Subtleties and Allusions

1. Islam, the Reviver of Judaism and Christianity

Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ states: If Islam and the Qur’an did not exist, no trace of Judaism and Christianity would remain, because Judaism and Christianity have been distorted, and the corrupted Torah and Gospel do not consider Mary (a.s.) to be virgin and make inappropriate accusations about that noble lady. They portray some prophets as wrestling with God and attribute some moral impurities to them. Such content causes no rational and wise person to consider these books as divine scripture, thus they would become isolated and disappear. However, the Qur’an explicitly declared Mary’s (a.s.) virginity, purity, and chosen status, spoke of the prophets (a.s.) with reverence, addressed the infallibility of Moses and Jesus (a.s.), and on the other hand, defined the boundaries of prophethood, messengership, and the degrees of revelation and inspiration. Thus, Mary’s (a.s.) honor was purified and the divine religions were reconstructed.(214) Indeed, it was the Qur’an that revived the Torah and Gospel and granted them the honor of permanence, as it expressed their original enduring identity.

2. The Negative Attributes of Prophets (a.s.) in Expressing Knowledge

1. The prophets (a.s.) do not speak of their own accord or based on desire and confused dreams (aḍghāth aḥlām); however, people are asleep: “People are asleep; when they die, they wake up”,(215) and their words are based on desire and confused dreams.
2. The prophets (a.s.) do not even speak truth mixed with personal desires; however, ordinary people, even if they do not wish to speak based on desire, mix religious matters with desires and personal interpretations; these people are more inclined to analogy (qiyās) and juristic preference (istiḥsān) rather than complete devotion (taʿabbud tāmm).
3. The words of the prophets (a.s.) are also not through reasoning, independent judgment (ijtihād), or deduction (istinbāṭ). Although the path of independent judgment is neither the path of pure desire nor the path of combining correct evidence with desire, and in this path, analogy (qiyās) and juristic preference (istiḥsān) are also avoided; however, this method is not free from deficiency and error.

The infallible Imams (a.s.) are also free and pure from all three aforementioned categories, and their words are according to divine revelation and inspiration and based on knowledge, because their knowledge is through angels or through the mediation of the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) or another way, through the teaching of the divine essence, and they never speak of their own accord, just as they do not issue legal opinions based on conjecture and analogy.

3. A Discussion About Drawing Lots

Shaykh Anṣārī states at the end of his discussion on the principle of continuation (istiṣḥāb):

“The apparent meaning of its reports [drawing lots] is more general than all the evidence for the principle of continuation; therefore, it must be specified by them, so drawing lots is limited to cases where the principle of continuation does not apply. Yes, drawing lots takes precedence over the principle of choice (aṣālat al-takhyīr) and the principles of permissibility (aṣālat al-ibāḥa) and precaution (aṣālat al-iḥtiyāṭ) when their basis is reason; and if their basis is religious devotion to them in their instances, then the evidence for drawing lots has authority over them as is clear; however, it has been mentioned in its place that the evidence for drawing lots is not acted upon without the support of its general application by the companions or a group of them; and God knows best”.(216)

This means that the evidence for drawing lots is general in relation to the evidence for the principle of continuation, so the evidence for drawing lots must be specified by the evidence for the principle of continuation. The evidence for drawing lots has precedence over the principle of choice and also over the principle of permissibility or the principle of precaution when their basis is reason; but if their basis is devotional evidence, the evidence for drawing lots will have authority. The problem with drawing lots is that this generality has not been acted upon and many specifications have been applied to it, therefore until the companions or a group of them have acted upon it, its weakness is not compensated and it will not have authority.

A number of later scholars, including both students of Shaykh Anṣārī and others, have accepted this view, while others, including Imam Khomeini, have not accepted it and have stated: “If Shaykh Anṣārī had investigated further, he would have concluded that the reports about drawing lots have not been specified”.(217)

Explanation: In Shi’i hadith collections, the phrase “drawing lots applies to every unknown matter” (kull majhūl fa-fīhi l-qurʿa)(218) or “it (drawing lots) is for every problematic matter” (innahā lil-qurʿa li-kull amr mushkil)(219) appears, with the latter phrase being more commonly used in books of jurisprudence and legal theory.

