me to [my] fulfilment’?” ʿUmar said, “O God, yes.” ʿAlī (a.s.) said to him, “Believe that, then.”’(365)
From Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (may God be pleased with him), who said: ‘We performed the ḥajj with ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. When he entered the circumambulation, he faced the Stone and said, “I know that you are a stone that neither harms nor benefits; and were it not that I saw the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) kiss you, I would not have kissed you.” Then he kissed it. ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib said to him, “Rather, O Commander of the Faithful, it does harm and benefit!” He said: Then he said,(366) “By the Book of God, Blessed and Exalted is He.” He said, “And where is that in the Book of God?” He said, “God Almighty said: ‘When your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them bear witness over themselves, [He said to them,] “Am I not your Lord?” They said, “Yes indeed!”’ God created Adam and wiped his back, and made them affirm that He is the Lord and that they are the servants, and He took their pledges and covenants and wrote that on a parchment; and this Stone had two eyes and a tongue. He said to it, ‘Open your mouth.’ He said: So it opened its mouth, and He made it swallow that parchment, and said, ‘Bear witness, for whoever comes to you, to [his] fulfilment on the Day of Resurrection.’ And I bear witness that I heard the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) say: ‘On the Day of Resurrection the Black Stone will be brought, and it will have an eloquent tongue, bearing witness for whoever touches it [in affirmation] of tawḥīd.’ So it, O Commander of the Faithful, does harm and benefit.” ʿUmar said, “I seek refuge with God from living among a people among whom you are not, O Abū Ḥasan.”’(367)
— From al-Ḥalabī, who said: ‘I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh (a.s.): Why was the touching of the Stone instituted? He said: God, Mighty and Majestic, when He took the covenant of the Children of Adam, called the Stone from Paradise and commanded it, and it swallowed the covenant; so it bears witness for whoever comes to it to [his] fulfilment.’(368)
Note: a. All existents, stones among them, have perception, ears and eyes at one of the stages; this is the stage designated as that of the glorification, praise, compliance, submission and prostration of the existents, which a number of verses have indicated: ‘There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification’;(369) ‘while to Him submits whoever there is in the heavens and the earth’;(370) ‘Whatever there is in the heavens and in the earth glorifies Allah’;(371) ‘To Allah prostrates whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth’;(372) ‘He said to it and to the earth, “Come, willingly or unwillingly!” They said, “We come obediently”’.(373)
Leaving aside these verses, which convey that the heavens and the earth speak and have awareness and knowledge, there are many narrations indicating that the earth bears witness(374) and complains, and that the mosque likewise bears witness and intercedes for whoever prays in it,(375) and complains of those of its neighbours who neglect prayer in it.(376)
The Noble Qurʾān and the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) hold that all existents bear knowledge, submission, glorification, praise and prostration to God Almighty, and there is no proof for taking the aforementioned verses and narrations as metaphor. Rather, whoever wishes to perceive the submission, prostration and glorification of the beings must change himself and so rise to a higher perception. The miracle of the Messenger (s.a.w.) was not that he made the pebble speak;(377) rather, it was the removal of the veil of heedlessness and ignorance from Abū Jahl’s hearing, so that he could hear the glorification of the beings and of the pebbles; otherwise, the glorification of these beings is constant and continuous.
The narrations establish for the Black Stone the eye, the two lips, the mouth, the tongue and perception, and its bearing of the trust with regard to the human being’s pledge to God’s Lordship and to their servanthood to Him in the locus of the covenant; and they likewise [establish] that its testimony on the Day of Resurrection will prevail in favour of the human being who fulfils the monotheistic pledge taken from him. All this is consistent with the aforementioned verses that relate that same stage: that we — I mean humans — in that mode of existence affirmed Lordship for God Almighty and witnessed servanthood in ourselves. Of course, a group of people may find this statement difficult to grasp, and they have interpreted this verse as they pleased, so as to differ from the Muʿtazilah in that.
b. In view of the explanation above, there is nothing objectionable in taking ḥadīths of the aforementioned kind as referring to the malakūt, for the Black Stone has a malakūt that is capable of being a witness. The root of the covenant of the Children of Adam, however, is in the locus of the fiṭrah.
c. The aforementioned ḥadīths make known the secret of the ruling concerning the recommendation that the one circumambulating the House kiss and touch the Black Stone, or point to it and say: ‘In the name of God, and by God, and God is greatest. O God, in faith in You, in affirmation of Your Book, in following the Sunnah of Your Prophet (s.a.w.), and in fulfilment of Your pledge…’(378) ‘O God, my trust I have discharged and my covenant I have kept, that it may bear witness for me before You to [my] fulfilment…’(379)
References
1. See al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 438; ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, vol. 1, pp. 84–85.
