Subtleties and Allusions

Completeness and Deficiency of Reception

The proper understanding of the principle of reception, along with analyzing its specific degree, is intricately tied to comprehending the nature of the words and their specific context. Similarly, the completeness or deficiency of reception depends on the completeness or deficiency of the words themselves.

In the Imami tradition, all true and beneficial words trace back to the word of tawḥīd (divine unity). The completeness of the word of tawḥīd is contingent upon adherence to the guardianship (wilāya) of the true upholders of tawḥīd—namely, the infallible and pure Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.). The ḥadīth of the Golden Chain from the Eighth Imam (a.s.) serves as clear evidence that the completeness of the word of tawḥīd is linked to the wilāya of its rightful guardians.

Thus, at every level of existence, the perfect manifestation of God’s tawḥīd is reflected in the perfect vicegerents—the infallible Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.), who represent a single light, with their various forms not contradicting the unity of their essence. The full attainment of refuge and entry into the stronghold of tawḥīd is achieved through embracing the wilāya of these pure monotheists. Adam, the Chosen One (a.s.), while on the Leg of God’s Throne, not only engaged with the words of tawḥīd but also witnessed the names of the perfect monotheists—Muḥammad (s.a.w.), ʿAlī (a.s.), Fāṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn (upon them be the best blessings). He received this understanding in such a way that, through seeking means and intercession by these blessed names, his prayer of tawḥīd became truly effective. Hence, Adam sought means through all those sacred beings.

Unfortunately, just as some Muslims have abbreviated the taṣliya (salutation) by sending blessings solely upon the Messenger of God (s.a.w.), omitting the names of his family and progeny, they have similarly neglected the names of the Messenger’s infallible family and progeny that were inscribed on the Pedestal of the Throne in the story of Adam’s (a.s.) intercession and plea for cure. They have documented the event of Adam’s (a.s.) teaching with an incomplete form of intercession and a curtailed plea for cure.

For instance, in Kashf al-Asrār wa ʿUddat al-Abrār by Khwaja Abdullah Ansari and in Rūḥ al-Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm wa-l-Sabʿ al-Mathānī by Shihab al-Din Sayyid Mahmud Ālūsī Baghdadi, this separation is evident. They differentiate between the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) and his progeny, stating: Adam saw inscribed on the Pedestal of the Throne, “There is no god but God, Muḥammad is the Messenger of God.” When Adam committed the error, he sought intercession through Mustafa and said, “O Lord, forgive me for the sake of Muḥammad.”(198)

The Repentance of the Servant is Surrounded by Two Repentances of God

The repentance (tawba) of the servant refers to his return to God through supplication, expressing obedience, and submission after committing a sin. However, the repentance of God, which signifies His kindness, care, and attention towards the disobedient servant, occurs in two ways: first, by inspiring the servant to repent, and second, by accepting the servant’s repentance.

Thus, there are two repentances from God, and the servant’s repentance is situated between these two acts of divine grace, encompassed by them. In Sūrah al-Tawba, it is mentioned that God inspired His servants to repent and return: “Then He turned to them so they could repent” (9:118), referring to the first act of God’s repentance. The verse under discussion, “So He turned to him”, which is described at the end with the attributes of tawwāb (Acceptor of Repentance) and raḥīm (Mercy), refers to God’s second repentance.(199)

Considering that the second repentance of God, like the servant’s repentance, involves the concept of return, it should be interpreted to include this aspect. For instance, after the servant repents, God returns the mercy that was withheld due to the sin, necessarily implying the acceptance of the servant’s repentance. Simply stating that God’s second repentance is merely the acceptance of the servant’s repentance does not fully capture the essence; while it may be correct to some extent, a more comprehensive understanding is required to do justice to the concept.

In any case, the first repentance of God, which is His special mercy and kindness towards His sinful servant, turns towards the servant, awakening him and prompting him to turn back to God. Without this divine favor, the servant lacks the ability to repent, and such a blessing would not encompass him. Thus, whenever a sinner repents and the grace of returning to the origin of existence is granted, he should know that divine kindness has surely included him, for all blessings originate from God: “And whatever blessing you have, it is from God” (16:53). Until the Raḥmānī (divine) breeze and the holy zephyr blow from His side, the sinful human remains asleep in heedlessness.

If a person, addressed in the blessed saying of Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī (a.s.): “O human… is there not an awakening from your sleep?”(200) wishes to awaken and be included in these divine breezes, he must align himself with the guidance of the Messenger of God (s.a.w.): “Indeed, your Lord has breezes in the days of your time, so expose yourself to them and do not turn away from them.”(201) This statement indicates that it is possible for God to inspire repentance and send His Raḥmānī breeze, yet the sinful human, through his free will, might still reject it and turn away.

