Subtleties and Allusions

1. The Status of Vows in Islam

In Islamic traditions, it is established that some rulings regarding vows (nadhr) from the codes of previous religious have not been abrogated. However, cases such as the vow of Zachariah (a.s.) and the vow of Mary’s mother (a.s.), their abrogation is either certain or probable.

The vow of Mary (a.s.) was a fast of silence (ṣawm ṣamt): “Eat, drink, and be comforted. Then if you see any human, say, ‘Indeed I have vowed a fast to the All-beneficent, so I will not speak to any human today.’”(19) Such a vow is invalid in Islam.(20) This vow was legitimate and common among the Children of Israel, which is why God presented it as a solution to Mary (a.s.).

The vow of dedicating a child (taḥrīr walad) is either invalid or its establishment and validity have not been confirmed, and its permissibility requires evidence, as it must be consistent with other evidence regarding vows and their rulings.

God mentions favorably the fulfillment of vows by the pure family (a.s.) in Sūrat al-Dahr: “They fulfil their vows and fear a day whose ill will be widespread.”(21) Although the obligation of fulfillment is not derived from “They fulfil their vows”, from the context of “whose ill will be widespread”, one can deduce that fulfilling a vow whose non-fulfillment leads to widespread evil is obligatory. Even if one cannot prove the obligation of fulfilling vows from this verse, the obligation can be derived from evidence regarding the prohibition of breaking vows and the fact that breaking a vow requires expiation (kaffāra). This is because the obligation to perform an act has a rational necessity, namely the prohibition of abandoning it, just as the prohibition of abandonment has a rational necessity, namely the obligation to perform. Of course, in such cases, the single religious duty has a single reward and punishment.

In any case, the general principle is that if Islam does not invalidate a ruling from previous religious laws, that ruling remains valid. This general principle has a fundamental role in jurisprudence (fiqh). Therefore, in the evidence of subsequent religious law, it must be discussed whether an absolute vow is established or whether a vow must be conditional.

Remember: 1. The current discussion is not about the necessity of the preferability of the vow’s object, just as the scope of “They fulfill their vows”(22) does not consider its preferability.

The condition of preferability of the vow’s object, or whether its being less preferable is an impediment, will be discussed in its appropriate place.

2. Absolute and Conditional Vows

Sayyid Murtaḍā and a group of earlier jurists believed that an absolute vow (nadhr muṭlaq) is not valid; they even claimed consensus on this matter. Thus, if someone says “I owe it to God to fast such and such” or “to pray such and such,” such a vow would not be valid. Rather, they held that a vow must necessarily be conditional,(23) either as thanksgiving or as deterrence.

There is no disagreement among jurists regarding the validity of conditional vows, whether in the form of thanksgiving or deterrence, as both consensus has been claimed on this matter and the general evidences include it.(24)

Regarding absolute vows, while Sayyid Murtaḍā claimed consensus on their invalidity,(25) the majority of jurists accept the validity of such vows. The general evidences are also free from restrictions. In the verse under discussion, the vow is absolute.

They have derived from the authentic narration (ṣaḥīḥa) of Manṣūr ibn Ḥāzim from Imam al-Ṣādiq (a.s.): “If a man says: ‘I must walk to the House of God,’ while he is in the state of ritual consecration (iḥrām) for pilgrimage, or ‘I must offer such and such sacrifice,’ it is nothing until he says: ‘I owe it to God to walk to His house,’ or says ‘I owe it to God to enter the state of ritual consecration for pilgrimage,’ or says: ‘I owe it to God such and such sacrifice if I do not do such and such’”(26) that an absolute vow is not valid, and they have restricted the general evidences of vows with this narration. However, this meaning cannot be derived from the mentioned narration, because the invalidity of the vow mentioned first in the narration is not due to it being unconditional, but rather because it lacks “for God” and is absolute in this respect.

In summary, it cannot be determined from the internal structure and meaning of the narration whether the invalidity of the vow is due to the absence of the noble phrase “for God” (lillāh) or due to the absence of a condition; certainty about either requires evidence, therefore the primary general evidences remain in their original force.

3. The Position of Valid Conditions

In the matter of “conditions” (shurūṭ), there is a discussion about whether an initial condition is valid or whether it must necessarily be within a contract. Fundamentally, a condition refers to an implicit commitment, and they do not call an independent and direct commitment a condition, therefore initial conditions are not valid, and “the believers are bound by their conditions”(27) is not evidence for the establishment of initial conditions.

The author of al-ʿUrwat al-Wuthqā(28) considers initial conditions to be valid like conditions within a contract. Therefore, the issue of insurance and similar matters is completely resolved through “the believers are bound by their conditions,” just as it can be established through other evidence, such as “Keep your agreements”,(29) and that aspect which considers a condition as a commitment within a commitment is not correct.

Note: The matter of insurance and similar issues can possibly be resolved by examining some specific evidence and particular narrations.