The Criterion of Being Religious

What it means for something to be "religious" (dīnī būdan) is that either through demonstrative reasoning or credible transmissions, God's intention regarding the need for a certain belief, virtue, or action becomes known. The essence of something being considered religious stems from the divine will, with rational or transmitted proofs serving merely as revealers of this divine intent. However, it's important to note that this very notion of "being religious" might be labeled as myth, superstition, or legend within the vocabulary of secular atheism. Just as idol worshippers viewed the Qur'an as mythical, Pharaoh warned the oppressed people of Egypt, Indeed, I fear that he will change your religion or cause corruption to appear in the land (40:26).

Pharaoh of Egypt deemed his idolatry and the baseless beliefs and those of his misguided followers as the true religion, dismissing the divine revelation brought by Moses, who directly conversed with God, as incorrect. This mirrors how the distinction between theoretical and practical reason varies among individuals. For instance, when Imām al-Ṣādiq (a.s.) was asked about the nature of reason, he responded, "...That by which the All-Merciful is worshipped and by which Paradise is earned." Conversely, when inquired about what existed in Muʿāwiya, he described it as "devilry, that was satanism." Similarly, an artful deceiver might dress his deception in the guise of culture and present it as reason, while dismissing the divine rationale of devout monotheists as mere illusion and fallacy.

In any case, the concept of a matter being religious is distinct for those versed in divine and Islamic teachings. It's crucial to differentiate between being religious and being devotional. Within religious practices, there exist instrumental (tawaṣṣulī) rulings alongside devotional (taʿabbudī) ones. In the case of instrumental rulings, compliance with divine commands—or their cessation—merely requires the performance of the action, even if done without the intention of drawing closer to God. This contrasts with devotional rulings (as opposed to instrumental), where simply performing the act does not fulfill the requirement. These actions must be undertaken with the intention of drawing closer to God and obeying His command. Hence, while the reward for instrumental rulings may depend on the intention of seeking proximity to God and obedience to Him, the essential compliance is achieved through the action itself.

Note: The term "devotional" can sometimes refer generally to actions commanded by God, where performing them is mandatory, regardless of their deeper purpose or the mysteries they may hold. An example of this in jurisprudence is the obligation to wash clothes from certain specified things [before prayer]. While such washing is mandated in religion and could be considered a devotional act, it actually serves as an instrumental obligation, not a devotional (worship-related) one. This establishes a nuanced relationship between what is religious and what is devotional within Islam. Matters in Islam are classified not just by their obligatory nature, but also by whether they are intrinsic obligations or prerequisites to other obligations. These are further divided into devotional and instrumental categories. Beyond this, obligations vary in other aspects, such as being specified or optional, individual or communal and so on.

From the discussions, it's clear that if demonstrative reason grasps a matter that is inherently part of Islamic beliefs, ethics, or laws, such a concept is definitively religious. Moreover, if demonstrative reason identifies a matter not directly included in these domains, yet it influences a believer in such a manner that it becomes obligatory in itself or serves as a prerequisite for an obligation, this concept is potentially religious. It becomes explicitly religious upon meeting specific criteria or during moments of necessity.

For example, when empirical reason, grounded in its unique, valid evidence, concludes that a specific combination of extracts produces an effective treatment for a certain disease, such a finding initially lacks a direct religious dimension. However, the moment this medication becomes essential for preserving the life of an individual suffering from said disease, acquiring and administering the medication transitions into a religious obligation. Should a person, despite possessing the necessary scientific knowledge and practical means, fail to procure this treatment and thereby neglect to safeguard the life that could have been saved through this medication, they have committed a violation against divine command. This is because God's decree reached this individual through empirical reasoning, and their neglect concerns a religious duty. Consequently, any action or inaction that intersects with a religious directive, whose benefits or detriments are verified by rational or empirical reasoning, assumes a religious significance—actual or potential—even in the absence of explicit scriptural guidance to affirm or refute it.

Therefore, although the mere presence of rational or empirical evidence regarding the execution of a certain matter does not directly indicate its religious or secular nature, when such a matter enters the domain of human actions—considering the benefits, harms, or neutrality involved—it becomes subject to divine mandates or recommendations, prohibitions or discouragements, or neutrality in cases of equivalency. The foundation for these five religious judgments may stem from reason alone, pure transmission, or a mix of both reason and transmission.

Summary

Any matter that necessitates belief or forbids it, promotes moral virtue or discourages it, or prescribes action or avoidance—whether as an obligation or a recommendation, or as a prohibition or disfavor—constitutes a religious matter (in terms of the stage of establishment).

Any proof that substantiates aspects of belief, ethics, or action is considered religious evidence, whether it's based on reason or transmission (in the context of substantiation).

All the mentioned forms of knowledge and substantiations are attributes of reason because comprehension is exclusively the domain of reason. This holds whether reason independently discerns the concept and the known, as in cases where inferential reason serves both as the path and the lamp—clearly revealing and illuminating the direct path of religion. Alternatively, the concept and the known might be articulated through transmission, with reason solely facilitating understanding from the sacred transmitted texts. In such instances, reason acts only as the lamp, not the path, with transmission constituting the path and reason illuminating it.

A matter whose detail knowledge is not directly related to beliefs, ethics, and practices but referenced in religious texts—such as the heavens and earth initially being a closed entity: Indeed the heavens and the earth were closed (21:30), and the heavens existing as smoke before their final form: Then He directed Himself to the heaven while it was smoke... And He completed them as seven heavens (41:11-12)—falls within the religious domain when elucidated through demonstrative reason. In these instances, both the substance of knowledge and the pathway to it are, or can be, inferred from sacred religious texts, making such knowledge religious by nature.

A matter not mentioned in any religious text, be it the Qur'an, ḥadīth, or reports from the infallibles (a.s.), may still hold religious significance in its application—if beneficial, as an obligatory or recommended act, and if harmful, as prohibited or disliked. However, the knowledge of such a matter itself does not inherently possess a religious character. In other words, while the obligation or recommendation associated with its practice is deemed religious, the subject matter itself is neither religious nor irreligious. These distinctions represent the difference between non-existence and existence, rather than direct opposition, allowing for the possibility of negating both.