2. See Tasnīm, vol. 6, p. 421, “dhurriyyatī”; vol. 12, p. 393, “dhurriyyah”; p. 613, “shāhidīn”; vol. 9, p. 79, “alaysa”; vol. 14, pp. 614–615, “balā”; vol. 12, p. 363, “lā tubṭilū”.
3. Tafsīr al-Taḥrīr wa-l-Tanwīr, vol. 8, p. 344.
4. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
5. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
6. Sūrat al-Masad, verse 1.
7. Sūrat Hūd, verse 44.
8. (Attributed to a poet from Iran.)
در بیان و در فصاحت کی بود یکسان سخن / گرچه گوینده بود چون جاحظ و چون اصمعی
در کلام ایزد بیچون که وحی منزلست / کی بود تبت یدا مانند یا ارض ابلعی
[Translator: “In expression and eloquence, how can all speech be equal, though the speaker be like al-Jāḥiẓ or al-Aṣmaʿī? In the word of the incomparable God, which is revelation sent down, how can Tabbat yadā be like Yā arḍu ablaʿī?”]
9. Sūrat Maryam, verse 16.
10. Sūrat al-Anfāl, verse 26.
11. Sūrat al-Ḥashr, verse 19.
12. ʿAwālī al-Laʾālī, vol. 4, p. 102; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 2, p. 32.
13. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 78.
14. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 257.
15. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 257.
16. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 78.
17. Sūrat al-Ṭāriq, verse 7.
18. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads “if it did not come out of the loins” (fa-in lam yakhruj min al-ẓahr); the argument requires “came out”.]
19. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 171.
20. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 175.
21. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 171.
22. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 175.
23. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 7.
24. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 60.
25. Al-Luhūf, pp. 60–61; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 44, p. 366.
26. Kulliyyāt Saʿdī, Gulistān, p. 50:
بنی آدم اعضای یکدیگرند / که در آفرینش ز یک گوهرند
[Translator: “The children of Adam are limbs of one another, for in creation they are of one essence.”]
27. Sūrat al-ʿAṣr, verses 1–3.
28. Sūrat al-Dhāriyāt, verse 56.
29. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 27.
30. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 154.
31. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 83.
32. Al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, pp. 219–220. Others have also mentioned the reading as a substitute, but he alone takes ‘their descendants’ (dhurriyyatahum) to be the substitute.
33. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads kāna fī mawṭin zamānī, wa-tadrījī wa-ghayr mutaghayyir (“in a temporal, gradual and unchanging locus”); the argument that follows requires the negation.]
34. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 83.
35. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
36. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 49.
37. Sūrat al-Jumuʿah, verse 1.
38. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 44.
39. Sūrat al-Ḥashr, verse 21.
40. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 43.
41. Al-Masāʾil al-ʿUkbariyyah, p. 113.
42. Al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 176.
43. [Translator: the Arabic prints wa-takhwīf wa-targhīb min jahannam; targhīb (“encouragement”) is probably a misprint for tarhīb (“deterrence”), which the context requires and the translation follows.]
44. See al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 176; Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, pp. 765–766 (citing some exegetes); Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī, vol. 3, p. 42; al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 218; Tafsīr al-Ṣāfī, vol. 2, p. 251.
45. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 29.
46. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 55.
47. [Translator: in Arabic, naʿam in answer to a negative question confirms the negative (“Yes, You are not our Lord”), whereas balā denies it (“Indeed You are”). The verse’s balā is therefore an affirmation of God’s Lordship.]
48. See al-Tibyān, vol. 5, pp. 27–28; Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 766.
49. Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah, vol. 2, p. 211.
50. See Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 99.
51. Sūrat al-Aḥzāb, verse 53; see Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 99.
52. Sūrat al-Dhāriyāt, verses 20–21.
53. Al-Mīzān, vol. 8, p. 307.
54. [Translator: the Arabic prints the same words in both places (ashhadahum ʿalā anfusihim); the contrast is presumably with a wording without ʿalā (“made them witness themselves”), as against the verse’s “over themselves”, which suits the bearing of testimony.]
55. Sūrat al-Ḥajj, verse 46.
56. Sūrat al-Muṭaffifīn, verse 14.
57. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65. Since this verse alludes to supplication that springs from the fiṭrah, it is fitting to mention an important point here. The tongue of supplication, which may be acquired, is answered in what it asks, provided that this is neither incompatible with the fiṭrah nor contrary to wisdom. For supplication and all other good things are among the means, and God has commanded us to seek the means of drawing near to Him: ‘O you who have faith! Be wary of Allah, and seek the means of recourse to Him’ (Sūrat al-Māʾidah, verse 35). And God’s wisdom is not changed by any of the means: ‘O He whose wisdom is not changed by means’ (al-Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah, Supplication 13). For the purpose of the means is that God should act according to His wisdom, not that His wisdom should be prevented. In sum, God answers the supplication that accords with wisdom and is in harmony with the fiṭrah.
