Interpreting the Qur'an by Opinion

Interpretation, as the process of elucidating ambiguities and revealing the essence of words or phrases whose meanings are not immediately apparent, constitutes a theoretical endeavor. This endeavor, akin to other theoretical discussions, necessitates grounding in axiomatic truths to clarify and illuminate the subject matter. This principle holds true regardless of whether the focus is on a singular term or a complex statement, since both conceptual and propositional bases may vary from being inherently obvious to being speculative in nature.

Thus, interpretation serves as an intellectual agreement or judgment regarding the intended meaning behind a verse and the divine intent it conveys, effectively acting as a form of argumentation or reasoning. Consequently, the field of exegesis, mirroring the structure of various academic disciplines, is built upon foundational premises and poses its unique set of queries. As previously highlighted in our discussion on defining the scope of interpretation, it is imperative to acknowledge the human element by incorporating a qualifier such as "to the extent of human capability," emphasizing the inherent limitations and capacities in the pursuit of understanding the Qur'anic text.

The interpretation of any form of speech, irrespective of its religious or secular context and whether it originates from the Qur'an or ḥadīth, necessitates a systematic approach to accurately determine and attribute the intended meaning of its speaker. It is imperative that speech is not interpreted based on personal conjecture before attributing such interpretations to the original speaker. This principle holds universally, transcending the boundaries between sacred and non-religious discourse. However, the interpretation of religious texts based on subjective opinion carries the added risk of incurring divine retribution.

Interpreting the Qur'an based on personal opinions occurs due to ignorance (jahl) rather than knowledge and insight, or due to folly (jāhiliyya) in contrast to wisdom and rationality. This stems from either a deficiency in theoretical intellect or a shortfall in practical reasoning. An interpretation that deviates from scholarly principles—He instructs them in the Book and Wisdom (62:2)—and contrary to spiritual virtues—He purifies them (62:2)—is deemed interpretation by opinion. This holds true regardless of whether it concerns broad doctrines or specific regulations and instructions. Therefore, verses that are clear, direct, and unequivocal do not require interpretation. They might broadly call to guidance or detail jurisprudential directives. Conversely, verses that are speculative, not immediately apparent, and require thoughtful analysis cannot be legitimately interpreted based on mere opinion.

Interpretation by opinion becomes problematic when it diverges from the Arabic language norms, disregards established rational principles and scientific methodologies, and also does not conform to the general outlines of the Qur'an itself. Yet, interpretations that avoid these pitfalls are considered acceptable. The distinction here is supported by texts that caution against opinion-based interpretation, often presented with contextual clues highlighting the seriousness of such actions. For example, certain traditions warn: "Whoever interprets the Qur'an based on his own opinion has fabricated lies against God. Anyone issuing religious verdicts (fatwās) without knowledge is condemned by angels from both the heavens and the earth. Every innovation leads astray, and every form of misguidance ends in the Fire." (97) Here, interpretation by mere opinion is likened to unlearned fatwā issuance, both categorized as innovations. It's understood that fatwās issued without proper knowledge refers to baseless opinions. Conversely, a jurist (mujtahid), equipped with the requisite scholarly expertise and issuing opinions based on knowledge, does not fall into the category of issuing fatwās without knowledge. Similarly, informed interpretations, even if based on individual understanding, do not constitute opinionated interpretations.

The Commander of the Faithful (a.s.) stated, "God, majestic in His majesty, declared: ‘Those who interpret My words based on their own opinions do not truly believe in Me. Those who liken Me to My creation do not understand Me. And those who resort to analogy in My religion do not adhere to My true religion.'" (98) In this narration, interpreting based on personal opinion is equated with comparing the Creator to creation and with employing analogy, both practices being devoid of established scientific principles and knowledge, thus reflecting ignorance rather than understanding.

Imām Ṣādiq (a.s.), when asked about judgment and governance, stated: "Any individual who adjudicates between two parties based on personal opinion is guilty of disbelief, just as interpreting any verse from the Book of God based on personal opinion constitutes disbelief." (99) This ḥadīth equates interpreting based on personal opinion with uninformed and arbitrary judgments. Specifically, if a judge's decision does not stem from knowledge supported by evidence and proofs, or from testimonies and oaths, but merely from the judge's own opinion and desires, it mirrors the issue with interpreting the Qur'an based on opinion. Such interpretation is objectionable if it fails to align with the principles of comprehension, rational and Qur'anic evidence, and, when necessary and without the risk of circular reasoning, if it also fails to align with ḥadīth-based evidence.

Of course, rational proofs, scientific evidence, and the knowledge acquired through intellect rather than through illusion, imagination, analogy, and conjecture, represent just one of the sources for interpreting the Qur'an, not its entirety. Consequently, a thorough examination of all Qur'anic teachings, alongside a reflective consideration of all ḥadīths, related sīra, and occasions of revelation, is essential. This approach clarifies the intent behind certain texts that prohibit interpretation based on personal opinion.

For example, the narration from Imām Ṣādiq (a.s.) that states, "There is nothing further from the intellects of men than it [the Qur'an]. The beginning of the verse is about something, its middle is about something, and its end is about something. It is a continuous speech that is applicable in [various] ways," (100) serves as a caution against attempting to understand the Qur'an solely through one's intellect or trying to grasp its entirety without consulting other sources. This implies that no interpreter has the liberty to solely rely on rational demonstrations and scientific evidence while disregarding transmitted evidence, whether it be from the Qur'an, ḥadīth, or historical accounts, or to claim understanding by merging rational and transmitted proofs and assert, "My opinion aligns with the Qur'an's depth." The essence of such texts is not to dissuade informed interpretation or to diminish the significance of the Qur'an's apparent meanings.

