Subtleties and Allusions

1) Applications of Derivatives of the Word “Rukūb”

The word “riding” (rukūb) in the Qur’an is used with the preposition “in” (fī) when referring to ships and similar vessels, as in Noah’s statement “And he said: ‘Embark in it’”(243)—not “ride it”—and similar to the phrase “when they both embarked in the ship” in the verses under discussion. This word is used without the preposition “in” (fī) when referring to animals like horses and similar mounts, as God says He created horses, mules, and donkeys for you to ride: “And [He created] horses, mules, and donkeys for you to ride”(244), and He did not say “to ride in them.” This difference in usage has several aspects, such as the fact that a person enters into a ship but not into an animal.

According to Abū l-Saʿūd, the secret behind the different usage of riding (rukūb) with and without the preposition “in” (fī) in various cases is that “riding” means elevation upon a moving object that either has voluntary movement, like an animal, or forced movement, like a ship. When used with the former (voluntarily moving), the primary meaning—that is, elevation upon something—is more prominent, hence they say “I rode the horse.” When used with the latter (forcibly moving), it is accompanied by the preposition “in” (fī) and indicates the object’s status as a location, hence they say “I rode in the ship”.(245)

2) The Arguments of Those Who Oppose Prophetic Infallibility Regarding the Verses Under Discussion and Their Response

According to Fakhr Rāzī’s account, those who criticize and oppose prophetic infallibility (ʿiṣma) have used these verses to argue from two perspectives:

Khiḍr was one of God’s prophets, so if Moses spoke truthfully to him saying “Have you made a hole in it to drown its people?”, then that prophet had committed a major sin, and if—God forbid—Moses’s statement was false, then he had lied.

Moses made a promise and took a firm oath not to object to Khiḍr; however, he did not fulfill his promise, and breaking a promise is a sin for any prophet.

In response to the first argument, Fakhr Rāzī writes that when Moses witnessed an unusual act from Khiḍr, he voiced those words; not because he believed Khiḍr had done something wrong, but because he wanted to learn the reason for Khiḍr’s action. As for the second argument, he attributes Moses’s objection to forgetfulness, noting that one who forgets cannot be held accountable.(246)

It would have been more appropriate for Fakhr Rāzī to respond to the second argument as he did to the first by deeply analyzing Moses’s action, namely that since Khiḍr’s apparent action had no religious justification, remaining silent about it would not have been pleasing to God, and thus he did not remain silent due to this religious consideration.

3) The Interrogative Nature of Moses’s Questions to Khiḍr

The story of the blessed presence of Moses and Khiḍr was accompanied by questions from these two noble figures. Whenever a matter is beyond the capacity and aptitude of the addressee, it inevitably raises questions. Thus, when Khiḍr made it a condition for Moses’s companionship that he not ask about anything: “Do not ask me about anything”(247), and Moses accepted this condition, he still asked Khiḍr in all three instances. However, these questions were of a non-objecting nature, as he knew there was a hidden secret within these actions that justified them; otherwise, he would not have been commanded to learn from him.

Explanation: Questions can be viewed in two ways:

1. Objecting questions, meaning to challenge; like the right of people’s representatives to question the president and government ministers(248), which is not of the same nature as a student’s inquiry and information-seeking from a teacher, but rather a challenge. As the Supreme God says about the criminals that they should be detained because they are under questioning: “But stop them; indeed, they are to be questioned”.(249) And He says that on the Day of Judgment you will be questioned about the blessings: “Then you will surely be asked that Day about pleasure”.(250) And He says: “Then We will surely question those to whom [a message] was sent, and We will surely question the messengers”.(251) In all these mentioned cases, the questions are objecting in nature and accompanied by implicit rebuke and reproach, though their degrees differ from one another.

