Subtleties and Allusions

1. The Fruit of Monotheistic Belief is the Restriction of Truth to God

In the course of the previous exegetical discussion, it was established that firstly, God speaks only truth, and secondly, truth does not come from other than God but only from Him. According to these two monotheistic principles: a. The divine wayfarer accepts with satisfaction whatever they see in the system of existence, and whatever reaches them or others from God, they consider it the essence of correctness and wisdom, because what is meant by speech is not limited to religious utterances, but rather God’s speech is His action itself, and whatever emerges or appears in the contingent world is God’s word, book, and truth.

The investigating researcher who seeks truth also strives to understand, hear, or discover through demonstrative reason, reliable transmission, or pure mystical witnessing what God has done and commanded.

The result is that the sages in practical wisdom, the philosophers in theoretical wisdom, and the theosophers who combine both theory (thought) and practice (action) will never depart from the sphere of divine tradition, for “What is there after the truth except error?”(658)

2. Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Come Only from God

The truth of true propositions and their veracity in relation to reality is because the world of reality is created by God, just as necessary propositions are also created by God. The attribution of creation to the Creator is sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. If it is said that “four is even” is not subject to making (jaʿl), it is because evenness is essential to the nature of four, and the essential - whether what is discussed in the chapter on universals and Isagoge or what is presented in the chapter on demonstration - is not subject to making (jaʿl). In other words:

The essential quality of a thing has no cause *** And it precedes in intellectual conception(659)

What is meant is that it does not need separate making (jaʿl) or another cause, and the same cause that makes the essence itself makes its essential quality as a consequence. Thus, all these necessary propositions have logical essential necessity, not philosophical essential necessity. All their elements are made, whether essentially or accidentally. Therefore, whatever is truth, veracity, good and beautiful is from God; meaning truth in theoretical wisdom and truth in practical wisdom, all are from God, either directly or indirectly. One who, based on the proximity of supererogatory acts (qurb nawāfil), enjoys complete divine manifestation will never be afflicted by the harm of doubt and uncertainty, and this response is the same prayer that the Prophet (s.a.w.) said: “O God, show me things as they are!”(660)

3. The Relationship Between God’s Action and Truth

All truth is from God, whether in practical matters or in moral and doctrinal matters. The claim is clear in moral and practical matters, but in doctrinal matters too, any true belief and thought from theoretical or practical scientific laws, if they correspond to reality and the matter itself (nafs al-amr), are truth, and every truth is from God. Even reality itself is from God, because reality and the matter itself, however it may be explained, is a contingent existent and every contingent comes from the Necessary (except according to those who consider the matter itself to be God’s essential knowledge).

Regarding the relationship between God’s action and His essence, the Ashʿarīs say “Whatever God does is truth, and truth and good are what God does, and false and evil are what God does not do.”

They do not recognize any other criterion for distinguishing good from evil or truth from falsehood, and they consider human intellect incapable of perceiving truth and falsehood.

Opposite to the deficiency of the Ashʿarīs stands the excess of the Muʿtazilites who say “God must do such and such or be such and such.”

The Imāmiyya, avoiding any excess or deficiency, considers the intellect to be independent in discerning truth from falsehood in many matters of theoretical wisdom, and also in understanding the good and evil of many issues in practical wisdom. However, unlike the Muʿtazilites, they do not consider God to be bound by any law, but rather they consider God’s action to be the source from which every law is derived. For example, the intellect recognizes trustworthiness and fulfilling promises as good, and betrayal and breaking promises as evil, and understands with certainty that God does not break promises. But unlike the Muʿtazilites, they do not say “it is obligatory upon God” (yajib ʿalā Allāh), rather they say “it necessarily follows from God” (yajib ʿan Allāh).

Note: The exposition of this lofty matter is that good and evil are rational, not transmitted, and in any case, they are religious, because the intellect is a complete discoverer, not a ruler, governor or maker. Also, the manner in which good emanates and evil does not emanate from God has been presented in various parts of this book and does not need to be repeated.