The Difference Between Knowledge and Belief

The term “companions of the Fire” is frequently accompanied by the phrase “wherein they will abide eternally,” although in some instances it appears without this phrase, such as in verses 29 of Sūrah al-Māʾida, 5 of al-Aʿrāf, 6 and 43 of Ghāfir, and 20 of al-Ḥashr. The word khulūd (eternity) originally denotes prolonged imprisonment but has conventionally come to imply permanence.(250)

The phrase “wherein they will abide eternally” is mentioned without a conjunction as a clarification of “companions of the Fire,” because the clarifier and the clarified are so intrinsically connected that one does not require a conjunction to link them.

The verse under discussion is straightforward, with no ambiguity, similarity, or deficiency in its scope. Regarding verses that condemn disbelief and denial, assigning severe punishment in Hell, it may be stated:

A human being, when confronted with divine verses, finds himself in one of two states: either he knows these are the words of God, the Glorified, in which case disbelief and denial are inconceivable; or he doubts their divine origin, which inevitably leads to disbelief and denial. Consequently, such verses are categorized as mutashābih (ambiguous), which, when presented to their rightful audience, lose their ambiguity and clearly indicate that disbelief and denial of divine verses are never permissible.(251)

It is important to note that this type of verse has a clear meaning, provided that its premises of affirmation are not obscured. Paying attention to the preceding premises plays a crucial role in clarifying the exegetical context of the verse. This context emphasizes that divine guidance, whether in the form of rational proof or reliable transmitted evidence, must reach the obligated human being directly from God. This means that God’s proof must attain maturity in argumentation, free from any signs of immaturity or inadequacy in its premises. Moreover, this guidance must reach the level of the obligated person’s knowledge to become a conclusive proof (ḥujja bāligha). This is referred to in the verse under discussion as “guidance comes to you from Me” (yaʾtīyakum minnī hudan). Consequently, the obligated human has no doubt about the authenticity of the call or the truthfulness of the claimant of prophethood and messengership.

The key point is that knowledge can coexist with disbelief and denial. Knowledge of a conclusion is a psychological state that necessarily follows the attainment of definite premises and preliminaries; no one can claim, after comprehending the definite premises of a matter, “I do not want to understand it.” However, faith and belief are psychological acts that involve the will between the self and acceptance. A person can, after knowing the truth and acknowledging its certainty, still choose not to believe in it. This is akin to what is mentioned in the verse: “And they rejected them, while their [inner] selves were convinced thereof” (27:14) and the verse: “You have already known that none has sent down these [signs] except the Lord of the heavens.” (17:102).

From this analysis, it becomes clear that, firstly, the ultimate dividing factor in all matters is the arrival of divine guidance and the completeness of God’s proof, such that no room is left for doubt, ambiguity, or ignorance for those obligated to follow it.

Secondly, belief in the truth of something cannot coexist with disbelief or denial of that same thing. However, Tafsīr al-Manār has not employed a precise expression in this regard, as it suggests that belief can be combined with disbelief and denial.(252)

Thirdly, knowledge of the truth of something can coexist with disbelief and denial, as is apparent from the verse under discussion and other similar verses, where a group, despite receiving divine guidance, chose to disbelieve or deny it. The difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledge is an awareness of the relationship between a predicate and its subject (ʿaqd), while belief is the internalization of the proposition within the soul of the one who possesses the knowledge. If this distinction between knowledge and belief—one being a product of theoretical reason and the other a product of practical reason—were applied, Tafsīr al-Manār would not have simplified the matter, and others would not have overlooked the nuance.