2. Interrogative and information-seeking questions: This type of question also has two forms:

Timely; untimely (premature). If someone asks something at the appropriate time, objection to them is not warranted; unlike premature questioning where objection might be warranted. An example is the angels’ question to the Divine Sacred Essence at the time of Adam’s creation, which was hasty: “They said, ‘Will You place upon it one who causes corruption therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?’ God said, ‘Indeed, I know that which you do not know’”.(252) Another example is Noah’s question; when the flood came and the Glorious God said you and your family would be safe in the ark while others would drown, Noah understood the term “family” (ahl) literally to mean household members. When his son drowned, he addressed God saying his son was his family, and God had promised his family would be safe and His promise is true; what was the secret behind his son’s drowning? The Glorious God replied that he was not from his family: “He said, ‘O my Lord, indeed my son is of my family, and indeed, Your promise is true’… God said, ‘O Noah, indeed he is not of your family… so do not ask Me about that of which you have no knowledge’”.(253) In such cases, the question is interrogative and information-seeking, not objecting, because the Glorious God is absolutely wise and purely just, and free from any forgetfulness, oversight and the like. Therefore, the drowning was certainly just and right, even though its secret was unknown to some, just as the angels’ question regarding Adam’s succession: “They said, ‘Will You place upon it one who causes corruption therein and sheds blood?’”(254) was also of this nature. Such questions are premature in reality, although from the questioner’s perspective, they align with the circumstances.

The questions of Moses the Interlocutor to Khiḍr were also untimely and for understanding, not objecting, as he was commanded to learn from someone who possessed two magnificent elements: “divine mercy” (raḥmat ʿindallāhī) and “divine knowledge” (ʿilm ladunnī): “So they found a servant from among Our servants to whom We had given mercy from Us and had taught him from Us knowledge”.(255) Consequently, he never acted contrary to mercy and divine knowledge, and Moses’ question was not objecting either. However, his limited capacity and seeing actions contrary to his knowledge, and occasionally feeling responsibility, led him to ask information-seeking questions.

The questions of all prophets and angels are of this nature, just as Noah directed his entire question toward God’s action, and the angels’ words in questioning the Divine Sacred Essence about human succession were accompanied by divine glorification and sanctification: “while we declare Your praise and sanctify You”.(256) Moses’ question to Khiḍr was also directed at Khiḍr’s action, meaning “these specific actions raise questions; what is their secret?” When someone knows the doer and knows that he is wise and infallible, but does not know the secret and mystery of his action, they ask questions focused on understanding the wisdom of the action, not objecting to the doer.

On this basis, the dialogue between Moses and Khiḍr, like the angels’ dispute, is a praiseworthy disputation (ikhtiṣām), as this story too was shaped by divine mercy and divine knowledge. The Glorious God says about the angels’ disputation: “Say, ‘It is great news… I had no knowledge of the exalted assembly when they were disputing’”.(257) “Disputation” (ikhtiṣām) is from the pattern of mutual action (iftiʿāl) and has the meaning of reciprocal action (mufāʿala), and what is meant by “they dispute” (yakhtaṣimūn) is praiseworthy disputation, because the angels are infallible and do nothing without God’s permission and do not disobey divine commands: “they do not disobey God in what He commands them and do what they are commanded”(258); “They cannot precede Him in word, and they act by His command”.(259)

From the expression of the angels’ disputation (mukhāṣama), it becomes clear that the disputation of each thing is according to its own nature. Therefore, the dialogue between Moses and Khiḍr is not like the objection of an ordinary person to another ordinary person, but rather, like the disputation of angels, it is a praiseworthy act aimed at acquiring knowledge.

4) Zeal: The Source of Moses’ Objection to Khiḍr

Zeal (ghayra) is one of the divine attributes, and no one is more zealous than God Almighty. Similarly, zeal is a virtue in believers, and just as knowledge, asceticism, and courage have degrees, zeal also has levels. Zeal has three necessary elements, and the stronger these pillars are in a person, the more zealous they are:

a) One must fully know their identity

b) With knowledge of their identity, they must not transgress another’s boundaries

c) They must not allow others to cross their boundaries

One who possesses these three characteristics is zealous. On this basis, the Commander of the Faithful said that no zealous man commits adultery: “No zealous man has ever committed adultery”(260), because an adulterer transgresses another’s sanctuary. Moses the Interlocutor was distinguished in the virtue of zeal, and his seemingly objecting questions to Khiḍr stemmed from his religious zeal, as he saw Khiḍr’s actions as contrary to the outward appearance of religious laws. Another example of his zeal is in the story of Sāmirī and his people’s calf-worship, where he strongly objected to his brother Aaron saying: “When you saw them going astray, what prevented you from following me? Did you disobey my command?” And Aaron said: “O son of my mother, do not seize me by my beard or my head. I feared that you would say, ‘You have caused division among the Children of Israel and did not observe my word’”.(261) It should be noted that mere verbal rebuke can be of the nature of “I mean you, but listen, O neighbor,” but if it is mixed with action, it definitely has its specific addressee.