Repentance and the Views of the Theologians

Repentance is a concept rooted in the shared meaning of simply returning. Although the servant’s return to God is distinct from God’s return to the servant, this distinction pertains to the specifics of each instance, which are inferred through various prepositions and contexts signifying the multiplicity of the signifier and the signified. Some exegeses, such as that of Fakhr al-Rāzī, describe repentance as a homonym,(202) which likely means they regard repentance as a shared concept.

Repentance differs from apology because a sinner who believes he has an excuse offers an apology, whereas a repentant person sees his sin as inexcusable. Similarly, repentance is distinct from turning to God (ināba), although these terms can be used interchangeably at times. The difference between repentance and turning to God can be understood from the words of Imam al-Sajjād (a.s.), who said: “O God, if remorse is repentance to You, then I am the most remorseful of those who feel remorse, and if abandoning disobedience to You is turning to You (ināba), then I am the first of those who turn to You.”(203) In this supplication, the determination to abandon sin in the future is termed as turning to God. Subtle distinctions between these terms are detailed in works on ethics, the full exploration of which goes beyond the scope of this text.

For complete and perfect repentance, six central elements and conditions are mentioned in the words of Amīr al-Muʾminīn (a.s.), which are also narrated from Dhū l-Nūn al-Miṣrī.(204) The slight differences between the two narrations do not undermine the unity of their content.

Although there is no essential difference between titles such as al-Tawwāb (The Oft-Returning) and al-Tāʾib (The Repentant), if we assume that divine names are limited, naming God as al-Tāʾib instead of describing Him as such is problematic,(205) since this specific name has not been used for God.

Some actions are exclusively within God’s domain. For example, creating an attraction or inclination towards repentance, which involves a special intervention in the heart of the sinner, is only possible for the Turner of Hearts (Muqallib al-Qulūb). Similarly, accepting the repentance of the repentant and pardoning or lessening his punishment are actions solely reserved for God. Thus, what has been attributed to some rabbis and monks regarding their claims of accepting repentance is considered blameworthy.

The discussion on the reality of repentance and the necessity of its three central elements—knowledge, state, and action—is a topic for the discipline of ethics. However, what needs to be briefly addressed here, and what is essential for judging between expert opinions, is whether the acceptance of repentance is obligatory upon God or not, and what it means for such acceptance to be necessary or not. The analysis of these issues is as follows:

a) Those who deny the rational concepts of goodness and ugliness consider the intellect removed from the position of judging such matters. For them, the intellect does not have a verdict on whether it is obligatory for God to accept the repentance of the repentant. Thus, the determination of goodness and badness lies solely in the hands of revelation, and revelation has only promised that God accepts repentance. Accordingly, this group views the acceptance of repentance as an act of pure grace.(206)

b) There are two main principles regarding the rational assessment of the goodness and badness of actions. Some adopt extreme positions, while others take a moderate approach. The extremists, such as the Muʿtazilites, argue that it is obligatory upon God to accept repentance (yuḥibbu ʿalā Allāh) and that failing to do so would be evil (yaqbuḥu ʿalā Allāh). They overlook the fact that the Infinite Being—Absolute Truth and Pure Existence—is not bound by any law. No law, however contextually appropriate, has power over God, as every existence apart from God is contingent, and all contingent beings are created by and subject to Him. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that any created being could govern or overpower the Creator.

c) Another group that acknowledges the rational assessment of the goodness and badness of actions considers the acceptance of repentance to be a grace, based on some apparent transmitted proofs, and does not view it as a necessity or obligation. Amīn al-Islām al-Ṭabarsī can be seen among this group. Although he does not deny the rational understanding of good and bad like the Ashʿarites, he cites the verse, “So forgive those who have repented and followed Your way, and protect them from the punishment of Hellfire” (40:7) as evidence that accepting repentance is an act of grace. His reasoning is that supplication is not required for something that is necessary or obligatory, as God would carry it out without any supplication.(207)

d) A different group, which believes in the necessity of the effect of repentance and the obligation of its consequences, has responded to the aforementioned transmitted proof by interpreting the content of the verse used as evidence in various ways. Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn can be considered part of this group, as after quoting the words of Amīn al-Islām (may his soul be sanctified), he critiques them as follows:

