Not Providing Reasons for God’s Actions

Jesus (a.s.) says with complete courtesy: “If You punish them, they are indeed Your creatures” (in tuʿadhdhibhum fa-innahum ʿibāduka), whereas the ordinary manner of speech would be to say “if You punish them, it is because they disobeyed You” (in tuʿadhdhibhum fa-innahum ʿaṣawka).

The intention of Jesus (a.s.) is that we cannot mention a cause for Your action and say that because they sinned, You punished them, and if they had not sinned, You would not have had the right to punish them. This statement is based on: “He is not questioned concerning what He does, but they are questioned.”(360)

Explanation: Regarding actions of God that humans have no way of understanding the cause of, one cannot measure God’s action against a law that has been presupposed and consider the Lord obligated to act according to that law, because firstly, if that law is non-existent, it cannot be a criterion for measurement, and if it exists, it is a subset of His creation.

Secondly, divine action is the text of the law and He has no equal: “nor has He any equal”;(361) “Nothing is like Him.”(362) Therefore, one cannot say that God must act according to such-and-such a law.

Thirdly, since that law is God’s action and action does not rule over the agent, no one can make any demand of God. Of course, He Himself promised to take believers to Paradise,(363) so humans are hopeful of His beneficence; or He threatened to punish the wicked, so every evildoer is fearful of His justice. But one can never condemn God to any action and say He must act according to such-and-such a law, because it is said that that law is made by reason and this reason is God’s creation. Does a limited action have dominion over an absolute agent? This supposition is impossible.

The explanation is that:

1. Each and every thing has an essential and inseparable characteristic. Characteristics are not all alike: some are in the realm of being and non-being, that is, theoretical wisdom (ḥikma naẓarī), and some are in the realm of ought and ought not, that is, practical wisdom (ḥikma ʿamalī). Essential characteristic is where the subject is the complete cause (ʿilla tāmma) of the predicate; but if it is only at the level of requirement (muqtaḍī) and not complete cause, that predicate and characteristic is perishable. The goodness (ḥusn) of justice (ʿadl) and the badness (qubḥ) of injustice (ẓulm) are among the essential characteristics of the subject in practical wisdom; but the goodness of truthfulness (ṣidq) and the badness of lying (kadhib) are at the level of requirement of the subject, not its complete causation, and therefore they are separable; that is, the subject called truthfulness requires goodness but is not its complete cause, and therefore in some cases it will become bad; likewise, lying requires badness but is not its complete cause, so in some cases it will become good.

2. Reason (ʿaql), as an illuminating lamp (sirāj munīr), understands these self-evident truths and has law-recognition (qānūn-shināsī) not law-making (qānūn-gudhārī), because nothing other than knowledge is made from a lamp. Justice - whose goodness is essential according to the independent cognitive authority of reason - is placing every thing or person in its proper place; but the place of things and the position of persons has been determined by God, who is the Creator of all things. Therefore, there is no pre-made law called the goodness of justice and the badness of injustice for God to perform His work according to its standard.

3. What is found from the system of creation in the name of justice and injustice, truthfulness and lying - which possess the attributes of goodness and badness at the level of complete causation or requirement - compels the wise reason to issue the verdict that the emanation of justice is obligatory from God (wājib ʿan Allāh), not obligatory upon God (wājib ʿalā Allāh); that is, there is a deep and well-established technical difference between “obligation from God” (wujūb ʿan Allāh), which is the logic of Imami sages (ḥukamāʾ), and “obligation upon God” (wujūb ʿalā Allāh), which is the logic of Muʿtazilī theologians (mutakallimān).