Subtleties and Allusions

1) Reality or Representation? Legislation or Creation?

The command to prostrate cannot be considered a literal command. If it were, it would fall into one of two categories: either a legislative command, like “Establish prayer and give zakāt and bow with those who bow [in worship and obedience]” (2:43), or a creative command, as in “Then He said to it and to the earth, ‘Come [into being], willingly or by compulsion.’ They said, ‘We have come willingly’” (41:11). Both possibilities present problems. The issue with the creative command is that it cannot be disobeyed; it is always accompanied by obedience, as whatever God wills creatively, its creation is certain: “His command is only when He intends a thing that He says to it, ‘Be,’ and it is” (36:84). The expression “Be” is not a verbal utterance but rather an act of creation, and in the words of the Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī (a.s.), God’s speech is not a sound or call perceived by the ear, but an act of creation: “…not by a sound that strikes [the ear] or a call that is heard, but rather His speech, glory be to Him, is an act from Him.”(25) From verses such as “They said, ‘We have come willingly,’” it is inferred that God’s creative command not only cannot be disobeyed, but also cannot be carried out reluctantly.(26)

Regarding the legislative command, it is important to note that angels are not subject to religious obligations. Concepts like revelation, prophethood, commands, prohibitions, promises, threats, heaven, hell, obedience, and disobedience do not apply to them. If a being is completely infallible and incapable of sin, then its obedience is necessary, and disobedience, arrogance, and disbelief are impossible for it. Thus, religious obligation, promises and threats, rewards and punishments, glad tidings, and warnings, which are foundational to legislative commands and prohibitions, have no relevance for angels. This is why, in the Qur’an, conventional and legislative laws conveyed through prophets and revealed scriptures are not associated with angels, as evidenced by verses like “I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me” (51:56), which do not include angels.

It may be argued that, firstly, concepts such as legislative commands are certainly conceivable for the jinn; like humans, they are subject to legislative and conventional laws, including the revelation of books and the sending of messengers. Secondly, Iblīs is indeed one of the jinn. Thirdly, Iblīs was commanded to prostrate in a legislative manner. Fourthly, both the angels and Iblīs were addressed in a unified command to prostrate. Given these four points, how is it that the command to prostrate is legislative for Iblīs but not for the angels?

The response is that, firstly, the primary addressees of the command to prostrate were the angels, with Iblīs included among them. Since the main and predominant addressees (the angels) are not subject to divine legislative rulings, the original nature of the command was not legislative. Secondly, the possibility that the command was legislative for Iblīs does not necessarily mean that it must be interpreted that way. Thirdly, establishing a distinct legislative command specifically for Iblīs would require clear evidence, which has not been conclusively demonstrated, though some have suggested this is implied by the verse: “When I commanded you” (7:12). Fourthly, interpreting a single command as having both legislative and figurative elements contradicts its apparent meaning and would require substantial proof, which has not been provided thus far.

The conclusion is that viewing the command to the angels as real, whether legislative or creative, presents significant issues that cannot be resolved. Since a third type of real command is inconceivable, the literalness of the command to prostrate must be set aside, and it should be understood figuratively. Although legislative and creative commands are incompatible with one another, they are not inherently contradictory, making their rejection feasible.

However, interpreting the command to prostrate allegorically does not imply that the actual command did not take place or that it is merely a fabricated narrative with no real-world counterpart. Rather, the allegorical interpretation conveys that a profound, unseen truth is being illustrated through a tangible form. This is akin to the verse in Sūrah al-Ḥashr regarding the Qur’an’s descent upon a mountain, causing it to crumble: “If We had sent down this Qur’an upon a mountain, you would have seen it humbled and coming apart from fear of God” (59:21). This depiction is certainly metaphorical, intended to illustrate that the mountain would be unable to bear such a profound revelation. No actual Qur’an was revealed to a mountain, nor did any mountain shatter under its weight. This is clarified at the verse’s end: “These are the parables We present to the people, so that they may reflect (laʿallahum yatafakkarūn).”