As previously discussed and further illustrated through the analogy with judgment, the approach of interpreting by opinion is akin to rendering a judgment between two parties based on personal opinion. Such judgments, even if they happen to align with the truth, lack a certain goodness related to the judge's qualifications, due to the bold presumption and carelessness of an uninformed judge. Accordingly, divine punishment, symbolized by fire, is also designated for such actions. It's noted that "A man who judges by the truth while he does not know is in the Fire." (101) Hence, someone who presumptuously assumes the role of a judge and makes decisions out of ignorance is deemed worthy of hellfire, even if by chance their judgment aligns with the truth. However, the severity of punishment might be less for someone whose judgment coincidentally aligns with the truth compared to one whose ignorant decision-making leads to a deviation from the truth. This distinction might also apply to interpreting by opinion, yet the principle of jurisprudential prohibition and the theological consequences of hellfire remain. The prohibition against judging without knowledge and interpreting based on personal opinion stems from reckless ignorance, irrespective of whether the error is recognized. Naturally, if the error is acknowledged, the culpability and subsequent punishment of such an interpreter are compounded.

The accounts of some ancients (that is, early scholars) showing restraint from engaging in Qur'anic interpretation and shying away from delving into it are akin to the caution exercised by some in issuing religious edicts or fatwās, as well as in mediating disputes and making judgments between two parties, choosing instead to steer clear of these responsibilities. Therefore, when the boundaries of an interpretation were clear, they did not hesitate to apply their own opinions. Furthermore, the exegesis by the Companions and their successors was not exclusively reliant on narrated traditions; it also embraced interpretations shaped by personal opinions and diverse expertise. Conversely, restricting Qur'anic interpretation strictly to the existence of a related exegetical tradition would result in many verses remaining unexplained, given the scarcity of such narrated interpretations.

Types of Interpretation by Opinion

The prohibited forms of interpretation by opinion can be summarized as follows:

1. Interpreting with ignorance regarding the core message of a verse—where a concept is derived from a verse and attributed to it incorrectly because it conflicts with rational proof. This applies regardless of whether the rational proof is philosophical, theological, empirical, or based on narrations. The method for rational proof varies depending on the subject matter. For abstract concepts, philosophical or theological reasoning is necessary. For empirical issues, experimental evidence and observation are required. And for narratives and actions of the prophets and saints (peace be upon them), a reliable narrated source is needed.

If an interpretation relies on either rational or narrated evidence but is derived from a verse without proper proof and attributed to it, then interpreting the verse based on this unfounded attribution constitutes interpretation by opinion and is forbidden. The Qur'an addresses this broader principle of not speaking without knowledge, not limited to the context of interpretation, stating, Do not pursue that of which you do not know. Indeed the hearing, the eyesight, and the heart—all of these are accountable (17:36). (102)

2. Ignorant interpretation concerning the speaker's precise intention and attributing content to him—that is, deducing a conclusion from a verse such that the deduction aligns with its appropriate proof, whether rational, empirical, or narrated, and seems entirely accurate—nevertheless requires credible proof to affirm that the speaker has intended this very meaning from the verse. The proof of attributing the discussed content to the speaker hinges on either rational deduction or transmitted evidence. Absence of comprehensive rational proof precluding other interpretations or demonstrating incompatibility of different content with the verse's message, or lack of reliable transmitted evidence pinpointing the intended meaning of the verse, makes the assignment of a particular and determined intention from the verse to the speaker an instance of culpable speculative interpretation. The responsibility of the interpreter, in this situation, is to attribute the aforementioned meaning to the speaker as a possibility. This means that the interpreter should view the content as potentially what the speaker intended, stating, "It is conceivable that the speaker intended this content," rather than definitively claiming, "This is what was intended, not anything else."

3. Ignorant interpretation with respect to the serious intention of the speaker and attributing probable intention to him—in cases where a matter inferred from the verse aligns with the demonstration appropriate to its field. Yet there exists credible, either rational or transmitted, proof showing the speaker had intended a different content for the verse. In such instances, it's not just the act of definitively attributing the previously mentioned content to the speaker that's considered impermissible and a form of blameworthy interpretation by opinion; even probabilistically attributing it falls under the same criticism. This stems from having substantial rational or transmitted evidence that the speaker did not intend the aforementioned content, but rather something else, thereby ruling out the possibility of considering the initially inferred content as even a probable meaning of the verse.

In any case, the Qur'an explicitly forbids such practices, as highlighted by the verse: Was not the covenant of the Book taken from them that they would not attribute anything but the truth to God, and they have studied what is in it? And the abode of the Hereafter is better for those who are Godwary. Do you not apply reason? (7:169). This verse underscores that attributing anything to God without genuine knowledge is impermissible. This lack of knowledge manifests in two ways: either the content itself doesn't align with true knowledge, or while the content might be correct and known, attributing it to God without concrete evidence is not allowed. Importantly, all of God's words are based on knowledge. However, when it comes to discussing a verse, determining whether God intended one possible meaning over another necessitates additional evidence. Only if such evidence is provided, can a specific interpretation be definitively attributed to God; otherwise, it can only be attributed to God probabilistically.

Another verse in the Qur'an that cautions against attributing unfounded claims to God is: Do you attribute to God what you do not know? (10:68). This injunction emphasizes that attributing characteristics, intentions, or statements to God without clear evidence is impermissible. Even if the content being attributed to God is correct on its own terms, establishing that God intended this specific content within a given verse necessitates solid evidence. Attributing anything to God without such evidence is considered unjust. Particularly, if the content is inherently false, like polytheistic beliefs or idolatry, attributing it to God is seen as a severe falsehood and an egregious injustice. Even if the content is true but is attributed to God without evidence, it remains an act of injustice. The only situation where attributing something to God is permissible is when the content is inherently correct and there's clear evidence that God intended this content to be conveyed.

Interpreting a verse carelessly and attributing its intended meaning to the speaker when the derived meaning is accurate and the speaker has indeed intended this accurate content presents a nuanced issue. If the interpreter lacks the means to verify the speaker's intention or fails to seek such verification, the action retains its merit, but the interpreter's approach lacks prudence. This is because the interpreter has attributed the interpretation to the speaker without verifying the accuracy of this attribution. In essence, the interpreter engages in two distinct actions: the first involves correctly inferring the meaning from the verse, an action that is inherently good; the second involves attributing this meaning to the speaker without sufficient evidence, an action that lacks virtue. Despite accidentally aligning with the truth, the interpreter's lack of demonstrative reasoning and insight into this alignment detracts from the interpretive act's overall integrity. Thus, even if the interpreter reaches the correct conclusion, their approach is subject to criticism for presumptuousness and recklessness.

