The Hidden Disbelief of Iblīs

The phrase “[he] was of the disbelievers” reveals that there was a concealed disbelief within Iblīs that surfaced during the divine test. This is why in Sūrah al-Aʿrāf it states, “He was not one of those who prostrated” (7:11), indicating that he was inherently not inclined to prostrate, not that kāna (was) implies ṣāra (became). A similar linguistic structure is observed in the case of Noah’s son: “He was of those who drowned.” The son had not yet drowned for it to be described in the past tense, but the word fāʾ in fa-kāna (so he was) shows the sequence of drowning as a consequence of refusal and arrogance. This signifies a transformation that occurred as a result of his actions.

However, in Iblīs’ case, there is no evidence to suggest a sudden transformation; instead, there is direct verbal evidence to the contrary: “and what you used to conceal” from the preceding verse. This implies that Iblīs had already harbored disbelief and arrogance, which he concealed until it manifested during the test. Additionally, there is rational evidence suggesting that Iblīs’ disbelief was pre-existing. If he only became a disbeliever at the moment of refusal and arrogance, what then was the nature of his initial temptation? This reasoning supports the view that Iblīs was inherently malicious from the beginning, thereby nullifying the question of what caused his arrogance.

Regarding the first contextual evidence, one might argue that the mere intention to act arrogantly does not constitute actual disbelief (kufr fiʿlī). But taking kāna in its literal sense confirms that Iblīs’ disbelief was already actual before the refusal. Concerning the second contextual evidence, while it might prompt questioning the cause of Iblīs’ disbelief, it does not conclusively prove that kāna does not mean ṣāra. Instead, it highlights the nature of his pre-existing disbelief. Since Iblīs had free will, exploring the reasons behind his arrogance and disbelief does not conflict with his autonomy. To attribute his refusal to a fundamental wickedness implies that his actions were pre-determined, overshadowing the significance of his choice.

Given that Satan was among the believers and worshipped God for six thousand years, as highlighted in the Commander of the Faithful’s Khuṭbat al-Qāṣiʿa,(20) this context negates the apparent meaning of the verse stating that Satan was of the disbelievers. Two interpretations arise:

1. Kāna as Transformation: This interpretation suggests that kāna means Satan became a disbeliever.

2. Foreknowledge of Disbelief: According to many Sunni exegetes, the phrase implies fī ʿilm Allāh (in God’s knowledge), meaning Satan was considered a disbeliever in God’s foreknowledge,(21) as supported by the Prophetic ḥadīth: “Deeds are [judged] by their ultimate outcomes.”(22) This view holds that Satan was among the disbelievers in God’s knowledge due to God’s awareness of his ultimate fate.

Response to these Interpretations:

Firstly, the firm resolve to disobey God at the time of the divine command constitutes actual disbelief (kufr fiʿlī) in terms of belief and dispositional disbelief (kufr shānī) in terms of action. What had become deeply embedded in Iblīs’ inner nature was actual disbelief regarding his belief, not merely a dispositional disbelief. This justifies interpreting kāna in its primary sense, affirming that Iblīs’ disbelief was not a sudden transformation but a pre-existing condition that became manifest.

This type of disbelief is categorized as a form of hidden disbelief (kufr mastūr), wherein the outward appearance does not immediately reveal the inward reality. Such disbelief is only fully exposed under divine testing, making clear the true nature that was always present but not visible. Thus, Satan’s worship and apparent piety over millennia were overshadowed by an inherent, concealed disbelief that eventually revealed itself in the refusal to obey God’s command.

Secondly, the origin of the question is that if human disobedience stems from the external temptation of Iblīs, then what external factor influenced Iblīs’s own disobedience? The response lies in recognizing the distinct nature of jinn compared to humans; meaning that while human disobedience might be influenced by external temptation from Iblīs, it does not necessarily follow that Iblīs’s disobedience, being a jinn and inherently different from humans, must also be preceded by an external factor.