At the end of Sūrah al-Aḥzāb, it states: “Indeed, We offered the Trust (interpreted as knowledge, wilāya, the Qur’an, religion, obligation, divine teachings, or the principle of fulfilling the trust as mentioned in law, as one of the religious injunctions) to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they declined to bear it and feared it; but man undertook to bear it. Indeed, he was unjust and ignorant” (33:72-73). The verse does not suggest that God literally presented the trust to these entities and they refused it; rather, it alludes to the immense weight of the trust, emphasizing that the heavens are incapable of bearing it, whereas man, due to the expansiveness of his being, the immaterial nature of his soul, and his unique potential, surpasses the heavens, earth, and mountains in capability.

Note: The command to prostrate differs from the presentation of the trust. In the matter of prostration, some obeyed (in whatever sense obedience is considered in such contexts), while others refused; those who obeyed were praised, and those who refused were condemned. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the prostration is analogous to the presentation of the trust in all aspects. A similitude may closely resemble one aspect while differing significantly in other aspects.

In any case, the main point in the story is that the station of humanity is so elevated that neither angels nor other creatures can reach it. (This loftiness pertains to the abstract spirit of man, not to his physical body or materialistic soul.) The highest station in the realm of possibility is that of humanity and divine vicegerency, a position before which even the angels humble themselves, while Satan seeks to obstruct the path for ordinary human beings from following the straight path. To ensure that this profound reality is understood by human beings, God has illustrated it in the form of a parable: the command for angels and Iblīs to prostrate before Adam, with the angels obeying and Iblīs rebelling against it.

However, just because a verse is interpreted as a parable due to specific indications or reservations, or because the Qur’an uses metaphors as affirmed in verses like “And indeed We have set forth for mankind in this Qur’an every kind of parable” (30:58) it does not automatically justify interpreting other verses that appear as real and external stories as similitudes. This requires additional evidence and indications.

Therefore, the argument by Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn Jabal ʿĀmilī, who uses verses indicating metaphors in the Qur’an, such as “Then He said to it and to the earth, ‘Come [into being], willingly or by compulsion.’ They said, ‘We have come willingly’” (41:11), to interpret such commands metaphorically,(27) is incorrect. The issue does not arise with the creative command in this verse, nor with the reality and creative nature of the obedience of the heavens and the earth, as the Qur’an attests that all existents glorify God and possess awareness and perception: “There is not a thing except that it exalts [God] by His praise, but you do not understand their [way of] exalting” (17:44).

Notes:

a) The type of infallibility that makes religious obligation impossible is the absolute infallibility, where disobedience is inherently impossible. However, the type of infallibility that permits disobedience but ensures it does not occur, such as that possessed by infallible humans, is compatible with religious obligation.

b) If the infallibility of angels is the first type, where disobedience is impossible, then religious obligation is not feasible. But if their infallibility is of the second type, where disobedience is possible yet does not occur, religious obligation remains compatible.

c) Not all infallible angels are alike. An angel that is wholly immaterial and purely intellectual cannot disobey and is not subject to conventional religious obligation. Conversely, an angel that possesses the immateriality of the soul, though still infallible, can both potentially disobey and be subject to religious obligation.

d) The interpretation of the command to prostrate as metaphorical hinges on the idea that the commanded angels possess a level of infallibility where disobedience is impossible. If this is not the case, the event should be understood according to its apparent meaning, where Iblīs’s refusal is seen as conventional disobedience. Thus, there would be no necessity to interpret the command as a metaphor.

2) Characteristics of the Prostration of the Angels

The verses related to the command of prostration are of two types: The first type only conveys the command to prostrate, while the second type, in addition to the command to prostrate, includes the manner of prostration, its swiftness, and promptness. The first type is like the verse under discussion and the verses in Sūrah al-Aʿrāf (7:11), Sūrah al-Isrāʾ (17:61), Sūrah al-Kahf (18:50), and Sūrah Ṭāhā (20:116), in which only the principle of prostration is commanded. The second type is like: “So they fell down before him in prostration” (faqaʿū lahu sājidīn), which appears in Sūrah al-Ḥijr (15:29) and Sūrah Ṣād (38:72); meaning that it is necessary for the prostration to be in the manner of falling down and collapsing, similar to what is mentioned about the parents and brothers of Joseph (a.s.): “And they fell down before him in prostration” (wa kharrū lahu sujjadan) (12:100), and like what is mentioned about the believers of God: “When the verses of the Most Merciful are recited to them, they fall down in prostration and weep” (idhā tutlā ʿalayhim āyāt al-raḥmān kharrū sujjadan wa bukiyyan) (19:58), and similar to what is mentioned about the repentant magicians who had a good end: “And the magicians fell down in prostration” (wa ulqiya al-saḥaratu sājidīn) (7:120). Since the angels hastened in complying with the divine command and carried it out without delay, as the Noble Qur’an expresses the immediate sequence of compliance with the command using the word “fa” (fāʾ), it becomes clear that the angels maintained both promptness and swiftness and also observed falling down and collapsing; because they immediately carried out what they were commanded to do, meaning they swiftly complied with the command “So they fell down before him in prostration” (faqaʿū lahu sājidīn).