58. Testimony, as has been said, has two places: a place of bearing and a place of giving. The place of bearing is that the witness is present when the event occurs, sees it and keeps it in his mind until he relates it in the court of justice, which is the place where the testimony is given.
59. Sūrat al-Dhāriyāt, verses 20–21.
60. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 185.
61. See al-Baḥr al-Wajīz, vol. 2, p. 476; al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 220. [Translator: “al-Baḥr al-Wajīz” is as printed; probably Ibn ʿAṭiyyah’s al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz.]
62. Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 767; al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 7, p. 318.
63. See al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 7, p. 318; Tafsīr Rūḥ al-Bayān, vol. 3, p. 273.
64. Sūrat al-Nūr, verse 24.
65. Sūrat al-Mulk, verse 11.
66. Sūrat al-Tawbah, verse 17.
67. Amīn al-Islām al-Ṭabrisī (may God have mercy on him) and al-Zamakhsharī, on His words ‘the day the Trumpet will be blown, and you will come in groups’ (Sūrat al-Nabaʾ, verse 18), narrate from the Prophet (s.a.w.) that some people will be gathered on the Day of Resurrection in various forms (see Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 10, p. 642; al-Kashshāf, vol. 4, p. 687). That is, in addition to the testimony of the limbs and their speaking — ‘They will say to their skins, “Why did you bear witness against us?” They will say, “We were given speech by Allah, who gave speech to all things”’ (Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 21) — they will be gathered in the form of predatory animals, or in the form of a harmful creature such as the snake and the scorpion, or of a wolf, and all of a person’s limbs will testify against him that his conduct was wolf-like. This is testimony by deed. In this testimony by deed, in which a person is transformed into the form of an animal, he and his members and limbs bear witness to his inner reality, just as in this world the wolf’s members — its claws, nails and so on — testify that it is a wolf and a predatory animal.
68. Gulshan-i Rāz, p. 22:
سیهرویی ز ممکن در دو عالم / جدا هرگز نشد والله اعلم
[Translator: “Black-facedness never parted from the contingent being in the two worlds — and God knows best.”]
69. Sūrat Fāṭir, verse 15.
70. Sūrat al-Jāthiyah, verse 23.
71. ʿAwālī al-Laʾālī, vol. 4, p. 102; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 2, p. 32.
72. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 2.
73. Sūrat al-Tawbah, verse 36.
74. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 98.
75. Kitāb al-Khiṣāl, vol. 2, p. 420; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 74, p. 400.
76. Al-Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah, Supplication 47.
77. When Imam al-Sajjād (a.s.) speaks of the Lordly effusion, he speaks as though there were nothing higher or loftier than he and his lineage; and in Syria, when he wishes to disclose this divine effusion, he sees no loftiness for anyone other than them: ‘I am the son of Mecca and Minā; I am the son of Marwah and Ṣafā’ (al-Iḥtijāj, vol. 2, p. 311; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 45, p. 162); that is, we were not able to go to Minā this year, but Minā is from us. But when he spoke of himself, he saw himself as less than a particle, and said that if we were to tell of the reality of our existence, there would be nothing less than us; for when the human being finds his reality, he sees himself destitute, nothing, and whatever he has is from God Almighty: ‘Whatever blessing you have is from Allah’ (Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 53).
78. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 14.
79. Sūrat al-Wāqiʿah, verses 49–50.
80. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 94.
81. Sūrat al-Muʾminūn, verse 101.
82. [Translator: the Arabic prints wa-l-ḍawābiṭ al-ittifāqāt al-ijtimāʿiyyah, with the article on both words; it may be meant as “the regulations [and] the social agreements”.]
83. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 254.
84. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads bayna al-fāṣilah bayna al-jumlatayn (“between the separator between the two sentences”); the first bayna appears to be superfluous.]
85. Sūrat al-Muʾminūn, verse 106.
86. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads fa-lā ʿudhra lahum li-annahum ghāfilūn (“then there is no excuse for them, because they are heedless”). The reasoning “because they are heedless” and the following “and likewise … they could argue” suggest that what is meant is that the coming generation, from whom no covenant was taken, would have an excuse; the printed text appears to be defective here.]