Inattentive interpretation with respect to the principle of the content in a case where both that matter in question is correct in itself and the speaker has intended that correct content. The interpreter in question has failed to verify both the accuracy of the matter's attribution to the speaker and the correctness of the matter itself. Instead, he has solely relied on his personal interpretation of the verse and ascribed this understanding to the speaker.

This recklessness and overconfidence may also fall under the category of opinion-based interpretation, demonstrating the interpreter's negligence and his failure to exercise due diligence. Such an interpreter relies solely on personal judgment to deduce meanings from verses without considering their proofs. When attributing these interpretations to the speaker, he leans on his personal beliefs rather than on rational or narrated evidence. Consequently, he endorses his subjective opinions and speaks without informed knowledge, regardless of whether his views align with reality. He fails to differentiate between the process of deriving meanings from the verses and the act of attributing these interpretations to the speaker due to this carelessness. Therefore, he bases his interpretations on personal opinion, not on verifiable proofs, and attributes them according to his own beliefs, not according to substantiated evidence. This approach is encompassed by the broad warnings against interpreting the Qur'an based on mere opinion or speaking about it without knowledge.

Interpretation by Opinion from the Perspective of Different Exegetes

Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310 AH), reflecting on the narrations that prohibit interpreting the Qur'an based on personal opinion or without proper knowledge, states:

These reports affirm our assertion that interpretations of the Qur'an made in ignorance, without explicit guidance from the Prophet (s.a.w.) or established evidence from him, are not permissible to be voiced based on personal opinion. Even if one's opinion accidentally aligns with the truth, the individual is still at fault because, in reaching the truth, there was no certainty in the accuracy of their opinion; instead, it was based on speculation. Anyone who speaks on matters of God's religion through mere speculation is attributing to God what they do not know. Such attributions have been explicitly prohibited by God in the Qur'an: "...and do not say about God what you do not know" (2:169).

Then, referencing the previously mentioned verse, Ṭabarī relays a ḥadīth from the Prophet (s.a.w.) stating: "Whoever interprets the Qur'an based on his opinion and turns out to be right, his statement may be correct, but his action is not." (103) Thus, interpretation grounded in knowledge, where the analysis of both conceptual and propositional premises is based on academic standards, is distinct from interpretation by opinion and falls outside the scope of prohibitions against such interpretation. It's worth mentioning that in addressing the critical issue of interpretation by opinion, Ṭabarī limits his contribution to narrating several reports and offering a brief commentary. Despite critiquing interpreters who rely solely on linguistic analysis and disregard the narratives of the Companions as examples of opinion-based interpretation, he does not delve deeply into the concept of interpretation by opinion in his work.

By contrast, Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (may God have mercy on him) (385-460 AH), before discussing the authenticated Tradition of the Two Weighty Things, highlighted reports that encourage the recitation of the Qur'an and adherence to its teachings, as well as those that emphasize evaluating and discarding subsidiary reports conflicting with the Qur'an. From synthesizing these narratives, he deduced the perpetual presence of the Qur'an and the People of the Household (a.s.) across all ages. Consequently, he stressed the importance of dedicating oneself to the interpretation and elucidation of the Qur'an's meanings, while setting aside any divergent interpretations.

Secondly, he referenced Imāmī traditions that deem interpreting the Qur'an without authentic reports from the Infallibles (a.s.) impermissible, criticizing the practice of explaining the Qur'an based solely on personal opinion. He also cited a Sunnī narration from the Prophet (s.a.w.), "Whoever interprets the Qur'an based on his opinion and happens to be correct still errs," highlighting the reluctance and caution shown by several Tābiʿūn and jurists from Medina—such as Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib, ʿUbayda al-Salmānī, Nāfiʿ, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, and Sālim ibn ʿAbd Allāh—towards interpretation by opinion.

Thirdly, he structured the combination of the aforementioned evidences as follows:

a) The words of God and His Prophet (s.a.w.) are safeguarded against any form of contradiction or conflict.

b) God declared: "We have made it an Arabic Qur'an" (43:3), clarified it as "in clear Arabic language" (26:195), and asserted "We did not send any apostle except with the language of his people" (14:4). Further, He proclaimed, "We have sent down the Book as a clarification of all things" (16:89) and affirmed, "We have not neglected anything in the Book" (6:38). Hence, considering the Qur'an's articulation in lucid Arabic and its designation as both an elucidation for the Prophet's (s.a.w.) people and a comprehensive guide, how could it be suggested that its plain meaning remains elusive? Would this not reduce the Qur'an to enigmatic verses, a notion profoundly incongruent with its divine stature?

c) God commended those who delve into the Qur'an's meanings with "Those among them who can discern it would have known it." and critiqued the heedless by questioning, "Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?" Furthermore, the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) proclaimed, "Indeed, I am leaving among you the Two Weighty Things (thaqalayn)..." Thus, the Qur'an, like the ʿitra (a.s.), stands as a divine proof (ḥujja). How can a proof be something beyond comprehension? Reports from the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) and the infallible Imāms (a.s.) emphasize the necessity to align ḥadīth with the Qur'an, accepting those that concur and dismissing those that conflict. How can the Qur'an serve as a criterion and a foundation for comparison if its meaning remains elusive? These points collectively underscore that comprehending the Qur'an should not be confined merely to the ḥadīths.

d) In conclusion, he elucidated that the Noble Qur'an's verses encompass four categories of meanings:

1. Matters whose understanding is solely within God's domain, leaving no room for human inquiry or discourse. Examples include queries about the Hour, as expressed in: "They ask you about the Hour, when is its arrival? Say: Its knowledge is only with my Lord. None will reveal its time except Him," and the affirmation "Indeed, God has knowledge of the Hour."