Note: Just as the Islamic nation is not only obligated to hold fast to the firm rope of God, but is also commanded to do so without division and in a state of unity, the angels also not only all prostrated, but prostrated together in a state of congregation. These two points—the prostration of all and the congregational prostration and lack of division among them—can be inferred from the two words kulluhum and ajmaʿūn, one of which refers to the generality and the other to the unity and togetherness of the angels.

3) The One to Whom the Angels Prostrated

After it has been established that Adam (a.s.) was the one to whom prostration was made, and not merely the qibla or the ultimate object of prostration, there are two possibilities regarding what aspect of Adam the angels prostrated to: One possibility is that they prostrated to the actual person of Adam, and the other is that they prostrated to the legal personality of Adam, specifically the station of humanity.

The apparent meaning of some words in the verse under discussion seems to confirm the first possibility, especially the mention of Adam. However, there is substantial evidence for the second possibility—prostration to the station of humanity, applicable in every era and to every individual to whom it applies:

a) The mention of the prostration incident following the story of vicegerency suggests that the one who holds the station of vicegerency is the one to whom the angels prostrated. It was previously mentioned in the exegetical discussions of verse 30 that vicegerency was established for the perfect human, not specifically for Adam. Thus, the prostration was directed toward the perfect human, even if he is not Adam.

b) The verse: “And We have certainly created you, [O Mankind], and given you [human] form. Then We said to the angels, ‘Prostrate to Adam’; so they prostrated, except for Iblīs…” (7:11) indicates that the addressees in this verse are all human beings. Instead of stating, “We created Adam and gave him form, and then commanded the angels to prostrate to him,” it states, “We created you and then gave you form, and then commanded the angels to prostrate to Adam.”

The apparent meaning of this kind of expression is that Adam was made the one to whom prostration was done as an exemplar of humanity.

It may be argued that this statement implies that all human beings, not just the perfect human beings, have been made the ones to whom the angels prostrate, because the addressees in this verse are clearly all human beings, and the pronoun “you” (kum) includes everyone.

The response to this is, firstly, that certain verses of the Qur’an take precedence over others regarding the term “human,” and by restricting the subject, exclude those who are only human in appearance, census, and outward identification from the reality of true humanity. For instance, the verse: “They are only like cattle; rather, they are more astray in [their] way” (25:44), the verse: “the devils of mankind” (6:112) and the verse: “So they are like stones, or even harder in hardness” (2:74). These verses exclude the aforementioned group from the reality of true humanity.

Secondly, the angels have various ranks, just as prostration, bowing, humility, and obedience have different levels. All believing humans have a share in the obedience of some angels, similar to what has been narrated about the lowering and placing of the angel’s wing in honor of the pursuit of correct and beneficial knowledge.(28)

The purport of the verse “Because You have put me in error, I will surely sit in wait for them on Your straight path…” (7:16) and the content of the verse “He said, ‘My Lord, because You have put me in error, I will surely make [disobedience] attractive to them on earth, and I will mislead them all…’” (15:39) indicate that Satan’s declarations, following his arrogance and refusal in the face of the command to prostrate, reflect his spite and resentment towards all humans. This suggests that the origin of his resentment, tied to the prostration incident, was not specifically related to Adam alone.

It could be argued that these verses, like the previous verse, indicate that the prostration was directed at all humans, not just the perfect ones. The answer remains the same: every true human shares in the humility of some angels.