87. [Translator: this sentence is incomplete as printed in the Arabic (wa-li-sadd hādhihi al-ḥujaj aw al-iʿtidhārāt … aw waḥdāniyyah.); it appears to lead into the following sentence.]
88. [Translator: the Arabic prints man lam naṣil ilayhim risālat al-waḥy; probably taṣil (“those whom the message of revelation did not reach”) is meant.]
89. Sūrat Ṭā Hā, verse 134.
90. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 165.
91. [Translator: the referent of “him” (yumkinuhu) is not stated in the Arabic; it may be God (who could not argue against human beings) or the human being.]
92. Sūrat al-Mulk, verse 8.
93. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 179.
94. Sūrat Qāf, verse 22.
95. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 1.
96. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 92.
97. It is like making a student understand the harms of not learning to read and write, and its benefits and the results that follow from it; then, to ward off weariness, he is told of the arena of play and fun, and he becomes attached to this arena, turns a blind eye to research and study, and becomes so immersed in play that he is heedless of study and research. The source of heedlessness such as this is the veil cast over the heedless person, not over the thing he is heedless of.
98. [Translator: the Arabic prints al-ghaflah ghayr al-ikhtiyāriyyah (“involuntary heedlessness”) in both brackets; the second should evidently be al-ghaflah al-ikhtiyāriyyah (“voluntary heedlessness”), as the preceding paragraph and the footnote show.]
99. [Translator: the Arabic shifts from the second person (“you are not charged”, ghayr mukallafīn) to the third (“they are not asked”, lā yusʾalūn) within the sentence; translated as printed.]
100. Sūrat al-Jinn, verses 26–27.
101. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 256.
102. Sūrat al-Takwīr, verse 24.
103. Sūrat al-Ḥadīd, verse 20.
104. Sūrat al-Ḥāqqah, verse 30.
105. Sūrat Qāf, verse 22.
106. Sūrat Qāf, verse 16.
107. Al-Tawḥīd, al-Ṣadūq, p. 306.
108. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 164; Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 15.
109. [Translator: “or it may have another indication” renders aw lahā dalīl ākhar as printed; the sense is presumably “or have another meaning”.]
110. Like muẓlim, in the sense of man ẓalama, not aẓlama, meaning ‘he entered darkness and gloom’; and abṭala means ‘he did something false’. The books of lexicon give it thus: abṭala al-rajul: when he brings what is false (Majmaʿ al-Baḥrayn, vol. 5, p. 322; see likewise Lisān al-ʿArab, vol. 11, p. 56, ‘b ṭ l’). [Translator: the first clause is translated as printed (min ẓalama lā aẓlama); the point being made is evidently that muẓlim, like mubṭil, is intransitive: “one who has entered darkness”.]
111. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 75.
112. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 75.
113. Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 765.
114. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 44.
115. See al-Tibyān, vol. 5, pp. 28–30; Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 765.
116. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 38.
117. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 173.
118. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads dāʾim ghayr murtafiʿ (“permanent and cannot be removed”); the reasoning that follows (“For it is possible…”) shows how the objection can be removed, so the sense presumably requires “is not permanent and can be removed”.]
119. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 20.
120. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 2.
121. Sūrat al-Muʾminūn, verse 12.
122. Sūrat al-Ṣāffāt, verse 11.
123. Sūrat al-Ḥijr, verse 26.
124. Sūrat al-Raḥmān, verse 14.
125. Sūrat Maryam, verse 16.
126. [Translator: the last clause is incomplete as printed (wa-illā an takūna al-aḥdāth wa-l-taḥawwulāt baʿda ʿālam al-dharr wa-qabla wuqūʿ ḥāditha al-mawt …); presumably: “and unless the events and transformations after the World of Particles and before death be greater than [those of] the terrifying event of death, the grave and the barzakh … up to the entry into Paradise or Hell”.]
127. Sūrat al-Nāziʿāt, verses 34–35.
128. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 44.
129. Sūrat al-Ṣāffāt, verses 51–54.
130. Sūrat al-Ṣāffāt, verse 55.
131. Sūrat al-Nūr, verse 25.
132. Al-Mīzān, vol. 8, p. 317.
133. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 11.
134. Resolve is of the nature of action; and all actions, outward and inward, whether through an intermediary or without one, are the responsibility of practical reason.
135. Certainty is of the nature of knowledge; and all sciences, whether of theoretical or of practical wisdom, are the responsibility of theoretical reason.
136. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 269; al-Durr al-Manthūr, vol. 3, p. 143.
137. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 269; al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, vol. 15, p. 398.
138. See al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah, vol. 9, p. 2.
139. [Translator: burhān al-tamānuʿ is as printed; it is usually the name of the proof of God’s unity from mutual hindrance, and its relevance here is unclear. The intended sense may be the middle term of the proof against transmigration.]