In any case, the phrase “drawing lots is for every unknown matter” (al-qurʿa li-kull amr majhūl)(220) is general and includes uncertainty in both legal uncertainties (shubuhāt ḥukmiyya) and factual uncertainties (shubuhāt mawḍūʿiyya). However, no jurist has resolved legal uncertainties through drawing lots, because legal rulings have their specific sources and evidence. Even if the primary ruling of matters is not clear from the Book and Tradition, doubt comes into play, and in the context of doubt, the traditions themselves have specified that in doubt about obligation, the principle of exemption (barāʾa) applies, and in doubt about “that which is obligated” which cannot be resolved through detailed knowledge and primary doubt, one must exercise precaution, and if doubt is preceded by certainty, the principle of continuation (istiṣḥāb) governs. Therefore, with the existence of practical principles such as continuation, exemption, and precaution, there remains no scope for drawing lots.

In factual uncertainties as well, if the uncertainty is not within the scope of general knowledge, it falls under the primary principle that “everything is unrestricted” (kull shayʾ muṭlaq), and if it is within the scope of general knowledge, either abandoning all is obligatory, like a vessel confused between two vessels, or compliance is obligatory, like confusion about the direction of prayer (qibla). Thus, drawing lots is not resorted to in factual uncertainties either.

Shaykh Anṣārī has observed that the companions rarely act upon “drawing lots is for every unknown matter,” and therefore he thought that they had turned away from it. The companions’ lack of implementation also shows that this statement was surrounded by qualifications that restricted it.

Al-Narāqī, in the sixty-second benefit of the book ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām concerning drawing lots, has cited numerous traditions.(221) From examining these traditions, it becomes clear that the scope of the rule “drawing lots is for every unknown matter” (al-qurʿa li-kull amr majhūl) is not very extensive, because firstly, this rule does not include legal uncertainties (shubuhāt ḥukmiyya). Therefore, if the companions did not act upon drawing lots in legal uncertainties, it is excluded by specification (takhaṣṣuṣan), not by particularization (takhṣīṣan).

Secondly, regarding factual uncertainties (shubuhāt mawḍūʿiyya), it only includes cases of competing rights (tazāḥum ḥuqūq). Thus, if the companions did not resort to drawing lots in factual uncertainties, whether in cases of general knowledge or primary uncertainties that do not involve competing rights, like legal uncertainties, it is excluded by specification, not by particularization.

Competing rights occurs when two pieces of evidence conflict, where there is no place for applying principles (neither principles applicable to legal uncertainties nor principles applicable to factual uncertainties). An example is when two people entrust similar deposits (wadaʿī) of a dirham or clothing to a trustworthy person, and one of these two pieces of clothing or one of the two dirhams is destroyed without negligence or carelessness; here, no principle can solve the problem, therefore it is only a case for drawing lots.

Specific traditions regarding drawing lots mostly concern competing rights, hence Imam Khomeini (may he rest in peace) stated that examining the cases of drawing lots clearly shows that in competing rights, drawing lots is the best solution,(222) and the objection of Shaykh Anṣārī and the doubt of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī and the followers of these two great scholars is not valid.

Note: If a verbal evidence is directed at a specific case, it lacks absoluteness; however, if evidence is presented without regard to a specific case, it can be absolute or general, and the specificity of the case will not cause restriction or particularization.

The practice of rational people, whether monotheists or not, has long been to use drawing lots to determine rights and resolve disputes. Examples include the case of Mary (a.s.), Jonah (a.s.), and the dispute of the Quraysh in building the Ka’ba, where they determined each person’s share by drawing lots, and a portion became the share of the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) and his companions.(223) Also, it was the practice of the Messenger of God (s.a.w.) when intending to travel to select a traveling companion from among his wives by drawing lots.(224)