One of the lessons from this story is that what matters to God, the Glorious, is human servitude and adherence to duty—being as God desires, not as we desire ourselves to be. Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.) said:

After God commanded Iblīs to prostrate, Iblīs said: “By Your might, if You excuse me from prostrating to Adam, I will worship You in a way that no one has ever worshipped You before: la aʿbudannaka ʿibādatan mā ʿabadaka aḥadun qaṭṭu mithlahā.” God responded: “I love to be worshipped in the way I want (not in the way you want): innī uḥibbu an uṭāʿa minnī ḥaythu urīd.”(29)

If someone does not follow this principle, it becomes clear that they are not truly a servant of God but are instead a slave to their own desires, trapped in their egoism. Instead of aligning with servitude and duty, they become ensnared by their instincts.

5) The Explanation of Ṭabrisī and its Critique

Ṭabrisī, may God have mercy on him, considers the verse under discussion as evidence of the superiority of Adam over all the angels. He argues that the command of prostration indicates that Adam has precedence over the angels, as it is not permissible to give precedence to an inferior over a superior. Since this statement is based on the notion that the angels’ prostration to Adam was a form of reverence and acknowledgment of precedence, he further explains: If this were not the case, firstly, there would be no justification for Iblīs’s refusal to prostrate or his statement, “Do You see this one whom You have honored above me?” (17:62) and “I am better than him” (38:76). Secondly, it would have been obligatory upon God to clarify to Iblīs that this command was not intended as reverence and precedence for the human, to prevent any misunderstanding that could lead to disobedience. This would have avoided the provision of grounds for his refusal and opposition due to a mistaken understanding of the command to prostrate.

The final part of this statement is flawed because the perfect servant is one who obeys the command of God, regardless of whether they fully understand its reasoning or not.

6) Is Iblīs a Jinn or an Angel?

Exegetes have two opinions regarding whether Satan is a jinn or an angel. The widely accepted view among the Imamites is that he is a jinn, and scholars like Shaykh al-Mufīd (may God be pleased with them) have presented several proofs for this:

a) The explicit statement of the Qur’an: “He was from the jinn and he disobeyed the command of his Lord” (18:50). There is no doubt that kāna in this verse does not mean ṣāra (became), so it cannot be argued that Satan, after disobeying the command to prostrate, became one of the jinn. This is because disobeying God and opposing His command does not alter the essential nature of the disobedient being from angel to jinn, as there is an essential and categorical difference between angels and jinn, and the existence of an abstract commonality between the two does not necessitate a categorical unity.

b) God has established specific rulings for the jinn category that do not apply to angels, such as their resemblance to humans and being equated with them in verses like: “I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me” (51:56) and “Then which of the favors of your Lord will you deny?” (55:13). Additionally, the jinn have offspring, as derived from verses like: “Do you take him and his offspring as allies?” (18:50) and they are divided into believers and disbelievers, as mentioned in Sūrah al-Jinn. Such characteristics and rulings do not apply to angels.

Therefore, it is not possible to consider the jinn as a subgroup of angels.

c) The effects that are specific to angels and do not exist in jinn; such as the characteristic of infallibility (ʿiṣma), which is derived from the verse “They do not disobey God in what He commands them, and do whatever they are commanded” (66:6). Considering the disobedience of Iblīs, we can conclude based on the first form that he is not one of the angels: Iblīs disobeyed, and no disobedient one is an angel. Therefore, Iblīs is not an angel. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the second form: Iblīs disobeyed, and no angel disobeys. Thus, Iblīs is not an angel.

Also, the characteristic of messengership, which is mentioned for all angels in the verse “Praise be to God, Originator of... Who made the angels messengers…” (35:1) (considering the alif and lām in al-malāʾika), indicates that the station of messengership is incompatible with disobedience.

These aspects negating Iblīs being an angel are also narrated by Shaykh Ṭūsī (may God’s pleasure be upon him), then he responds to aspects that are not befitting the lofty status of this great exegete.

This sage considers those who have not engaged into religious knowledge to be outside the house of divine knowledge, and those who have engaged in it but have not found pure demonstrative proof in all principles to be in the vestibule of the house of religious knowledge, not fully acquainted with the master of the house. He considers those who have excelled in this knowledge and gathered all the necessary demonstrative proofs to be fully acquainted with the sultan of the house. He considers the pinnacle of such knowledge, companionship, and acquaintance to be the share of the prophets, and the lower degrees of it to be the share of their true followers and the sages. Just as the prophets have different ranks, some of them have observed their Lord from afar, as he said: “From afar, the Lord appears to me,” and some of them have witnessed their Lord from near. He says: One who has no realization in the knowledge of God, but rather utters the name of God based on imitation or imaginary perception, is, in my view, outside the house of knowledge and far from it.

