Appearance
Subtleties and Allusions
1. The Life of Jesus
The matter of the death and living state of Jesus is, firstly, not a subsidiary devotional issue (furūʿī taʿabbudī) like prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, such that a scholar could issue a legal ruling (fatwā) based on a single report (khabar wāḥid) or the apparent meaning (ẓuhūr) of a verse or tradition. Secondly, it is not among the doctrinal matters (masāʾil iʿtiqādī) that require demonstrative investigation (taḥqīq burhānī), because only the prophetic mission of that blessed being, his being among the resolute prophets (ūlū l-ʿazm), and his possession of a book are among the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) that one must believe in; but belief in his being alive or dead at present is neither among the principles of religion nor among its subsidiary branches (furūʿ).
Thirdly, it is a scholarly matter whose proof or negation requires rational demonstration (burhān ʿaqlī) or reliable transmitted evidence (naql muʿtabar); but establishing rational demonstration in this particular issue is not possible, because from the perspective of reason, both his departure and return are feasible, as is his current living state. Similarly, there is no decisive transmitted evidence (dalīl naqlī jazm-āwarī) at hand, although the apparent meaning of traditions is clearer than the apparent meaning of verses. Within the limits of presumptive evidence (asnād ẓannī), one can say that:
“it appears they have said such-and-such”
“it appears that it is such-and-such”
And there is a difference between these two statements:
One relates to issuance (ṣudūr) and the other concerns signification (dalāla), and these two matters are sometimes identical and sometimes different; that is, sometimes both are certain and sometimes both are presumptive, and sometimes issuance is certain and signification presumptive, and sometimes issuance is presumptive and signification certain.
Likewise, the four Gospels in which the story of the crucifixion and killing of Christ appears were written after his lifetime. That true Gospel of which Jesus gave news: “He said, ‘Indeed I am a servant of God! He has given me the Book and made me a prophet’” (19:30) is different from those that were written by his followers, and infallible reliance on the writings of that personage’s followers is not permissible, because they were not infallible (maʿṣūm) and there is the possibility of error in their reports.
Another proof of the unreality of the four Gospels is the denial of the killing and crucifixion of that personage in the Gospel of Barnabas.(11) This very contradiction shows its lack of infallibility (ʿiṣma), although they do not accept this Gospel.
2. The Illusion of the Widespread Transmission of Christ’s Crucifixion
Proving the crucifixion of Jesus through widespread transmission (tawātur) is incorrect for two reasons:
The chain of transmission (sanad) of the aforementioned report reaches back to a small group who were close observers of that scene, and the matter was confused for them. Certainly, this confusion damages the claim of widespread transmission or its authority (ḥujjiyya).
Widespread transmission is not a rational demonstration (burhān ʿaqlī), because it is an accumulation of presumptions (ẓunūn) and a widely transmitted report (khabar mutawātir) will never be like the principle of the impossibility of the conjunction of opposites (imtināʿ ijtimāʿ ḍiddayn) and the impossibility of negating something from itself (imtināʿ salb shayʾ az nafs khud); that is, the degree of certainty (qaṭʿ-āwarī) of widespread transmission is less than conventional knowledge (ʿulūm mutaʿārif); apart from the fact that in sensory matters (maḥsūsāt) it is possible that sometimes God may miraculously confuse a group about something; or substitute someone’s likeness (shabīh) in their place, just as sometimes some of the angels would appear in the form of Diḥya al-Kalbī.(12) This matter is possible and some individuals thought representation (tamathul) was embodiment (tajassum); but it does not lead to sophistry (safsaṭa) such that someone would say “if we err in our sensory perceptions, the foundation of the authority of reports (ḥujjiyyat akhbār) would collapse, because if the possibility of error is admitted in sensory matters, no sensory perception is authoritative, since it is possible that the narrator erred in transmitting from the infallible (maʿṣūm) or thought a non-infallible to be infallible.” This statement is not correct, because the nature of miracles (iʿjāz) is clear and miracles have a different domain and never invalidate correct epistemology (maʿrifat-shināsī), and its explanation is deferred to its appropriate place.
3. Jurisprudential Analogy as an Instance of Following Conjecture
Jurisprudential analogy (qiyās fiqhī), which is logical analogy (tamthīl manṭiqī), yields nothing more than conjecture (gumān), therefore relying on it is among the instances of following presumption (ẓann) which has been condemned: “They follow nothing but conjectures and they do nothing but surmise” (6:116); “indeed conjecture is no substitute for the truth” (10:36).
Fakhr Rāzī says: Acting upon analogy (qiyās) is not following conjecture (ẓann), because there is definitive and certain evidence (dalīl qāṭiʿ wa yaqīnī) for acting upon it, therefore a ruling that is obtained through analogy is knowledge (ʿilmī) not conjectural (ẓannī).(13)
Fakhr’s statement is the same as that of Shi’i legal theorists (uṣūliyyān) who say “conjecture in the method does not negate the certainty of the ruling” (ẓannat al-ṭarīq lā tunāfī qaṭʿiyyat al-ḥukm);(14) when scientific evidence has been established for the authority (ḥujjiyya) of a conjectural method - such as a single report (khabar wāḥid) - its validity is scientific; but jurisprudential analogy (qiyās fiqhī) (logical analogy [tamthīl manṭiqī]) is not of this type, because not only is there no firm evidence for its authority, but there is firm evidence for its invalidity, so followers of analogy constantly remain in doubt and uncertainty: “They have no knowledge of that. They follow nothing but conjectures.”(15)