In the words of Imam Khomeini, drawing lots is not limited to “known reality” (wāqiʿ maʿlūm), just as “possession” (yad) and “report” (khabar) are indicators and represent reality “always or usually corresponding.” Rather, drawing lots is for resolving disputes, whether in cases where there is a known reality - such as an entrusted garment or dirham where the owner is known to God, even though unknown to the trustee and the owners of the garment and dirham, and lots are drawn to resolve the dispute and solve this problem(225) - or in cases where there is no known reality. For example, if they want to initially undertake an action that creates competing rights and in any case has no known reality, lots are drawn, like the drawing of lots mentioned in the Constitution regarding the members of the Guardian Council (jurists and legal experts), where after three years of the first six-year term, half of the members of each group must change by drawing lots and new members must be selected in their place,(226) and similar to the story of Zechariah (a.s.) which had no known reality. Of course, everything is known to God, and God knows what will be accomplished through drawing lots, but here it is not known who has the right and what God’s ruling and divine decree was beforehand.

In the story of Jonah (a.s.), according to some accounts, there was a “known reality” (wāqiʿ maʿlūm),(227) which was to catch the runaway servant (ʿabd ābiq) and throw him into the sea.(228) According to some narrations, which are apparently more authentic and stronger, there was no known reality, and the lots were drawn solely to lighten the ship by throwing someone into the sea.(229) However, God knows where the fate and destiny He has ordained will end.

Imam Khomeini (may God sanctify his secret) himself wrote a treatise on drawing lots and strongly insisted that this new perspective was not presented by Shaykh or Ākhūnd, and their students also followed the path of these great scholars.(230) The conclusion is that, as Imam Khomeini (may God sanctify his secret) stated, firstly, drawing lots is a “principle” (aṣl) not an “indicator” (amāra), because in the language of evidence regarding lots, lack of knowledge and doubt are inherent; like the evidence of principles, such as: “The burden is lifted from what they do not know”,(231) “All water is pure until it is known to be impure”,(232) “Everything that contains both forbidden and permissible is permissible for you forever until you specifically recognize the forbidden in it and leave it”,(233) and “Everything is unrestricted until a prohibition comes regarding it”.(234) Therefore, it has been said: “Lots are for every unknown matter” or “difficult matter” or “ambiguous matter” or “in what is problematic,” some of these expressions appear in Sunni narrations(235) and our jurists have also used them, and this language is that of principle, not indicator; and the practical principle will necessarily be subject to the presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb) in cases where there is a previous state.

Secondly, both the narrations about drawing lots concern competing rights, and among rational people, lots are used in cases of competing rights, and in other words, the narrations about drawing lots are confirmatory (imḍāʾī) rather than foundational (taʾsīsī).

Furthermore, another group of narrations considers drawing lots to be the right of the “ruler” (ḥākim), “guardian” (walī), or “leader” (imām); such as “the governor drew lots between them”(236) and “lots are only for the leader”.(237) The author of Wasāʾil and others have narrated the traditions about lots in the chapter on judiciary,(238) and this indicates our traditionists’ understanding of lots, because disputes are sometimes judicial and their resolution is the responsibility of the judge, and sometimes political where their resolution is the responsibility of the ruler or guardian of Muslim affairs. In such jurisprudential cases, the matter of judiciary is separate from the matter of governance, therefore even one who has not accepted the doctrine of the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) in matters of governance might accept it in judicial matters.

On this basis, some instances of drawing lots in these narrations relate to the political leader of society, meaning the ruler and leader, and other instances relate to the judge, and overall, they concern conflict and competition over rights.

With this explanation, one cannot agree with Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs’s legal opinion regarding lots. He states that when the direction of prayer (qibla) is uncertain, one can use the method of casting lots to determine a direction for prayer,(239) even though lots are for unknown matters and regarding the direction of prayer there exists general knowledge (ʿilm ijmālī), and general knowledge, like detailed knowledge (ʿilm tafṣīlī), establishes religious obligations. The evidence for the establishment of obligation through general knowledge, whether in potential or actual form, will take precedence over the evidence for lots.

Moreover, no one has agreed with Sayyid ibn Ṭāwūs’s legal opinion. This opinion concerns uncertainty about the direction of prayer (qibla), therefore lots cannot be used to determine what is lawful or unlawful, noon or Friday prayer, two uncertain vessels, or which of two women (in case of uncertainty) is a foster-sister or milk-sister. The narrations concerning the mated sheep that say: the lawful meat is distinguished from unlawful meat by lots,(240) does not mean that lots apply in cases of general knowledge (ʿilm ijmālī), rather this is a jurisprudential matter and its ruling is devotional (taʿabbudī).