Regarding the first aspect, he says that kāna (“was”) means ṣāra (“became”), indicating that Iblīs was previously one of the angels. Even if kāna is taken to mean itself, Iblīs being a jinn does not contradict him being an angel, because it has been said that the jinn are considered one of the groups of angels, as they were the treasurers of Paradise, or they were called jinn due to their being hidden from the sight of the eye.(30) This statement is rejected by what has been mentioned before, that jinn and angels have an essential difference.

Regarding the second aspect, he says: Firstly, Iblīs having offspring has been established through a solitary report (khabar wāḥid).(31) Secondly, assuming the authenticity of the chain of transmission, this report does not prevent God from having placed the desire for intercourse in one of the angels, namely Iblīs, to make his duty more difficult, and there is no reason to consider it far-fetched.(32)

The response to this critique is that what indicates Iblīs having offspring is not limited to the narration, but first and foremost, it is the verse “Do you take him and his offspring as allies” (18:50). However, one angel possessing the desire for intercourse without the other angels having even a weak level of it is incompatible with their essential unity. That is, Iblīs having offspring itself is evidence that he has a separate essence.

Regarding the third aspect about the infallibility of angels, he says: What indicates the infallibility of angels is related to the keepers of the Fire and has no connection to the angelic kind in general. Because God states at the beginning of the incident: “…over it are [appointed] angels, stern and severe,” and then He says: “They do not disobey God…” (66:6). And regarding the messengership of angels, he says: The general meaning of the verse “Who made the angels messengers” is restricted by the verse “God chooses messengers from among the angels” (22:75), because the word “from” (min) necessitates distinction.(33) That is, some angels are messengers, not all of them. Inevitably, the proposition of angelic messengership will be a particular affirmative (ījāb juzʾī), not a universal affirmative (ījāb kullī), and a syllogism lacking a universal proposition does not yield a conclusion.

The response to the first part of this aspect is that if we accept that the verse “over it are [appointed] angels, stern…” only indicates the infallibility of the keepers of Hell, then the angels in charge of the perceptible Paradise, and above that, will certainly be infallible, because their existential rank is higher than the keepers of Hell. On the other hand, the verse “And they say, ‘The Most Merciful has taken a son.’ Exalted is He! Rather, they are [but] honored servants. They cannot precede Him in word, and they act by His command” (21:26-27), is universal and includes all angels.

One might attempt to refute this generality by citing the story of the angel Fiṭrus, who was allegedly exiled to earth, but this story has neither an authentic chain of narration nor any indication of its reliabil ity. This is because such reports, even if assumed to be authentic, are not valid in matters of belief. And even if they are authoritative in and of themselves, they must be presented to the Qur’an like other non-definitive narrations, and if they contradict the general principles of the Qur’an, they should be set aside, and their knowledge should be left to their people.

The answer to the second part, i.e., the verse “God chooses messengers from the angels and from mankind” (22:75), is that: The repetition of the word min (from) in “and from mankind” gives rise to the possibility that the first min is for denoting genus and the second is for division, and the meaning of the verse is that God chooses the genus of angels for messengership, but He selects only some of the humans for this position.

One might object that firstly, on what basis should the first min be for denoting genus and the second for division? Secondly, the first min being for genus only indicates that God selects messengers from the genus of angels, and it does not indicate that all angels are messengers, and essentially, this is the requirement of selection and choosing.

The answer is that firstly, the repetition of the word min indicates a difference in its meanings or allows for it; otherwise, there would be no reason for repetition. Secondly, the main focus of the discussion is to critique the statement of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (may his soul be sanctified), who derived division from the aforementioned verse, not to prove universal affirmation. The point is that it is possible that the aforementioned verse does not indicate division, not that the mentioned verse indicates generality. Thirdly, the selection of all angels from among the creatures does not contradict the requirement of selection, because all angels are a part of the creatures and some of them.