2. Content whose apparent meaning directly reflects its true significance, understood by every proficient speaker to whom it is directed. Examples include the commandments: "And do not kill the soul which God has forbidden, except by right," and the declaration "Say: He is God, [who is] One."

3. Content that is ambiguous (mujmal), where the superficial meaning doesn't fully reveal the specifics, such as the commands: "Establish prayer and give zakāt," "And [due] to God from the people is a pilgrimage to the House—for whoever is able to find thereto a way," "And give its due on the day of its harvest," and "And in their wealth is a known right." These verses hint at practices like the number and manner of prayers, the rituals of ḥajj, and the specifics of zakāt, which cannot be fully grasped without the Messenger of God's (s.a.w.) elucidation. To conjecture on these without informed knowledge is prohibited. It's plausible that the previously mentioned reports that discourage interpretive speculation pertain to this kind of text.

4. Content where a term carries multiple meanings, and considering any one of those meanings individually could be accurate. In such scenarios, deriving a definitive interpretation without guidance from an Infallible is not feasible. It's only plausible to suggest that each interpretation might represent what God intended, with ultimate knowledge resting with God alone. However, if the term is employed in a particular context and additional evidence indicates a specific interpretation over others, then it can be asserted that this interpretation reflects God's intended meaning. While Shaykh Ṭūsī's (may God have mercy on him) in-depth discourse provides several valuable insights, it is beneficial to highlight certain aspects:

5. The verses that delineate the knowledge of the Hour as exclusively belonging to God are clear and unambiguous in their messaging, akin to several other verses in the Qur'an. The extraction of this exclusive divine knowledge from these verses constitutes an act of scholarly exegesis (tafsīr) rather than opinion-based interpretation (tafsīr bi-l-raʾy). The prohibition specifically targets the act of defining the precise moment of the Resurrection—an aspect on which the verse is silent, except to affirm that such knowledge is solely God's domain. The exegete's role here is not to conjecture about the timing but to elucidate the verse's explicit content. This interpretation naturally leads to the understanding that knowledge of the Resurrection is confined to God alone. Shaykh Ṭūsī's commentary seems to blur the distinction between explaining this verse and attempting to pinpoint the Hour.

6. The necessity of comparing ḥadīths to the Qur'an underscores an essential procedure beyond just validating the Qur'an's apparent meanings and the derivations made from it; it introduces a critical methodology, not mentioned in the statements of Shaykh Ṭūsī, for verifying the authenticity of ḥadīths against the Qur'anic text. This method dictates that the Qur'an's content must first be firmly understood and accepted as the benchmark for evaluating the reliability of ḥadīths. Engaging with ḥadīths, therefore, requires an initial affirmation of the Qur'an's authority to prevent a circular dependency, where the validation of one depends on the other. This concern, especially regarding the potential circularity in relying on ḥadīths to authenticate Qur'anic interpretations, was detailed in Chapter 3, discussing the role of ḥadīth in relation to the Qur'an.

Although the analogy is not precise, the comparison of the verses "Say, ‘He is God, the One'" (112:1) with "Do not kill the soul which God has forbidden except by right" (6:151) suggests that understanding the Qur'an is not merely a linguistic exercise. This is underscored by Imām al-Sajjād's (a.s.) statement regarding God's anticipation of future generations of deep thinkers with the revelation of "Say, ‘He is God, the One'" and the subsequent verses up to "and God knows what is in the breasts" (57:6). The concepts of Oneness (aḥadiyya) and Self-Sufficiency (ṣamadiyya), for instance, extend beyond the comprehension of the Jahiliyyah Arabs, known for their literary achievement in the Seven Odes, and remain elusive to atheists, polytheists, and anthropomorphists, who are bound to a material worldview. While those proficient in Arabic can grasp the surface meaning of these verses, the full extent of their depth and subtleties escapes basic linguistic analysis, pointing to the necessity of a deeper, more informed approach to understanding the Qur'an's profound messages.

3. The Qur'anic verses concerning rulings (aḥkām) are distinct and explicit in their directives, poised for elucidation and comprehension. These verses, inherently unambiguous, serve as benchmarks for discarding uncertain interpretations. Following the guidance of the Qur'an itself and supported by narrations like the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things (ḥadīth al-thaqalayn), the task of detailing, specifying, or providing exceptions to these verses rightfully belongs to the discourse of the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.). Absent concrete evidence for a verse's particularization or restriction, its broad or general interpretation stands, rooted in the principles of absoluteness or generality. This stance is maintained unless there's definitive proof that a verse's intent is to establish a law in itself, thereby negating the need for inferred absoluteness or generality.

Regarding both legislative aspects and the detailing of specific rulings, it's feasible to deduce directly from a given verse whether it concerns legislation. Thus, explanation based solely on the verse in question is justifiable. However, this does not grant the interpretation independent validity when considering other verses. This underscores the distinction between the fundamental accuracy of exegesis and its execution without constraints or in isolation, a nuance that has inadvertently been mingled into the discourse.

Shaykh Ṭūsī subtly introduces the concept of consensus (ijmāʿ) as bearing significance in Qur'anic interpretation, a subject slated for detailed exploration in Chapter 7, focusing on the role and opinions of exegetes.

Intra-religious and Extra-religious Knowledge

The exploration of Qur'anic exegesis based on opinion (tafsīr bi-l-raʾy) has shed light on its nature and implications—highlighting both the concept itself and the unanimous verdict that it is both logically and scripturally unfounded and thus objectionable. This raises a pivotal question: Can the interpretation of religious texts be conducted without incorporating knowledge external to the religious framework? And if external knowledge is indeed utilized, does it need to be rigorously analytical and sophisticated? While this topic warrants a comprehensive treatment deserving of its own dedicated analysis, a succinct overview can be offered here:

The comprehensive essence of religion has been segmented by some scholars into isolated components. At times, they've advocated for the detachment of politics from religion, proclaiming a divide between the two. On other occasions, they've drawn lines between science and religion, proposing that science stands apart. There have been moments when the impact of religion on shaping human identity has been minimized, equating it with cultural influences—whether Iranian, Western, Eastern, or tied to other geographic or ethnic backgrounds. This perspective has likened the profound, unifying force of divine religion to the varied cultures born of regional and ethnic contexts, placing them on an equal footing in the realm of human identity formation. Thus, they've posited that religion (viewed as divine culture) and non-religious cultural elements (such as those from Iranian and Western traditions) hold equivalent sway in shaping and defining who we are.