140. See Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 97.
141. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads anna Ādama qad akhadha (or ukhidha) min banī Ādama wa-min banī Ādama aʿqābahu, which does not construe cleanly; the sense appears to be that the taking was both from Adam and, from the Children of Adam, their posterity, so that the verse and the narration each state one side of it.]
142. See Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 99.
143. See Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 99.
144. See al-Mīzān, vol. 8, pp. 311–314.
145. See Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 766 (citing some exegetes); Tafsīr al-Ṣāfī, vol. 2, p. 251; al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 176; Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī, vol. 3, p. 41; al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 218.
146. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 11.
147. Al-Luhūf, pp. 60–61; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 44, p. 366. And “the Children of Adam” (banī Ādam) in the saying of the Persian poet: بنی آدم اعضای یکدیگرند (Kulliyyāt-i Saʿdī, Gulistān, p. 50). [Translator: “The Children of Adam are limbs of one another.”]
148. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 44.
149. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 165.
150. Sūrat al-Mulk, verses 8–9.
151. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 78.
152. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
153. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 58, p. 187; Musnad Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, vol. 2, p. 233.
154. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 165.
155. See al-Tibyān, vol. 5, pp. 27–28; Majmaʿ al-Bayān, vol. 4, p. 766, citing some exegetes.
156. Sūrat al-Insān, verses 2–3.
157. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 30.
158. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 30.
159. See al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 176.
160. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
161. See al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, pp. 176–177.
162. Al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 218.
163. Sūrat al-Ḥashr, verse 21.
164. Sūrat Ibrāhīm, verse 24; Sūrat al-Naḥl, verses 75, 76 and 112.
165. Sūrat al-Raʿd, verse 17.
166. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
167. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 83.
168. Sūrat al-Nūr, verse 41.
169. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
170. [Translator: so printed (wa-l-imkān al-ʿaqlī al-ṣirf wa-ẓuhūr al-dalīl al-naqlī al-muʿtabar wa-mujarrad iḥtimāl al-tamthīl ghayr muṣaḥḥiḥāt li-ḥaml al-āyah ʿalā al-tamthīl). The argument suggests that the intended sense is: given pure rational possibility and the apparent meaning of the reliable transmitted proof [in favour of a real dialogue], the mere probability of representation does not justify taking the verse as representation.]
171. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 30.
172. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 130.
173. Al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 176.
174. Al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 218.
175. See al-Mīzān, vol. 8, p. 319.
176. Sūrat al-Jāthiyah, verse 24.
177. Sūrat al-Ḥijr, verse 21.
178. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 83.
179. Sūrat al-Qamar, verse 50.
180. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads umūr tadrījiyyah (“gradual matters”); the context, and the wording of al-Mīzān being reported, require umūr ghayr tadrījiyyah (“non-gradual matters”).]
181. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 75.
182. Sūrat al-Takāthur, verse 7.
183. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 83. [Translator: so printed; the words quoted are from verse 82.]
184. Sūrat al-Mulk, verse 1.
185. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 83.
186. See al-Mīzān, vol. 8, pp. 319–321.
187. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 82.
188. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 60.
189. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 82.
190. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 83.
191. Sūrat al-Mulk, verse 1.
192. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 75.
193. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 185.
194. Sūrat al-Muṭaffifīn, verse 14.
195. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 75.
196. Sūrat al-Takāthur, verses 5–6.
197. Al-Maḥāsin, vol. 1, p. 246; see likewise al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 54.
198. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 193.
199. Kulliyyāt-i Shaykh Bahāʾī, Shīr wa Shakar, p. 27.
200. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 117.
201. See al-Mīzān, vol. 8, pp. 321–322.
202. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 22.
203. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 83.
204. Sūrat Hūd, verse 56.
205. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 185.
206. Sūrat Ṭā Hā, verse 55.
207. Sūrat al-Wāqiʿah, verses 49–50.
208. Sūrat al-Ḥadīd, verse 20.
209. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
210. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65.
211. [Translator: the Arabic prints yazīdu aw yakthuru ʿalā hādhā (“exceeds or is more than this”); it is probably a slip for “more or less”, which the translation follows.]
212. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 438; Maʿānī al-Akhbār, p. 108.
213. Al-Kāfī, vol. 4, pp. 206–207.
214. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
215. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 269.
216. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 18.
217. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 13.
218. Sūrat Ṭā Hā, verse 54.
219. Sūrat al-Fajr, verse 5.
220. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 44.
221. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 50.
222. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 80.
223. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 82.
224. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 24.
225. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 164.
226. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 165.
227. Sūrat al-Mulk, verses 8–10.
228. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
229. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 7.
230. Sūrat al-Takāthur, verses 5–6.
231. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 54.
232. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 193.
233. [Translator: “speculative” (al-naẓarī) is as printed; since the three ways set out above are the rational, that of revelation and that of the fiṭrah, it probably should read “transmitted” (al-naqlī).]
234. Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, verse 169.
235. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 50.
236. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 53.
237. Sūrat al-Raʿd, verse 3.
238. Sūrat al-Raʿd, verse 4.
239. Sūrat al-Ḥadīd, verse 25.
240. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 165.
241. [Translator: “revelation and the fiṭrah” is as printed; the argument, and the repetition in the next sentence (“revelation and reason”), indicate that it should read “revelation and reason”.]
242. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
243. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 10. The inspired soul may be buried beneath the rubble of anger and lust and so be betrayed (tudass). Such a fiṭrah has no flourishing or elevation, but it never ceases to exist: ‘the original nature endowed by Allah according to which He originated mankind … There is no altering Allah’s creation’ (Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30). In the arena of the Resurrection, the human being’s essence, composed of spirit and body, sees the punishment with this preserved fiṭrah. The habits (malakāt) and evil characteristics in this world, such as consuming ill-gotten wealth (suḥt) and the slander of the tongue, appear in the form of harmful animals that sting his fiṭrah, and he is tormented by them; whereas, were the fiṭrah truly to disappear and the unbeliever or the believer to be turned into a viper or a scorpion, he would take pleasure in the stings.
244. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 9. The human being, wherever he may be — in the village or the city, in the East or the West — has an inspired soul, and the universal lines of divine inspiration concerning vice and virtue (al-fujūr wa-l-taqwā), and the good path as against the bad, have become distinct to him; if he acted on what he knows, the way would open before him to perceive many truths. Righteous action is to innate perceptions what watering is to the tree of Ṭūbā (the human spirit), so that the human being grows: ‘one who purifies it is felicitous’. According to the well-known ḥadīth, ‘This world is the sowing-field of the Hereafter’ (Tanbīh al-Khawāṭir wa-Nuzhat al-Nawāẓir, vol. 1, p. 183; ʿAwālī al-Laʾālī al-ʿAzīziyyah fī al-Aḥādīth al-Dīniyyah, vol. 1, p. 267), whoever is a farmer must watch over his crop and not neglect to water it. The inspired soul, which is the human being’s capital, must be watched over and watered. Right knowledge and righteous action are what water this soul: ‘one who purifies it is felicitous’. But if, instead of watering it, he obliterates the hungering soul (al-nafs al-nāhimah)(245) and the fiṭrah beneath the weight of [selfish] aims, inclinations and inner instincts, he is, as it were, an obstacle to its growth, and it does not reach the goal: ‘and one who betrays it fails’ — as if this farmer were to heap a mound of earth over the grain of wheat and bury it, instead of scattering it on the ground. (For further clarification see: Tasnīm, vol. 25, pp. 217–218; see also Tasnīm, vol. 29, pp. 515–538.)
245. [Translator: “the hungering soul” (al-nafs al-nāhimah) is as printed; the footnote is about watering the inspired soul, so it probably should read “the inspired soul” (al-nafs al-mulhamah).]
246. Sūrat al-Raʿd, verse 11.
247. The secret of the turnabout is that the bitter events that threaten life lift the veil and illuminate the reality of the human being, which is ‘nothing but connection to God’ (ʿayn al-rabṭ bi-llāh). In the ordinary state the face of the heart is covered with rust: ‘No, that is not the case! Rather, their hearts have been sullied by what they have been earning’ (Sūrat al-Muṭaffifīn, verse 14). A dusty mirror either reflects poorly or does not reflect at all; and the owners of these rusted hearts are either blind — ‘but it is the hearts in the breasts that turn blind!’ (Sūrat al-Ḥajj, verse 46) — or see with a squint, so that they reckon one to be two, or the enemy a friend. The removal of the dust in the state of danger removes the rust for a time, so that the mirror of the human being’s existence is polished and becomes transparent; and with the transparency of his existence and his witnessing of himself, nothing appears to him but God’s Lordship over him.
248. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65.
249. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 58, p. 187; Musnad Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, vol. 2, p. 233.
250. Sūrat al-Jāthiyah, verse 24.
251. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65.
252. [Translator: “quality” (ṣifah) is as printed; the context (points and places in the universe) suggests ṣuqʿ (“region, quarter”).]
253. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 594.
254. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 54.
255. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 30.