The message that is presented in the verse “God chooses messengers from among the angels and from among mankind” is about the message in revelation and the conveyance of revelation, and its specificity to some of the angels does not contradict the absolute message that is presented in the verse “He made the angels messengers,” such that it would particularize it. The explanation for this is that the content of the verse “He made the angels messengers” is that all angels are messengers and possess the absolute message, whether they are like Isrāfīl (a.s.) and the agents under his command, who are responsible for the message in sustenance, or like ʿIzrāʾīl (a.s.) and the messengers under his command, who possess the message of seizing souls: “Our messengers take him” (6:61), or like the noble recorders who are responsible for recording the beliefs, morals, and actions of human beings, or like Gabriel (a.s.) and the angels under his command who are responsible for conveying revelation, about whom God, the Glorified, has mentioned with special greatness, saying: “By the hands of noble and virtuous envoys” (80:15-16).

Whereas the first verse is only related to the last type of message. So, there is no contradiction between the two, such that one would particularize the other. Of course, one must be committed to the fact that the absolute divine message, even if it is not in conveying prophetic revelation, necessitates the infallibility of the messenger; otherwise, one cannot prove the general infallibility of the angels from the verse “He made the angels messengers.”

7) The Reason for Satan’s Opposition to the Divine Command

Iblis’ refusal to prostrate was due to arrogance, not compassion or any inability to carry out the command. The Qur’an states: “He refused and was arrogant and became one of the disbelievers.” This refusal stemmed from his materialistic view, reliance on ignorant analogies, prejudice, and egoism, which manifested in his statement: “I am better than him. You created me from fire and created him from clay” (38:76). The phrase “he became one of the disbelievers” indicates that this arrogance and self-conceit were forms of hidden disbelief within Iblis that surfaced during his test. Although he worshipped God for six thousand years, his apparent monotheism masked an inner, concealed disbelief, suggesting that his disobedience was not a sudden change but a revelation of his true nature.

The Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī (a.s.), in the Khuṭbat al-Qāṣiʿa, comments on this, stating: “Take heed from what God did to Satan, when He nullified his long work and great effort. He had worshipped God for six thousand years,(34) yet he became arrogant for a single moment.” This implies that Iblis’ good deeds were real but were nullified by his arrogance, which aligns with the notion that kāna (“was”) in the phrase kāna min al-kāfirīn (“he was of the disbelievers”) means ṣāra (“became”).

The answer lies in distinguishing between hypocrisy (nifāq), hidden disbelief (kufr mastūr), apostasy (irtidād), and manifest disbelief (kufr mashhūr). Hypocrisy refers to disbelief in the heart and actions, while outwardly displaying faith in speech and conduct. Hidden disbelief entails a rebellion against the necessity of obedience and servitude; it resides within a person’s nature but remains buried and concealed, such that neither the person nor others are aware of it. This hidden disbelief emerges in the context of a trial, rather than suddenly occurring. Apostasy, on the other hand, represents newly occurring disbelief rather than manifest disbelief—it arises during a trial, not from a previously hidden state. Manifest disbelief contrasts with hidden disbelief as it is clearly visible to both the individual and others. To reconcile the apparent meanings in the verse, the Khuṭbat al-Qāṣiʿa, and similar sources, it is evident that Iblīs’ disbelief was of the hidden type, rather than hypocrisy, apostasy, or manifest disbelief.

In any case, Satan’s defiance of the command to prostrate was not due to external temptation—no one seduced him. Instead, the cause was internal; he harbored an inherent desire for greatness, and his devilry was hidden within him. The emergence of the perfect human being—serving as a criterion to distinguish true believers from imposters and to separate the wicked from the righteous—unveiled this internal reality, exposing his true nature. As Amīr al-Muʾminīn (a.s.) described, he was “the leader of the obstinate ones” (imām al-mutaʿaṣṣibīn),(35) indicating that he did not follow anyone else and was not influenced by an external leader or factor.

The case of Iblīs demonstrates that arrogance and pride before God are the gravest of sins, as they directly lead to disbelief. While neglecting a single prostration or prayer is indeed a major sin, it does not necessarily result in disbelief. Disbelief becomes evident when the reason for disobedience is questioned. God, the Glorified, sought a confession from Iblīs, saying: “I commanded you, and you heard My command, so what prevented you from carrying out My order: What prevented you from prostrating when I commanded you?” (7:12). The response from Iblīs was not, “Your command did not reach me, and I was ignorant of it,” which would not have amounted to disbelief. Instead, he retorted, “In my view, You should not have given such a command!” This represents ijtihād (independent reasoning) against the divine text.