On similar grounds, with the same questionable underpinnings, there have been arguments for distancing reason from religion and disassociating religion from reason. Claims are made that certain aspects are of a rational nature rather than religious, or rational rather than jurisprudential (sharʿī). However, the truth is that reason is to be contrasted to transmission (naql), not religion (sharʿ). This distinction arises because religious knowledge can be derived solely from reason, solely from transmission, or from a synthesis of both. Thus, reason is in opposition to tradition and textual transmission, not to the entirety of religious doctrine.

The science of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) addresses the validity of rational judgments and knowledge. Jurisprudence (fiqh) explores the necessity of adhering to reason's verdicts. Within the religious community, there's emphasis on valuing rational compliance and critiquing its neglect. Theology (kalām) considers the reward for reason's adherence and the consequences of its defiance. Human reason, as a pillar of religious understanding, parallels transmitted texts as a foundational source for religious teachings. However, reason must be legitimate and uncorrupted to serve as such a source. This entails applying the same rigorous principles and criteria used to establish the universe's origin, divine unity, and other philosophical and theological certainties, including the indispensability of revelation, prophethood, and the assurance of resurrection. When an issue aligns with these rigorous, scientific standards, it becomes a part of the religion's foundation. This means that, whether directly linked to revelation or not, rational evidence can refine interpretations—clarifying absolute statements, specifying broad principles, or serving as a contextual clue or justification for metaphorical expressions in verses or ḥadīths.

Certainly, a mind unladen with foundational principles and presuppositions cannot grasp the intricacies of nature or divine law (sharīʿa). The initial proposition encountered by an enlightened intellect is the principle of non-contradiction. Subsequent to this foundational principle, other axiomatic principles are recognized, leading to inferential propositions that become comprehensible in light of these axioms, all tracing back to the foundational principle of non-contradiction. As previously discussed, every concept understood through such rigorous intellectual exercise entails the tripartite considerations of legal theory, jurisprudence, and theology. However, just as deviations, arbitrary interpretations, and misunderstandings can infiltrate the interpretation of transmitted texts, similar errors can occur in the utilization of rational discourse. The exploration of such deviations falls outside the scope of this discussion.

The delineation between intra-religious and extra-religious spheres knowledge, as well as the distinctions drawn between minimal and maximal religion and similar categorizations, originate from a fragmentation of religion's integral reality. This process detaches aspects of religion from its whole, artificially opposing parts of a unified entity against each other, thereby promoting a notion of discord between reason and religion, science and religion, politics and religion, human identity and religion, as well as scientific management and jurisprudential management. This manufactured opposition is as illusory as the golden calf fashioned for the Israelites.

Although ancient expressions sometimes seem to suggest a conflict between reason and divine law (sharīʿa), their actual focus was the relationship between reason and revelation (samʿ) or reason and transmission (naql). These discussions did not pit reason against religion, especially not within the domains of legal theory, jurisprudence, and theology, which all fundamentally rely on rationality. Instead, they acknowledged reason's role alongside revelation as integral to religious understanding. Just as certain actions are deemed obligatory or forbidden based on transmitted evidence, rationality also dictates obligations and prohibitions.

When a matter is deemed obligatory through rational reasoning as a foundational principle, it shouldn't be isolated from its corresponding legal obligation. Legal obligations, as delineated by religious texts, encompass both direct duties and actions that serve as prerequisites for other duties. Consequently, any action required as a prerequisite doesn't hold an independent ruling separate from the primary obligation it supports. However, this doesn't imply that such prerequisites are devoid of their specific subordinate rulings. These secondary rulings are invariably in place, regardless of whether the preliminary action is justified through reason or transmitted evidence.

Understanding religion and its teachings must occur holistically, without resorting to analogy, division, or dissection. A religion that is fragmented, dissected, or torn apart is not representative of the religion in its entirety but only a fraction of its true essence. Therefore, it becomes evident that drawing distinctions between what is considered intra-religious and extra-religious must be approached with caution, as such demarcations can sometimes be accurate and at other times misleading. That is:

Firstly, the foundational basis for religious rulings is derived from the sacred texts of the Qur'an, the authentic Sunnah of the Infallibles (a.s.) (104), and the product of demonstrative reason, all of which present definitive divine criteria.

Secondly, the essence of religion encompasses the will of God, which is unveiled through various means: at times, it is discerned through reason; at other times, it is revealed through transmission; and occasionally, it becomes known through a combination of both, either by inference or conjunction.

Third, both transmission (the transmitted text) and reason (the demonstrably rational text) are contingent, created entities that serve to unveil the divine will. As outlined in the language of authentic transmissions, reason functions as an inner messenger, while definitive transmission serves as an outer messenger. This means that definitive reason can be viewed as the internal aspect of divine law (sharʿ), and divine law as the external aspect of reason. Both, however, are encompassed within the realm of religion, with one being external to the typical human understanding and perception, and the other internal. Thus, it's understandable why definitive reason is considered one of the foundations for deriving religious rulings.

Fourth, human knowledge regarding the principles and rulings of religion falls into two categories: accurate, truthful, and valid versus erroneous, false, and invalid. The accurate and truthful category is undoubtedly guided by divine will, and such knowledge is inherently religious. This knowledge, resonating with divine will and illuminated by divine guidance within the intellect of a servant of God, is unmistakably divine. Even though it originates from human beings—who, in various aspects other than this knowledge, might be ignorant, errant, or even morally flawed—it remains distant from the exalted realms of divine revelation, prophethood, and Imāmate. However, when a definite rational proof enlightens their minds, such reason unquestionably becomes a source of religious knowledge. Therefore, this type of correct knowledge should not be seen as mere human knowledge in opposition to religious knowledge; rather, it ought to be regarded as rational religious knowledge, contrasting with transmitted religious knowledge. This distinction emphasizes that reason contrasts with transmission, not with religion itself.