Thirdly, an internal factor, even if it appears as a dominant inclination, does not imply compulsion; Iblīs’s internal disposition—his arrogance and rebellious nature—is enough to lead him astray without external instigation. This internal disposition suffices for his disobedience, rendering an external factor unnecessary and not implying coercion.

The principle of Iblīs’ exception does not imply more than his refusal to prostrate; meaning it does not clarify whether the refusal was excusable or not. Although the term abā (“he refused”) only indicates Iblīs’s act of refusal, it becomes clear that this refusal was not due to forgetfulness, neglect, or ignorance of the ruling or subject matter. However, it does not inherently imply whether this refusal was excusable, as in the verse, “Then they refused to carry us and were apprehensive of it” (33:72), where apprehensive refusal can be seen as excusable, or that it was without excuse. However, the term istakbara indicates that Iblīs’s refusal was rooted in arrogance, not in any valid excuse.

Arrogance is a vice of the soul and a moral defect. Beyond his personal disobedience, Iblīs also had a deeper issue with his heart and beliefs, as indicated by the phrase, “he was among the disbelievers.” This suggests that Iblīs was already a disbeliever, harboring denial and arrogance within his soul, much like the verse: “As for those who do not believe in the Hereafter, their hearts are in denial, and they are arrogant” (16:22). Arrogance involves belittling the truth and looking down upon creation. This vice that afflicted Iblīs set his question, behavior, and actions apart from the refusal of the heavens and the earth, from the inquiry of the angels, and from Adam’s disobedience (as will be discussed further).

Although the disbelief of Iblīs was concealed and only revealed through the test of prostration, it was never inherent to his nature; that is, he was not innately predisposed to an atheistic worldview or inclined towards disbelief and heresy. This is because no accountable being, who bears responsibility for their beliefs, morals, jurisprudence, and obligations on the Day of Resurrection, is created devoid of an innate sense of monotheism. The verse concerning the covenant of God’s Lordship and the servitude of individuals specifically mentions the Children of Adam, but its reasoning is general and encompasses other beings, including the jinn and Iblīs. If any free-willed and accountable being were inherently heedless of God’s Lordship and unaware of their servitude in the divine realm, they could argue on the Day of Resurrection, saying, “We were heedless of this (monotheism),” or they might say, “Our ancestors practiced polytheism, and we simply followed them due to our upbringing and environment.”(23)

Thus, it is essential that every free and accountable being be created upon the nature (fiṭra) of monotheism and faith, not upon polytheism and disbelief, or at the very least, be blank-minded regarding both. The process of acquiring monotheistic knowledge should resemble that of learning any other acquired science, where the mind at the start is like a blank slate: “And God brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers while you knew nothing” (16:78). Therefore, it cannot be claimed that Iblīs’s nature was fundamentally rooted in disbelief, nor does the phrase “and be among the disbelievers” suggest the innate precedence of his disbelief.(24) Rather, it may be inferred from the expression “he refused and was arrogant” that arrogance was not intrinsic or essential to him but rather a trait he adopted, as implied by the linguistic construction with the letters “s” and “t.” This tyrannical trait of Iblīs has a longstanding history, and the chronic nature of this condition can be deduced from the use of the past tense verb “was” (kāna).

A sign of the deep-rootedness and institutionalization of this vice within Iblīs is reflected in the phrase used: “he was of the disbelievers” (kāna min al-kāfirīn) rather than simply stating “he was a disbeliever” (kāna kāfiran). This wording implies his affiliation with a collective of his kind, suggesting that he drew support and solidarity from this group, much like the expressions: “Were you truthful or were you of the liars?” and “Or are you of those who are not guided?” (27:27). Observing the stylistic endings of the verses, which all conclude with sound plurals ending in wāw and nūn or yāʾ and nūn, adds a layer of literary elegance. However, the key point here is that Iblīs constantly sought affirmation from his association with the group of disbelief, even though no other unbeliever had emerged yet, and he deliberately distanced himself from the community of faith, obedience, and compliance with God’s command. The phrase “he refused to be with those who prostrated” (15:31) serves as evidence of this attitude, indicating that he not only refused to prostrate but also rejected membership in the group of those who submitted and prostrated.