Even if Iblīs and the angels were both initially unaware of the high station of humanity (assuming the command to prostrate came before the teaching of the names), Iblīs did not engage in a sincere inquiry as the angels did. Rather than acknowledging God’s freedom from imperfection and trusting His wisdom in commands, Iblīs arrogantly objected, asserting, “I am superior to Adam!” In contrast, the angels, being protected from arrogance, both inquired genuinely and acknowledged God’s wisdom.

Note: Protection from arrogance is not exclusive to angels: “…and the angels, and they are not arrogant” (16:49); rather, anyone who is with God and is ʿindallāhī (close to God) is shielded from the effects of arrogance: “Indeed, those who are near your Lord are not arrogant in His worship” (7:206).

The station of ʿindiyya (closeness to God) encompasses numerous outcomes. Its negative aspect involves being free from arrogance when faced with any truth and justice, while its positive aspect includes many perfections that are discussed in their appropriate context.

It is important to note that the station of being with God can manifest in two ways: either the servant is with God, or a special divine grace accompanies a specific servant. As mentioned in the saying: “The Messenger of God (s.a.w.) was asked, ‘Where is God?’ He replied, ‘With those whose hearts are broken.’”(36) This highlights that being with God is not only a source of unique spiritual strength—“with a Powerful Sovereign”(54:55)— but also a sign of particular brokenness and humility bestowed upon those whom God chooses to be with.

8) Distinguishing Legislative Ugliness from Existential Goodness

The subject matter of the Noble Qur’an sometimes pertains purely to the existential realm, such as discussions about the creation of the heavens, earth, minerals, and plants. In these cases, the focus is on their existential system, without mention of legislative praise, reward, or punishment. At other times, it addresses the realm of legislative rulings, discussing practices like prayer, fasting, and their conditions of validity, wherein their jurisprudential system, including obligatory and situational rulings, is outlined. This also includes the explicit mention of hidden and inner benefits and harms that form the basis of harmonious legislation, making distinction and separation challenging.

The story of Adam (a.s.), and the story of Iblīs, on the other hand, are complex to distinguish and analyze, combining the third type of Qur’anic subject matter. Adam, as a human, and Iblīs, as a jinn, are subject to their own specific obligatory rulings. If their accounts are not separately recounted and the detrimental blending of existential and legislative perspectives is not avoided, attaining an accurate understanding becomes impossible.

For example, Iblīs is a creational (takwīnī) sign of God while also deserving of God’s legislative (tashrīʿī) stoning and curse. Iblīs, being God’s creation, serves as a divine sign and possesses an inherent beauty: “Who perfected everything which He created” (32:7). Thus, Iblīs, like other creations, holds a special beauty from a creational perspective. However, this does not contradict his accursed and damned status legislatively, as Iblīs, endowed with free will, thought, and responsibility, is accountable for his actions. Due to his arrogance and rebellion, he has deserved stoning and curse from a legislative viewpoint.

By distinguishing legislative ugliness from creational beauty and separating the beauty of being a creational sign from the ugliness of becoming a sinner legislatively, one can grasp the profound insights that some wise poets have expressed. From the perspective of Iblīs, lamenting his affliction with stoning and curse and his entrapment in the snare of the divine plan, a poet has articulated:

“He laid the hidden snare of His plot in my path,

Adam was the bait in the middle of that snare’s circle.

He wanted to make me the target of curse,

He did what He did, the earthly Adam was an excuse.”(37)

According to some, in the framework of acts that are free from compulsion and devoid of incarnation and union, everything is merely a pretext. There exists only one light of the divine face, reflected in the world-revealing cup of the soul of the perfect human, from which it multiplies according to the concordances of the horizons:

“The companion, the musician, and the cupbearer are all Him.”

The imagination of water and clay is merely a pretext on the path to God.(38)

Hence, some experts argue that attributing misguidance to God should be understood through the lens of creation, seeing Iblīs as a manifestation of God’s retributive misguidance, not the initial misguidance, which is counted among the negative attributes of the Exalted. The divine exile and cursing of Satan should be explained through the language of legislation, with each aspect having its specific context; the ultimate reconciliation of these views is reserved for another occasion.