What opposes religion are desires, whims, and inclinations towards atheistic ideologies, where proponents idolize their own intellects and devoutly follow their desires. This behavior is highlighted in the verse, Then when their messengers brought them clear proofs, they exulted in the knowledge they had (40:83). Reveling in their atheistic beliefs, they scorn the divine revelation, oblivious to how their own condemnable actions become their downfall and entrapment.

Fifth, the knowledge of nature and divine law converge in the sense that accurate knowledge concerning the external order of the world is inherently religious. This is because the source of all knowledge and worldly benefits is divine: You do not have any blessing but that it is from God (16:53), He taught man what he did not know (96:5). Its goal is to ensure proper use in the realms of faith, ethics, and conduct, leading to divine satisfaction and communion. Its legal authority in jurisprudential theory, the imperative to comply with it in jurisprudence, and the associated promise, warning, and punishment in theological discourse all affirm its religious nature.

Sixth, gaining access to unblemished nature and achieving pure divine knowledge is achievable, and instances of such attainment are evident. This is particularly true when there are conflicting perspectives on understanding nature or divine laws. In such scenarios, two opposing views about nature or divine commandments clash, each negating the other. Since it's impossible for two contradictories to coexist or for both to be rejected simultaneously, one viewpoint must inherently be true and accurate, while the other is definitively false and erroneous. However, discerning truth from falsehood pertains to the comprehension of nature or divine commands, a matter of substantive knowledge, not the field of epistemology, which is a separate discussion.

Sometimes, multiple perspectives put forth are either collectively correct or collectively mistaken, albeit with variations in the degree of correctness or magnitude of error. This scenario arises when the perspectives are complementary rather than contradictory, meaning they harmonize without negating each other. Because these views do not present direct contradictions, it is feasible to accept them all as accurate and valid or to dismiss them all as flawed and incorrect, given their non-oppositional nature.

Seventh, understanding nature or divine law doesn't evolve automatically. Among the rational and scientific bases for our understanding, some remain fixed and unchangeable, while others may evolve. Such changes aren't always progressive; they might result from a transformative scholarly perspective or from misleading efforts by those who distort the meanings for their ends, trading religious integrity for worldly gain. As highlighted in the Qur'an, examples include distortions by some among the Jews, who manipulate words from their contexts and forget parts of their teachings, and those who alter the divine message after understanding it, as mentioned in verses such as ...among those who are Jews are some who distort words from their [proper] places (4:46), They distort words from their [proper] places and have forgotten a portion of that of which they were reminded (5:13), and And there was a party of them who used to hear the words of God [recited to them], then distort it after they had understood it (2:75). Thus, the permanence of certain understandings of nature and religion, the evolution of perspectives due to scientific advancements or societal changes, and the alteration of interpretations by self-serving manipulations are all possible.

Eighth, discussions around the purported conflict between philosophy and religion, often framed as the clash between reason and divine law, including arguments about "the incoherence of the incoherence," reveal imprecision in expression or overlook the inherent unity and harmony between reason and transmission. A closer examination of the authority of reason and the domain of the applicability of its ruling reveals that it should not be seen as opposing religion. Instead, the most effective method to understand the role of reason within the realm of religion is to engage with reason itself.

Of course, the atheistic denial by those who reject God's existence and the reality of resurrection, as well as the metaphysical ignorance of skeptics, falls outside our discussion. Such atheistic perspectives dismiss religion as mere myth. In contrast, those who have validated the divine essence of religion through reasoned proof would never juxtapose reason against religion, consider them incoherent, or issue a verdict on the separation of demonstration and the Qur'an. Instead, reason, enriched by divine and religious insights, alternates between being an attentive, informed, and trustworthy listener and an articulate, truthful spokesperson for religion itself. It can act both as the path and the lamp, illuminating the way on its own, or merely as the lamp, shedding light on the transmitted path.

It's essential not to attempt emptying the mind or disregarding reason when interpreting religious texts. This approach, even if achievable, does not align with religious principles. The objective should be to distinguish and remove uncertain, weak, and imaginary notions from robust and secure rational principles. This ensures that illusions don't replace rational thinking, and fancy doesn't wrongfully take its stand. Such a process is not only possible and required but has, to some degree, already taken place.

Ninth, the principle of causality is deeply embedded in religious thought (in the same profound sense of the laws of the cosmos being religious laws, as previously explained), as highlighted by reason in both philosophy and theology, and acknowledged through transmission. As articulated by the Commander of the Faithful (a.s.), "Everything subsisting through Him is an effect." (105) In the realm of gnosis (ʿirfān), the emphasis isn't on denying causality but on transcending the illusion of intermediary causes to focus on the ultimate cause. Gnostic understanding of divine unity pivots on recognizing the absolute and infinite nature of the Necessary Being. This recognition leads to viewing causality through the lens of manifestation, interpreting procession as appearance, reconceiving real causes as merely preparatory, and ascribing true causality exclusively to the Necessary Essence.

The approach employed in Tafsīr al-Mīzān by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī leverages philosophy and theology as the framework for interpreting the entire Qur'an, representing a pivotal stage of religious reasoning. Within the nuanced layers of al-Mīzān, there exists a subtle discourse on profound mystical themes. These discussions are presented indirectly, through allusions rather than direct statements, and in a manner that is illuminative rather than explicit, reserved for those deemed "purified" as per the Qur'anic verse, none touch it except the purified (56:79). Similarly, Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's work, grounded in the perspective of gnosis, ascends to the zenith of religious thought.