256. Sūrat al-Qalam, verse 15.
257. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 52.
258. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verses 66–67.
259. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 58.
260. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 63.
261. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 64.
262. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 64.
263. Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ, verse 65.
264. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 78.
265. The self-evident (al-badīhī) admits of proof but does not need proof — such as that two added to two equals four, or the falsity of circularity (al-dawr), or the impossibility of negating a thing of itself, or the necessity of a thing’s being affirmed of itself, and that everything is itself (the principle of identity, al-huwahuwiyyah). But the [impossibility of the] conjunction of contradictories does not admit of proof: if one wished to establish a proof of its negation, or [if] it were made a subject of doubt, it would still remain fixed. If one wished to negate such a thing, it is fixed; and if one wished to cast doubt on it, it is likewise fixed. So it does not admit of proof, because doubt does not combine with non-doubt; and it does not admit of demonstration.
266. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 78.
267. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
268. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
269. This meaning has its own particular foundations and relates to the different levels and foundations of the soul: whether the soul is corporeal in origination and spiritual in subsistence, or spiritual in origination and spiritual in subsistence.
270. Al-Tawḥīd, al-Ṣadūq, p. 331.
271. ʿIlm al-Yaqīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 1, pp. 40–41.
272. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
273. Al-Mīzān, vol. 16, pp. 188–189.
274. See Tafsīr al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm, vol. 1, pp. 426–427.
275. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
276. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 13; Musnad Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, vol. 2, p. 233.
277. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 9.
278. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 10.
279. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads wa-l-tamthīl muʿtazilah. It probably means “the representation [view] of the Muʿtazilah” (cf. al-Zamakhsharī’s reading of the verse as representation, above); muʿtazilah could also be read as “set aside”.]
280. Sūrat al-Anfāl, verse 65.
281. Sūrat al-Anfāl, verse 66.
282. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 84.
283. See al-Kāfī, vol. 8, pp. 274–275; Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, vol. 2, p. 51.
284. Sūrat al-Ḥāqqah, verses 44–47.
285. [Translator: maskh, naskh, faskh, raskh — a rhyming set (roughly “deforming, copying over, undoing and fixing”), which are also the classical names of the four kinds of transmigration; the author uses them as wordplay for the corruption of the Gospel.]
286. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 46.
287. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 79.
288. History is full of ordinary people who claimed prophethood, and their number is no fewer than that of the prophets. The pattern has held steady that whenever an office shone forth and the common people turned towards it, a substitute for it was fabricated in order to profit from its resources. Every age that was empty of a prophet was likewise empty of a false prophet (mutanabbī); that is, if a messenger appeared at some period of time, they would begin to contend with him by the vilest means and obstruct his path; and when they saw firmness and resolve in his affair, saw miracles from him, and saw that he had sanctity among the common people, they hastened to create a substitute for him. The false prophet appears opposite the prophet for this task. When the Messenger of Islam (s.a.w.) proclaimed his prophethood, Musaylimah the Liar and Sajāḥ did not appear; but once his prophethood had become entrenched in souls and had spread among the people, and his standing was honoured among them, the likes of Musaylimah the Liar and Sajāḥ sprang up.
289. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
290. Sūrat Hūd, verse 44.
291. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 7.
292. Among the masters of literature, the fāʾ faṣīḥiyyah is said to be the one used for fuller explanation and ampler clarification, like the fāʾ in His words ‘and be patient for the sake of your Lord’ (wa-li-rabbika fa-ṣbir) (Sūrat al-Muddaththir, verse 7; the translation of Tafsīr al-Mīzān, vol. 15, p. 323).
293. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 8.
294. Sūrat al-Ḥijr, verse 29.
295. Al-Amālī, al-Ṣadūq, p. 451.
296. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
297. Sūrat al-Qaṣaṣ, verse 5.
298. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 75.
299. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 75.
300. [Translator: al-ʿuddah (“equipment, apparatus”) is as printed; it may be a misprint for al-ʿaduww (“the enemy”), i.e. “the cultural enemy”.]
301. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verse 97.
302. Sūrat al-Nisāʾ, verses 98–99.
303. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 15.
304. Sūrat al-Ḥashr, verse 19.
305. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 101.
306. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 102.
307. Sūrat al-Naml, verses 13–14.
308. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 19.
309. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 213.
310. [Translator: the Arabic repeats the phrase as printed: li-annahu nafsānī lahu ḥaẓẓ min al-tajarrud wa-bihā lahu ḥaẓẓ min al-tajarrud; the second clause may be a duplication.]
311. Sūrat al-Najm, verses 3–4.
312. Sūrat al-Shūrā, verse 51.
313. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 13. Likewise, on the narrations of the World of Particles, see Tafsīr Kanz al-Daqāʾiq, vol. 5, pp. 229–231.
314. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
315. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 12.
316. Al-Tawḥīd, al-Ṣadūq, p. 330.
317. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 22.
318. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 91.
319. Sūrat al-Shams, verses 7–8.
320. Sūrat al-Ḥadīd, verse 20.
321. Sūrat al-Shams, verse 9.
322. Sūrat al-Muṭaffifīn, verse 14.
323. Sūrat Muḥammad (s.a.w.), verse 24.
324. Sūrat Yā Sīn, verse 10.
325. Sūrat al-Shuʿarāʾ, verse 136.
326. Jāmiʿ al-Akhbār, p. 185; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 67, p. 25.
327. Sūrat al-Anʿām, verse 121.
328. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 257.
329. Sūrat al-Ḥashr, verse 19.
330. Sūrat al-Māʾidah, verse 105.
331. Sūrat al-Aḥzāb, verse 41.
332. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 453.
333. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, pp. 132–133.
334. Sūrat Ṭā Hā, verse 115.
335. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 8.
336. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
337. Sūrat al-Māʾidah, verse 48.
338. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 97.
339. Sūrat al-Rūm, verse 30.
340. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 133.
341. ʿUyūn Akhbār al-Riḍā (a.s.), vol. 2, p. 136; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 39, p. 246.
342. ʿUyūn Akhbār al-Riḍā (a.s.), vol. 2, p. 135.
343. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 438.
344. Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, vol. 2, p. 40.
345. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 74.
346. Tafsīr al-Qummī, vol. 1, p. 248.
347. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65.
348. Al-Tawḥīd, al-Ṣadūq, p. 117.
349. Sūrat Yūnus, verse 64. [Translator: as printed; the words quoted are Sūrat Yūnus, verse 74, as the footnote on the previous page gives it.]
350. Tafsīr al-Qummī, vol. 1, p. 248.
351. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 179.
352. Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt, verse 65.
353. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 66, p. 293.
354. Sūrat al-Tawḥīd, verse 3.
355. Sūrat al-Baqarah, verse 255.
356. Sūrat al-Kahf, verse 50.
357. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 7.
358. Al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 12.
359. Al-Durr al-Manthūr, vol. 3, p. 143.
360. Qurb al-Isnād, p. 309; Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah, vol. 24, p. 360.
361. ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, vol. 1, p. 84; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 241.
362. Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 441.
363. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
364. Rūḥ al-Maʿānī, vol. 5, p. 103.
365. Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, vol. 2, p. 38; ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, vol. 2, p. 425.
366. [Translator: the Arabic as printed reads qāla: thumma qāla (“He said: Then he said”); the dialogue suggests ʿUmar’s question “By what?” (bima?) has dropped out or been misprinted.]
367. Al-Durr al-Manthūr, vol. 3, p. 144.
368. Al-Kāfī, vol. 4, p. 184. Many ḥadīths have accumulated on this matter (see Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah, vol. 13, pp. 316–322).
369. Sūrat al-Isrāʾ, verse 44.
370. Sūrat Āl ʿImrān, verse 83.
371. Sūrat al-Jumuʿah, verse 1.
372. Sūrat al-Naḥl, verse 49.
373. Sūrat Fuṣṣilat, verse 11.
374. Al-Kāfī, vol. 3, p. 455; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 7, p. 318. This matter is likewise understood from His words (s.w.t.) ‘On that day she will relate her chronicles’ (Sūrat al-Zalzalah, verse 4).
375. On this matter it has come from the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.), in setting out one of the virtues of the great Mosque of Kufa: ‘It is as if I see it brought on the Day of Resurrection in two white garments, resembling one in iḥrām, interceding for its people and for whoever prays in it, and its intercession is not refused.’ (Man Lā Yaḥḍuruhu al-Faqīh, vol. 1, p. 231; Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah, vol. 5, pp. 257–258.)
376. See Kitāb al-Khiṣāl, vol. 1, p. 175; Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah, vol. 5, p. 202.
377. Mathnawī-yi Maʿnawī, Book One, p. 94, couplets 2154 and 2158:
سنگها اندر کف بوجهل بود / گفت ای احمد بگو این چیست زود
از میان مشت او هر پاره سنگ / در شهادت گفتن آمد بی درنگ
[Translator: “There were stones in Abū Jahl’s palm; he said, ‘O Aḥmad, say quickly what this is…’ / From within his fist every piece of stone came without delay to uttering the testimony.”]
378. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 96, p. 342; see also Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, vol. 9, p. 379.
379. Al-Kāfī, vol. 4, p. 404.