Even where there is an obligatory uncertainty (shubha wujūbiyya) and in cases of general knowledge where compliance is obligatory but combination is impossible, general knowledge is not binding and lots are applicable; such as in the case of a hermaphrodite (khunthā) whose matter is between two prohibited things, meaning they do not know whether to marry a man or a woman.

In summary:

1. The application of lots, apart from Qur’anic evidence, has two bases in tradition, one set being general and the other set being specific to particular cases. The abundance of general and specific texts, if not reaching the level of verbal or conceptual successive transmission (tawātur lafẓī or maʿnawī), is certainly at the level of widespread transmission (istifāḍa).(241)

2. Consensus on the validity of lots cannot be considered devotional evidence, because with the existence of abundant textual evidence from the Qur’an and traditions, sound reasoning suggests that this consensus has a basis, therefore it will not be purely devotional evidence, and if consensus is claimed, it merely means the agreement of companions on its validity, not argumentation through consensus.

3. The scope of the authority of lots (qurʿa) is in subjects, not in rulings; and also in cases of conflicting rights. However, there is room for reflection regarding the expansion and restriction of rights, whether it includes both the rights of God and the rights of creation, or is specific to conflicting rights of creation.

4. The reason jurists address lots, and also the reason traditionists mention narrations about lots specifically in the chapter on judiciary in the discussion of conflicting evidence, indicates its specificity to legal subjects where precaution is not obligatory, because there is no room for lots in the definitive aspects of general knowledge where precaution is necessary.

5. It is not easy to derive from its evidence that lots are an indicator (amāra), and its nature as a practical principle, which is authoritative for removing confusion during action, is closer to reality.

6. Some have considered lots as an indicator while prioritizing the principle of presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb), which is a practical principle, over it, because the subject of lots is that which is problematic, difficult, etc., and with the application of presumption of continuity, the very subject (i.e., the problem and difficulty) is negated.(242) However, the basic premise that lots are an indicator is incorrect. The investigation regarding principle and indicator, and that doubt in principle is as a subject and in indicator as an instance, and that doubt in some cases of indicator becomes a subject, is the responsibility of the science of principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh).

4. The People of Analogy and Lots

Al-Qurṭubī reports that al-Shāfiʿī, according to some accounts, compared “lots” with divining arrows and rejected it,(243) although according to another account, he considered lots valid(244) and said: Here we abandon analogy (qiyās) to follow the tradition, because tradition states that lots are for anything ambiguous or problematic.(245) The people of analogy, based on “O you who have faith! Indeed wine, gambling, idols and the divining arrows are abominations of Satan’s doing, so avoid them, so that you may be felicitous”,(246) consider lots prohibited because divining arrows are forbidden in the verse, and lots are like divining arrows, therefore they have the same ruling as divining arrows and are prohibited.

Azlām is the plural of zalam or zulam. They used zalam, which was a special arrow, for a type of gambling.(247) There are two views regarding how these arrows (azlām) were used:

1. On some of these arrows, they would write “my Lord commanded me” and on others “my Lord forbade me,” while some were left blank. Then they would mix the arrows and place them in a container. When they wanted to do something, they would draw one of these sticks; if it said “commanded me,” they would proceed with the action, and if it said “forbidden me,” they would abstain, and if it was blank, they would draw again. This was considered a form of divination (takahhul).
2. Azlām was a type of gambling where they would slaughter an animal and prepare ten wooden arrows, marking seven of them with distinct signs indicating the number of shares, while three arrows remained unmarked. If someone’s share was one of these three arrows, they had to pay for the meat while others received it for free.(248) This practice, which is a form of gambling and resembles lots, is forbidden: “Prohibited to you are carrion, blood… and that you seek division by the divining arrows” (5:3),(249) because it is an instance of consuming wealth unjustly, not “trade by mutual consent” (4:29).(250) However, lots in cases of conflicting rights with the consent of the parties or sides is a rational matter.