The Qur'an itself, with its multifaceted dimensions ranging from the clarity of Arabic to the celestial heights of the Mother Book, bridges the earthly articulation in the Ḥijāzī dialect with the sublime wisdom of the divine. It serves as a extended rope, one end anchored among humanity and the other supernatural end is in the handless grasp of God which is the divine message. In this divine communication, every exegete, operating within the scope of this divine linkage—avoiding extremes of addition or omission—engages in religious reasoning. Their interpretations of sacred texts are informed by rational religious principles, devoid of any extrinsic religious considerations.

To illustrate the nuanced distinction between philosophy and gnosis, rather than a dichotomous contradiction between them, let's briefly explore the meaning behind the poetic utterances of the eminent 7th-century AH gnostic, Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. His verses resonate with a profound splendor that transcends mere intellectual understanding:

The prophets came to sever secondary causes / They cast their miracles on Saturn.

The whole Qur'an speaks of severing secondary causes / The exaltation of the poor and the ruin of Abū Lahab. (106)

Also:

From start to end, the Qur'an stands / A testament to discarding secondary means and causes, nothing more.

Some of the points we can derive from the above verses of poetry are:

The prophets' message centered on divine unity (tawḥīd), emphasizing the sole reality of God's existence and portraying the world's diversity as signs, manifestations, and reflections of the One True Existence. They neither attributed undue reality to the world's multiplicity nor dismissed it as mere illusion. Instead, they presented the world's diversity as a mirror reflecting the oneness of God, where such multiplicity is as truthful as a mirror's reflection, not deceptive like a mirage.

The message of the prophets centers on inviting people towards the ultimate cause—God Himself—rather than denying causality altogether. To suggest that they promoted a belief in randomness, luck, or chaos would be a gross misrepresentation. Their message negates the efficacy of ordinary, intermediary causes while affirming the existence of the singular, ultimate cause. Prophethood, thus, does not reject the principle of causality; it redirects attention from the apparent to the real cause, eschewing the notion of a universe governed by chance or chaos.

Miracles certainly align with the principle of causality, not by coincidence or the denial of causality. The causative force behind the prophets' miracles is concealed, rooted in divine will (the active origin or the source of manifestation) and the sanctity of the prophetic soul (the receptive origin or locus of manifestation). The sway of miracles over earth and sky exemplifies the supremacy of a higher manifestation exerting influence over a lower one.

The entirety of the Qur'an, echoing the call of divine unity, emphasizes the severance from secondary causes, not from the principle of causality itself. To reject causality would mean, God forbid, disconnecting from the Cause of Causes. The denial of the principle of causality would leave no room for any cause within existence, be it eternal and timeless or contingent and transient. Thus, refuting causality essentially amounts to accepting chance, fortune, and accident.

The elevation of the poor and the ruin of Abū Lahab, among others, transcend mere superficial causes and effects, tracing back to the will of the Ultimate Cause—the One who owns sovereignty, dominion, and the spiritual realm. Ultimate authority, ownership, and control belong solely to Him, as stated: You exalt whom You will and You abase whom You will"(3:26), all might belongs to God (10:65), to God belongs all might (35:10).

The Qur'an and supplications acknowledge the principle of causality, recognizing both initial and intermediate causes, while portraying God as the Originator of causes—He establishes the effectiveness of other causes and is the Annihilator whose eternal will prevails over all entities, causes, and mechanisms. Simultaneously, God is presented as the Essential Cause, independent and unparalleled in causality, and as the Purely Near Cause, closer to everything than anything else could be. Thus, there's no necessity for intermediaries or external means for connection, because "the journey to You is short in distance, and You are not veiled from Your creatures, but their deeds obscure them from You..." Given the distance between servant and Master being the nearest, it is apt to say: "All praise be to God, whom I invoke for my needs whenever I desire, and with whom I find solace for my secrets whenever I choose, without any intercessor, and He suffices me..." (107)

This supreme stage of the unitary worldview is not—God forbid—for negating the principle of intercession or seeking a means of approaching Him. It recognizes the clear Qur'anic verses, the multitude of narrations, and the essence of supplications that affirm the role of angels, prophets, and saints—especially the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.), in their capacity as intercessors for mankind, who are always mindful of their lowly devotees, like the author of these lines. This understanding points us toward the ultimate Mediator on the Day of Judgment, God, the Most Merciful of the merciful. Others, due to the confines of their existence or the limit of their manifestation, can only offer restricted intercession, possibly excluding those neglectful of prayer, among others. However, the hope for God's all-encompassing mercy remains alive. Therefore, while engaging with philosophical and theological concepts, one must cultivate a mystic hope in the Supreme Cause. While seeking intercession through the descendants of Ṭāhā and Yāsīn, one ought to hold a humble and prayerful hope in the most supreme of intercessors. Such a comprehensive worldview necessitates direct invocation of God by all His Beautiful Names, bypassing intermediaries, to preserve the purity of monotheism in the believer's heart.

The point is that there's a significant distinction between denying intermediary causes and factors—a mystical perspective—and wholly refuting the principle of causality—a misinformed view. Understanding this nuanced difference is as challenging as discerning a hair-thin line, and navigating its subtleties is akin to treading on a sword's edge. This brief explanation sheds light on the wisdom behind the words of the revered ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāḍil Tūnī. He revealed during a lecture on Qayṣarī's commentary on the Fuṣūṣ that select students from the Islamic seminary in Isfahan (108) clandestinely delved into the Mathnawī (109) with an expert in the subject.

Given the discussion about the role of reason and rational evidence as integral to religious interpretation of transmitted texts, a crucial consideration previously highlighted becomes pertinent. In defining the concept of exegesis, it's imperative to include the caveat "to the extent of human capability." This is because the divine texts entail God's communication regarding His Exalted Names, Supreme Attributes, and the sagacious deeds concerning both the world and the hereafter, encompassing both the tangible and the intangible realms. Comprehending God's words, akin to understanding His creations, is constrained by human perceptual limits. Thus, achieving a thorough grasp of Qur'anic sciences and insights, similar to mastering the mysteries of the natural world, ranges from challenging to exceedingly arduous. Consequently, just as the definition of Qur'anic exegesis entails recognizing divine intent within human limitations, so too does the exploration of the natural world (philosophy) and its sciences (exegesis) necessitate this acknowledgment of human cognitive boundaries.