Firstly, the questioning and supplication are not due to the lack of necessity of the effect of repentance, but rather because the repentant servant doubts whether the conditions for the acceptance of his repentance have been fulfilled. The essential necessity of the matter does not contradict doubt in the realization of its conditions. Secondly, not all questions are posed to request the realization of what is being asked. Sometimes, questions are asked even when there is certainty about the realization of that matter because there is benefit in the act of questioning itself. In asking, the humility and meekness of the questioner are expressed, which are beloved qualities in the presence of the Absolute Master. Moreover, extending discourse with the true Beloved, engaging in prolonged conversation, and expressing one’s needs are desirable acts. This is reflected in the Qur’anic verse, “Our Lord, do not impose blame upon us if we have forgotten or erred” (2:286), where similar aspects have been articulated.(208)

e) A group that believes in the necessity of the effect of repentance being consequential to it outlines their views in a few foundational principles:

First Principle: The system of existence operates through a sequence of cause and effect, meaning that every contingent phenomenon has a cause, and when the conditions and essential elements of causality are fulfilled, it becomes the complete cause of another specific outcome.

Second Principle: Just as the emergence of an effect without a cause is impossible, the separation of an effect from its complete cause is equally impossible. Thus, the detachment of each from the other is inherently unattainable.

Third Principle: The causality of a complete cause can be established through empirical evidence, mathematical proof, philosophical reasoning, or definitive and reliable transmitted evidence.

Fourth Principle: According to reliable transmitted evidence within Sharia, certain matters are complete causes for specific outcomes; these causes align with the domain of practical wisdom.

Fifth Principle: The concept of the necessity of accepting repentance and the obligation to do so is not in line with the Muʿtazila belief of obligation upon God (wujūb ʿalā Allāh), which is an incorrect notion. Nor does it align with the Ashʿarite perspective, as they do not acknowledge the system of cause and effect or the necessary relationship between contingent entities. Instead, the obligation to accept repentance does not imply a mere favor. Repentance, when it meets its conditions, acts as a complete cause for its acceptance, making the acceptance obligatory and necessary. This is akin to how cleanliness results from washing with soap or how quenching of thirst results from drinking water. God has established obedience as a cause for expiation of sin and good deeds as a cause for erasing misdeeds. This does not constrain divine power but reflects the divine will’s determination to make these matters causal for the specified outcomes.(209)

What can be stated to clarify and complete the aforementioned discussion is that the challenge in forming a judgment here does not lie in measuring the effect against the cause, but rather in evaluating its issuance from God, glory be to Him. The central focus is whether God must accept repentance that fulfills all the conditions of acceptance or if the acceptance of complete, perfect, and sincere repentance, which encompasses all the conditions, is merely a favor from God and nothing more.

The Muʿtazilites argue that it is obligatory for God to accept complete repentance, while the Ashʿarites view the acceptance of complete repentance as purely a matter of divine grace. Shaykh al-Mufīd and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (may their souls be sanctified) have endorsed the principle of grace. ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, in some of his theological works, has also inclined toward the principle of grace. Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī has withheld judgment on this issue in some of his writings, such as Tajarrud. The late Shaykh al-Bahāʾī, in his Arbaʿīn, considered the view of al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī (may their souls be sanctified) to be more probable and found the evidence supporting the obligation of acceptance to be flawed and inadequate.(210)

To form a sound judgment on this matter, it is essential to make a final distinction between the different titles and subjects of discussion. Although this final view can be inferred from the statements of Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn, it is a profound legacy from the great Shaykh al-Raʾīs (may his soul be sanctified). Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn himself inherited this crucial insight from that eminent philosopher, consistently displaying scholarly humility toward it and striving to recognize the truth. It is necessary to regard this as a fundamental principle: distinguishing clearly between “obligatory upon God” (wājib ʿalā Allāh) and “obligatory from God” (wājib ʿan Allāh). That is, the acceptance of sincere repentance, complete turning to God, and perfect remorse will certainly and necessarily be issued by God, but not because He is obligated to do so.

For instance, the issuance of justice is necessary from God, not upon God, and the issuance of injustice is impossible from God, not upon God. Similarly, in accepting repentance, such grace from God is essential, but not obligatory upon Him. The inclusion of the term “Merciful” (raḥīm) alongside “Acceptor of Repentance” (tawwāb) in the verse under discussion cannot resolve this theological dilemma. In another verse, as previously noted, the term “Wise” (ḥakīm) accompanies the term “Acceptor of Repentance” (tawwāb). Thus, while Ālūsī’s view of this as a sign of grace aligns with the principle of God’s gracious acceptance—surpassing His just acceptance—it does not fully address the current discussion, where acceptance oscillates between grace and theological necessity.