5. Seeking Divine Guidance (Istikhāra)

In connection with the discussion of “lots,” we can briefly address the practice seeking divine guidance (istikhāra). There are two extreme views regarding istikhāra: On the one hand, Āyatullāh Sayyid Ḥasan Bujnūrdī reports that some have issued legal opinions declaring istikhāra forbidden,(251) just as some have considered divination through the Dīwān of Ḥāfiẓ to be forbidden. He himself, who has adopted the opposite extreme as his position, counts istikhāra among the proofs of monotheism and says: If there were no God and the relationships of matters in the unseen realm were not regulated, how could a problem be solved with one istikhāra.(252)

In the introduction to the chapter on “Pilgrimage” in the noble book al-ʿUrwa, it states:(253) There is no firm evidence for the recommendation and preference of seeking divine guidance (istikhāra) through the Qur’an and prayer beads (as is common practice); likewise, there is no strong evidence, except weak sources, that istikhāra is among divine traditions. The correct and important form of istikhāra is the supplication for divine guidance that appears in the Sajjādiyya. This supplication is not for removing confusion, rather any action, especially important matters, should be undertaken after consultation and after determining the appropriateness of the action and after making a decision, beginning with seeking good from God. However, common forms of istikhāra are for removing confusion; meaning that after consultation, reflection, and thought, if one’s thinking reaches no conclusion, istikhāra can be used to remove confusion, and experience also indicates favorable results.

In summary, no definitive evidence encourages and urges us toward istikhāra in the way that it encourages supplication and intimate discourse for seeking good.(254)

The great jurists mostly deal with the supplication of istikhāra and rarely perform istikhāra. The practice of Sayyid is that they would recite the supplication of istikhāra after consultation and thought, and perform istikhāra to remove confusion.

Note: The prohibition of istikhāra is well-known, and deriving its prohibition from “and that you seek division by the divining arrows”(255) is not straightforward, even though it has been attributed to Muqaddas Ardabīlī’s Zubdat al-Bayān(256).(257)

6. Types of Contention and Dispute

Contention and dispute are of two types: 1. Blameworthy contention where each person seeks to elevate their own desires, not God’s will. 2. Praiseworthy contention which is based on divine criteria and for elevating God’s word, just as occurred in the praiseworthy and commendable dispute regarding the guardianship of Mary. Distinguishing between these two types of contention is not easy, as it is among those matters that are finer than a hair and sharper than a sword.

Even in Paradise, where there is no conflict of any kind, there exists praiseworthy contention: “They will pass from hand to hand a cup wherein there will be neither any vain talk nor sinful speech”.(258) This contention does not arise from rancor or ill-will, for God says: “We will remove whatever rancour there is in their breasts, and streams will run for them”.(259) Until a person is purified of rancor and ill-will, they will not enter Paradise. And regarding Paradise, He also says there is no place for futility, vanity, or sin: “They will not hear therein any vain talk or sinful speech”.(260) Therefore, false contention has no place there; however, the same praiseworthy contention that exists among angels in the Supernal Elite is present: “I have no knowledge of the Supernal Elite when they contend. All that is revealed to me is that I am just a manifest warner”.(261)

7. The Verse Does Not Indicate the Aunt’s Right of Custody

Al-Qurṭubī, in his commentary on the verse under discussion, raises this jurisprudential issue that child custody is the mother’s right; if the mother is not present or for any reason cannot take custody of the child, the maternal aunt (khāla) has more right to custody than other relatives. The basis for deriving this ruling from the verse is that the guardianship of Mary was given to Zechariah, who was Mary’s maternal aunt’s husband.(262)

In response, it must be said that firstly, the verse is not about the right of custody (ḥaḍāna) but rather about guardianship (kafāla); secondly, this guardianship fell to Zechariah through drawing lots, and he happened to be Mary’s maternal aunt’s husband.

Al-Qurṭubī also claims the right of custody for the maternal aunt in his commentary on the verse “Mothers shall suckle their children for two full years,—that for such as desire to complete the suckling—and on the father shall be their maintenance and clothing, in accordance with honourable norms”(263).(264) Yes, discussing this issue is appropriate for the verse in Sūrat al-Baqara, but not for the verse under discussion.