It's crucial to clarify the role of reason in relation to transmission. The question arises: does reason act as the scale, lamp, or key to divine law? Furthermore, within the framework of divine law, can reason function as a juristic criterion similar to analogy, given the divergent views on the legitimacy of analogy within Islamic thought? The delineation of reason's various roles—whether as a measure, illuminator, entryway to understanding divine directives, or as a basis for logical deductions akin to juristic analogy—and the validation or repudiation of these roles falls under the purview of a dedicated discourse. (110)

The Erroneous Restriction of Religion to Transmitted Texts

Religion, as previously stated, emerges from the interplay between reason and transmission, not solely from transmitted texts. The foundational principles for interpreting sacred texts need not be exclusively sourced from these texts themselves. Being "intra-religious" does not imply being "intra-textual." The obedience and adherence to rational principles are not justified solely because their credibility is affirmed in transmitted texts. Such affirmations within these texts serve more as validations rather than as the origin of rational principles' authority. This is because the validity of rational principles and scientific proofs is inherent, not externally bestowed. If the authority of rational certainty were dependent on transmitted texts, it would lead to a circular argument, as the validity of transmission is itself established through reason. Reason, which acknowledges the existence of the universe's Origin, His wisdom, and the necessity of religion for guiding societies, is the true foundation of authority. Thus, confining religious content to transmitted texts and viewing reason and its principles as external, expecting transmitted texts to verify their validity, is mistaken. Unfortunately, this misconception has deeply entrenched itself in people's minds and is challenging to dispel.

If an exegete relies on illusory or erroneous principles when interpreting sacred texts, even without intending to distort these texts to match preconceived notions, they still engage in opinion-based interpretation (tafsīr bi-l-raʾy). Such interpretation does not necessarily stem from malicious intent; the exegete might act out of error, not malice, indicating a distinction between wrongful action and intent. Conversely, an individual who deliberately aims to align the content of the Qur'an with their deceptive or incorrect views, not only engages in wrongful action but also harbors malevolent intent. This reflects a deliberate attempt to misrepresent the text, merging both wrongful deed and ill will.

It is clear that demonstrative reason acts as an internal messenger, akin to a prophet within, whereas illusion and fallacy are akin to internal false claimants to prophethood. The distinction between true prophethood and false claims exists both internally and externally. Thus, embracing a fallacious syllogism as if it were valid is equivalent to dismissing a rational syllogism, akin to turning one's back on truth. This intellectual regression parallels the concept of religious apostasy, signifying a departure not just from logical reasoning but also from the foundational principles of faith.

To elucidate this concept further, consider an analogy involving the Prophet. The Prophet embodies two facets: a human and ordinary aspect, through which he resembles other individuals, not receiving or transmitting any divine message. Conversely, there exists a spiritual and extraordinary dimension that sets him apart, through which he receives divine revelations and communicates these to society. This spiritual dimension signifies his role as a divine proof, both upon himself and upon others.

The rational and wise human being also has these same two aspects: the human-physical and the rational-spiritual. On the physical level, humans, like other natural entities, do not directly receive knowledge from God. However, on the spiritual level, humans can discern rational proofs of God's sovereignty, which apply to them and to all who encounter such clear rational insights within their spiritual essence. This pure rational evidence is undeniably divine in origin, for humans, by their nature, lack the intrinsic capacity to grasp truths without divine illumination. Upon creating humans, God endowed them with the faculty to comprehend and articulate, teaching them what was beyond their innate understanding: He created man, [and] taught him eloquence (55:3-4), He taught man what he did not know (96:5). Thus, true knowledge and sound reasoning are gifts from God, vested with authority, as has been previously elucidated.

When a reflective individual, by preserving the divine endowment from the distortions of delusion and fantasy and by shielding the divine revelation from the adversities of both internal and external satanic influences, attains accurate and unblemished knowledge—and with those very principles of demonstration which initially led him to grasp the bounty of Qur'anic revelation, he embarks on the interpretation of divine scriptures—he can convey to others, drawing from his inner conviction and concealed evidence: "I am merely a human, akin to you. Yet, divine grace ignited the flame of knowledge within the lamp of my being, allowing me to achieve true understanding." It's essential to recognize that the gap between a regular person, who comprehends a portion of God's message as conveyed through His prophet with solid rational justification, and the prophet himself spans an immense divide, highlighting the unbridgeable difference between the infallible and the fallible, the prophet and his community. Nonetheless, whenever a rational being discerns a truth, he must acknowledge that, firstly, pure knowledge is a gift from God, and secondly, it serves as divine proof.

Thus, such knowledge is inherently part of the religious realm. Any deductions made from sacred texts using this demonstrative insight must be recognized as derived within the realm of intra-religious precepts and assumptions. This means that the sacred texts have been interpreted through a lens shaped by an internal religious understanding.

To reiterate, it's important to distinguish between legitimate rational proof, which acts as an inner prophet, and fallacy, which is like an internal false claimant to prophethood. When an interpreter, misled by flawed principles and premises, approaches the interpretation of sacred texts, he essentially brings extraneous presuppositions into the realm of religion. This approach, characterized as blameworthy interpretation based on personal opinion (tafsīr bi-l-raʾy), introduces elements external to the religious framework. Nevertheless:

"For the price of a thousand from abroad, they won't buy even a single barley grain / Even if all humankind joined forces, they could not overcome the mountain of hypocrisy" (111)

Just as all praiseworthy and laudable interpretations based on opinion are with intra-religious presuppositions, pre-understandings, and foundational principles:

"Do not go without knowledge, for it deepens your love for Me / The people of insight work with what they already know." (112)

What attains the standard of pure proof is familiar, not foreign, and intra-religious, not extra-religious.